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SUMMARY: 
This thesis focusses on litigation for migrants’ rights in the UK, and in particular litigation 
conducted by lawyers and activists motivated by the cause of promoting and protecting 
migrants’ rights. The thesis conceptualises this form of migrants’ rights activism as ‘cause 
litigation’. The thesis asks the question, what happens when immigration and migrants’ rights 
questions are litigated for political purposes in the UK? In answering this question the thesis 
shows that cause litigation has in some circumstances been able to develop some highly 
significant forms of rights-protecting systemic change. However, the thesis also shows that 
cause litigation is vulnerable to adverse Executive reactions. Executive conduct in the area of 
immigration and migrants’ rights is governed by an overarching imperative to exercise and be 
seen to be exercising control. Cause litigation presents direct challenges to this imperative. In 
response to these challenges the Executive has engaged in both evasion and an increasingly 
aggressive backlash against changes secured through cause litigation and the activity of cause 
litigation itself. This backlash has succeeded in undermining many of cause litigation’s 
achievements and has ultimately diminished the role of cause litigation and the rule of law in 
regulating immigration control in the UK. This is not to argue that the advancements obtained 
through cause litigation are irrelevant; those that survive, albeit in a reduced form, are non-
negligible in the otherwise highly adverse context of the UK’s immigration politics. Cause 
litigation is, therefore, one of the few avenues open for migrants’ rights to be protected and 
advanced, even if it is in a compromised and vulnerable form. It is argued, though, that an 
activism technique that was a response to the political disadvantage migrants’ rights 
campaigners face, by securing practical change without mainstream political support, has 
ultimately not been able to escape from the UK’s adverse immigration politics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
This thesis examines the role that litigation plays in protecting migrants’ rights in the UK. In 
particular, it focusses on the work of lawyers and other activists who, rather than simply 
operating with a traditional cab-rank approach, pursue a form of legal mobilisation in order 
to protect and promote the cause of migrants’ rights. As this thesis will show, this politicised 
legal activism is at the heart of many of the most important developments in immigration law 
in the UK. At the same time, however, it has become increasingly controversial politically, 
with the successes it secures for migrants’ rights running counter to governmental policy and 
the prevailing political consensus on the need for ever tighter immigration restrictions. The 
thesis therefore focusses on both the legal and policy changes that migrants’ rights litigation 
in the UK has brought about and the wider relationship these changes have had with the 
development of the UK’s immigration politics and government policy. 
The thesis builds on previous studies of the influence of liberal norms, such as universal rights 
and the rule of law, in immigration policy,1 and on studies of political litigation and ‘legal 
mobilisation’ in general and for migrants’ rights in particular.2 The thesis contrasts with these 
studies, though, in two ways. Firstly, it does not treat these liberal norms as a constant 
discursive force within the UK’s immigration politics, but discusses the effects of their 
practical activation and mobilisation for a particular cause. Secondly, it argues that in addition 
to securing technical changes to procedure, politicised litigation has in some circumstances 
been able to develop some highly significant forms of rights-protecting systemic change. 
However, the thesis also shows that this litigation is vulnerable to adverse executive 
reactions, as a result of the obstructive role it plays against the executive’s immigration policy 
imperatives. The title’s quote comes from a leading migrants’ rights litigator, interviewed for 
this research, who talked of ‘lifting the wire’ of immigration policy for migrants to come 
                                                          
1 Joppke C, ‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration’ (1998) 50 World Politics 266; Joppke C, 
Immigration and the Nation State: the United States, Germany and Great Britain (OUP 1999); Hampshire J, The 
Politics of Immigration (Polity 2013) 
2 Kawar L, Contesting Immigration Policy in Court: Legal Activism and its Radiating Effects in the United States 
and France (CUP 2015); Sterett S, ‘Caring about Individual Cases: Immigration Lawyering in Britain’, in Sarat A & 
Scheingold S (eds), Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, (OUP 1998); 
Maiman R, ‘Asylum Law Practice in the United Kingdom after the Human Rights Act’, in Sarat A and Scheingold 
S (eds) The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure and Agency in Legal Practice, (Stanford University Press 2005) 
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through. She viewed her work as limited to making small and temporary gaps in an otherwise 
daunting immigration control edifice that would both remain in place and might well spring 
back closed. This thesis examines the extent to which this is the case. 
This introductory chapter will start by setting the scene in which the thesis plays out, before 
discussing the background issues that motivated the study. It sets out the central question 
that the thesis will seek to answer and provides an outline of the key literature that has 
informed it. Finally, the chapter discusses the methodology that the study uses and then sets 
out an outline of how the thesis will progress. 
Background: The Politics of Immigration and Migrants’ Rights in the UK 
In the summer of 2016, as this thesis was being finalised, the UK voted to leave the European 
Union. The single largest issue that drove the Leave vote appears to have been immigration.3 
Since the expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe in 2004, immigration has been elevated to 
one of the major political issues of the day.4 In addition to these underlying concerns, from 
around 2014 onwards a major increase in disordered and deadly refugee migration into 
Europe occurred. The scale both of the numbers involved and the loss of life prompted 
increased media and political awareness of border camps at Calais and in Greece and Italy, as 
well as speculation that the refugees represented a terrorist or criminal threat.5 The repeated 
invocation by the Leave campaign of the need to ‘take back control’ appeared to tap into a 
sense of deep unease about a chaotic and threatening world. 
These developments, though, fit part of a wider context that this thesis will chart. As will be 
shown, the post-War history of UK policy is largely of hostility towards immigration, 
particularly the immigration of Black and Asian populations from the ‘New Commonwealth’.6 
More recently the New Labour government sought to modify this restrictionist policy focus. 
This was done not least through its policy towards eastern European migration, along with 
                                                          
3 Goodwin M, ‘Why Britain Backed Brexit’ (The UK in a Changing Europe, 4 July 2016) http://ukandeu.ac.uk/why-
britain-backed-brexit%e2%80%8f/ accessed 22 September 2016 
4 Bobby Duffy & Tom Frere-Smith, ‘Perceptions and Reality: 10 things we should know about attitudes to 
immigration in the UK’ (Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute, January 2014) https://www.ipsos-
mori.com/Assets/Docs/Publications/sri-perceptions-and-reality-immigration-report-summary-2013.pdf 
5 Daily Mirror, Jihadi terrorists could be hiding in Calais refugee camp ready to enter and attack Britain, (12 
August 2016), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/jihadi-terrorists-could-hiding-calais-8620074 accessed 
22 September 2016 
6 Spencer I, British Immigration Policy since 1939: The Making of Multi-Racial Britain (Routledge 1997) 
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other liberalisation of economic migration. Yet, this was also combined with continued and 
increasing hostility to irregular migration, particularly asylum seeking, against which New 
Labour promised to be ‘as tough as old boots’.7  
Following the collapse of the New Labour project, the Coalition government reinstituted an 
overtly restrictionist immigration agenda, announcing a top-line net-migration target 
considerably lower than such figures had been for many years and tailoring policy in an 
attempt to meet it.8 At the same time, it proclaimed the intention of making the UK a ‘hostile 
environment’ for irregular migrants,9 through imposing further immigration status-
restrictions on basic needs and services. The UK, then, has experienced a long-term trend of 
demand for immigration restrictions from substantial majorities of the public and 
governmental ambitions to deliver on these demands. The few variations that there have 
been have tended to be in the intensity with which anti-immigration sentiment is felt by the 
majority of the public, and the particular targets and techniques for restrictionist measures 
chosen by the executive. 
Throughout this period, though, an alternative force has existed within British politics, which 
will be the focus of this study. While majority opinion has remained steadfastly opposed to 
immigration, the combination of concern for racial equality and opposition to the variously 
draconian enforcement measures taken by the UK immigration authorities has led to 
migrants’ rights becoming a key issue for the UK’s human rights and social justice activists. 
Permanently embattled, these groups have sought to counter negative media 
representations of migration issues,10 influence governmental policy development11 and 
intervene to prevent what they perceive as rights violations by the executive’s immigration 
                                                          
7 Blunkett D, quoted in Don Flynn, Tough as old boots’? Asylum, immigration and the paradox of New Labour 
policy, IRP, November 2003, http://www.swslim.org.uk/documents/themes/lt12-flynn.pdf  accessed 22 
September 2016 
8 Migration Observatory, Missing the Net Migration Target (27 November 2014) 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/missing-the-net-migration-target/ 
accessed 22 September 2016 
9 The Guardian, Immigration bill: Theresa May defends plans to create 'hostile environment' (10 October 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/10/immigration-bill-theresa-may-hostile-environment 
accessed 22 September 2016 
10 Refugee Council, Top 20 Facts about Refugees and Asylum Seekers, (Undated) 
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/4735_top_20_facts_about_refugees_and_asylum_seekers 
accessed 22 September 2016 
11 Ritchie M HC Deb, 6 March 2012, c638W  
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administration.12 Yet, while social attitudes on questions such as race have undoubtedly 
liberalised in the UK, migrants’ rights activism has remained a distinctly minority activity. 
Despite their commitment, migrants’ rights activists remain outgunned and possess few tools 
with which to exert influence. Immigration and migrants’ rights controversies remain 
dominated by restrictionist rhetoric and policy development.   
Motivations and Issues Behind the Study 
This thesis focuses on one of the key ways by which immigration into the UK has persisted in 
the face of such concerted opposition. Scholars of migration have developed theories as to 
the structural reasons why liberal states continue to allow unwanted immigration to occur. 
The first wave of such discussion emphasised limits on the sovereignty of liberal states such 
as the UK, imposed by the increasingly globalised market place and liberal states’ participation 
in international institutions.13 However, these views were challenged, most prominently, by 
Joppke, who while accepting that these issues were undoubtedly important, argued that of 
greater importance were aspects of what he termed ‘self-limiting sovereignty’. As he puts it,  
‘The capacity of states to control immigration has not diminished but increased... But 
for domestic reasons, liberal states are kept from putting this capacity to use.14  
These domestic reasons he describes as the varyingly strong moral obligations felt by elites 
and the liberal state to immigrant populations and, most importantly for this study, the legal 
process whereby ‘abstract commands of statutory and constitutional law’ have been applied 
to immigration questions.15 More recently still, Hampshire has developed this argument out 
from the legal process specifically to a broader focus on ‘liberal norms’, of which regard for 
individual rights and the rule of law are key parts, as an important ‘expansionist’ force in 
liberal immigration policy.16 
However, these studies have a tendency to take judicial interventions in immigration 
questions as an inevitable, natural phenomenon within liberal states. While to a certain 
                                                          
12 Women for Refugee Women, Campaign, (Undated)http://www.refugeewomen.co.uk/campaign/ accessed 22 
September 2016 
13 Sassen S Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (Columbia University Press, 1996) chap 3 
14 Joppke, Liberal States (n1) 270 
15 Joppke, Liberal States (n1) 271 
16 Hampshire (n1) 5  
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extent this may be true in so far as immigration and immigration control is regulated by law 
and therefore some form of litigation is likely to occur, this thesis will show that this 
perspective misses a crucial aspect of the picture. Judicial interventions only occur when cases 
are brought to them and judges’ rulings reflect the issues and arguments that are presented 
to them. The nature of judges’ interventions are therefore to a significant extent, although 
clearly not exclusively, contingent on the actors that bring those cases and the influences and 
frameworks that those actors operate within. As a result, it is important to understand more 
about that process and how it produces the particular judicial interventions that have 
occurred in immigration policy making and enforcement. 
As will be discussed throughout this thesis, as a result of migrants’ rights becoming a key issue 
for the UK’s broader human rights, racial and social justice activism, immigration law in the 
UK and its related fields have over time developed a very significant politicised movement 
practicing within it. This movement, made up of both lawyers and a wider non-legal NGO 
sector, has seen legal practice as a key means of defending and promoting the cause of 
migrants’ rights. The thesis will therefore address what the presence of this core of legal 
activists within the UK’s immigration field has meant for judicial interventions into 
immigration enforcement and the development of immigration policy. 
The author of this thesis has been professionally involved in this form of legal activism, both 
as a casework lawyer and latterly working for an international human rights NGO. However, 
the motivations behind this study began, five years ago, with concerns about the 
sustainability of a model of activism that appeared to be divorced from mainstream public 
politics. The self-conscious use of the legal process for the defence and promotion of 
migrants’ rights appeared to be a political act that was seeking to conduct itself outside of the 
normal requirements of constituency building and mobilisation that democratic politics 
required. This in turn raised interesting constitutional questions about the relationship 
between law and politics in the UK.17 Most obviously, political objectives were being sought 
through means that skirted around public debate. This is a long-running point of contention 
in US politics regarding the ‘liberal’ rulings of the Supreme Court, which have been critiqued 
by conservative commentators as ‘intellectual class values, which are far more egalitarian and 
                                                          
17 Loughlin M, Sword & Scales: An Examination Of The Relationship Between Law And Politics (Hart 2003); 
Bellamy R, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (CUP, 2007) 
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socially permissive… than those of the public at large and so cannot carry elections.’18 While 
it had not been expressed in quite these terms, this was a position that was starting to be 
expressed in UK political debate around the time that research began on this thesis.19 
More interestingly, though, this legal activism was profiting from the constitutional 
convention that politics, in the sense of party politics and the wider discursive contest over 
power, would not encroach directly into legal matters. For this convention to hold in a society 
that lacks a written constitution the law, in the sense of legal process and the lawyers and 
judges that enact it, is required not to stray into territory regarded as being the exclusive 
purview of politicians and politics.20 As Sarat and Scheingold have argued, failing to observe 
this requirement, by for example pursuing the cause of migrants’ rights through litigation, 
‘puts at risk the political immunity of the legal profession and the legal process.’21 An erosion 
of ‘political immunity’ in this way carries with it a risk that the legal profession and the legal 
process become targets for the UK’s anti-immigration politics.  
Much the same could be said regarding the relationship between legal processes and politics 
as for the nature of the UK’s debate on human rights more generally. As was noted above, 
migrants’ rights issues have been a major focus of the UK’s human rights campaigners. This 
has been as a result of issues, in addition to asylum, such as the widespread use of indefinite 
immigration detention,22 the immigration detention of children23 and various migrants’ 
rights-affecting measures taken as part of the war on terror.24 These actions demonstrated 
the UK state’s willingness to engage in practices against foreign nationals that it would not 
consider applying to its own citizens. As Benhabib has noted, ‘ultimately, citizenship was the 
prime guarantor for the protection of one’s human rights’.25 As a result, while classical 
                                                          
18 Bork R, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law, (Simon and Schuster, 1991) 337 
19 Lord Dyson, What is wrong with human rights? (Hertfordshire University 3 November 2011) 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_111103.pdf accessed 22 September 2016 
20 Sumption J, ‘Judicial and Political Decision-Making: The Uncertain Boundary’ (the F.A. Mann Lecture 2011) 
http://www.pem.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/1C-Sumption-article.pdf accessed 22 September 
2016 
21 Sarat and Scheingold, The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make (n2) 3 
22 Wilsher D, Immigration Detention: Law History Politics, (CUP 2014) 
23 Fillmore E, ‘The Effects of Immigration Detention on the Health of Children and Families in the UK’ (2010) 34 
Adoption & Fostering 88-91 
24 Jones K, ‘Deportations with assurances: addressing key criticisms’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 183 184; Jackson J, ‘Justice, 
security and the right to a fair trial: is the use of secret evidence ever fair?’ [2013] PL 720; Greer S, ‘Human rights 
and the struggle against terrorism in the United Kingdom’ (2008) 2 EHRLR 163 
25 Benhabib S, Rights of Others (CUP 2004) 68 
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interpretations of constitutional or fundamental human rights standards present them as 
being somehow ‘existing independently of social recognition’26and therefore elevated above 
the ordinary cut and thrust of politics, migrants’ rights have become one of the key 
battlegrounds in wider political discussion about the merits of the UK’s adherence to 
international human rights norms and the extent to which such norms should be judicially 
enforceable.  
Given this starting point, it might be thought that a suitable approach to this study would 
have been a critical investigation of whether or not such legal activism should be happening, 
or a critical analysis of the law’s role in defending migrants’ rights. However, this is not the 
approach that has been taken. While not entirely abandoning a critical approach, the study 
starts from the basis of accepting the reality of the regulation of immigration by a legal 
framework and that that framework inevitably produces litigation affecting migrants’ rights 
issues. Taking the world as it is, the thesis also offers no comment on debates around the 
merits or otherwise of borders and immigration control per se. To this extent more radical 
critical scholars may consider that it falls within the genre of what El-Enany has critiqued as 
‘“legal idolisers”, who cling to protective laws, overlooking their exclusive function.’27 
However, rather than analysing whether or not migrants’ rights activists should be pursuing 
immigration-related litigation when that litigation will be occurring regardless, with political 
and practical consequences for migrants’ rights, the thesis focuses on the extent to which 
litigation does and can protect migrants’ rights in the present circumstances and the related 
issue of the relationship such litigation has with the development of governmental 
immigration control policies. The thesis should therefore be understood as falling within the 
socio-legal scholarship of immigration and migrants’ rights in the UK.  
The Thesis’ Focus 
The present thesis draws on work from a number of different disciplines and lines of analytical 
enquiry. Scholarship on ‘cause lawyering’ has provided a route for moving from studies of law 
and politics as questions of constitutional or philosophical significance28 into studies of legal 
                                                          
26 Dembour M-B, When Humans Become Migrants: Study Of The European Court Of Human Rights With An Inter-
American Counterpoint (OUP 2015) 3 
27 El-Enany N, ‘On Pragmatism and Legal Idolatry: Fortress Europe and the Desertion of the European 
Refugee’(2015) 22 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 7 
28 Loughlin(n17); Bellamy (n17) 
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work with political motivations as a practical enterprise. This has proved vital in setting the 
thesis’ terms and formulating an understanding of the form of legal work being analysed. The 
‘cause lawyering’ research project, led by Sarat and Scheingold29 but taken on by others since 
then,30 was primarily concerned with the daily business of working as a lawyer and  
‘the ways lawyers construct causes and causes supply lawyers with something to 
believe in, as well as ways commitment to a cause challenges conventional ideas of 
lawyer professionalism.’31  
As such they provide a framework for approaching the question of how the motivations of 
the litigators matter in an analysis of the outcomes their work produces and the 
consequences of their actions. Yet these studies placed the lawyer themselves and their 
practice firmly at the centre of the analysis and focussed less on the cause they were seeking 
to support, other than for case-study purposes. 
The related strand of ‘legal mobilisation’ scholarship has proved more useful in approaching 
the study as a focus on litigation as a tool for political activism. The early work in this body of 
literature, particularly that by Scheingold,32 Rosenberg,33 Klarman34 and Tushnet35 
encouraged a concentration on ‘judicial impact’; the simple question of whether or not legal 
activists achieved what they set out to achieve through the courts, if not, why not, and in light 
of this, ultimately whether or not the ‘turn to law’ was a wise use of campaigning energy and 
activist resources. As Rosenberg put it, ‘Under what conditions can courts produce political 
                                                          
29 Sarat A & Scheingold S (eds), Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, (OUP 
1998); Sarat A and Scheingold S, Cause Lawyering and the State in a Global Era (OUP 2001); Sarat A and 
Scheingold S, Cause Lawyers and Social Movements (Stanford University Press 2006); Sarat A and Scheingold S, 
The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure And Agency In Legal Practice, (Stanford University Press 2005); 
Scheingold S and Sarat A, Something to Believe In: Politics, Professionalism, And Cause Lawyering (Stanford 
University Press 2004) 
30 Marshall A-M & Crocker Hale D, ‘Cause Lawyering’ (2014) 10, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 301; 
Meili S, ‘UK Refugee Lawyers: Pushing the Boundaries of Domestic Court Acceptance of International Human 
Rights Law’ (2013) 54 Boston College Law Review 1123 
31 Sarat A and Scheingold S, Cause Lawyers and Social Movements (n29) 1 
32 Scheingold S, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change (2nd Ed University of Michigan 
Press 2004) 
33 Rosenberg G, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (2nd Ed, University of Chicago Press 
2008) 
34 Klarman M, Brown v. Board of Education and the civil rights movement: abridged edition of From Jim Crow to 
civil rights: the Supreme Court and the struggle for racial equality (Oxford University Press 2007) 
35 Tushnet M, ‘Some Legacies of Brown v. Board Education’ (2004) 90 VLR 1693 
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and social change? When does it make sense for individuals and groups pressing for [social] 
change to litigate?’36  
This approach has been subsequently moved away from as the sole concentration on legal 
and/or policy change as activist outcomes failed to take into account the myriad other socio-
political influences that activist litigation can have. It was McCann that first led this move, in 
an overt challenge to Rosenberg. 37 Through a broader focus on ‘the constitutive role of legal 
rights both as a strategic resource and as a constraint on collective efforts to transform or 
‘reconstitute’ relationships among social groups’38 McCann sought ‘a more expansive, subtle 
and complex view of law’s role in political struggle than most studies focusing on reform-
oriented litigation alone offer.’39 In seeking this more expansive analysis he moved away from 
simple litigation outcomes to an analysis of the consequences for activist movements of their 
adoption and engagement with legal forms and processes. It is this activity he termed ‘legal 
mobilisation’. 
This approach has most recently, and most importantly for the present thesis, been applied 
to immigration questions by Leila Kawar in her discussion of the ‘radiating effects’ of litigation 
on immigration in the US and France.40 Kawar’s study is particularly important for the present 
thesis for two reasons. Firstly, it is one of very few detailed examinations specifically focussed 
on legal activism on immigration issues, albeit not in relation to the UK context.41 Secondly, it 
is important for its particular emphasis on the intersection between the activist tool being 
used (politically motivated litigation), the politico-legal context in which it is being used (in 
her case, the US and French judicial and political systems) and the politics of the activist issue 
in question (immigration policy and the rights of migrants). Political litigation operates in a 
sphere of mutually influential political, social and cultural factors which result in 
consequences that are very particular to their context. As Kawar herself demonstrates, the 
fact of the use of litigation by activists affects the politics of immigration policy in different 
                                                          
36 Rosenberg,(n33) 4 
37 McCann M, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and The Politics of Legal Mobilization (The University Of Chicago 
Press 1994) 
38 Ibid 7 
39 Ibid 9 
40 Kawar (n2) 153 
41 For the UK specifically, book-length, Webber F, Borderline Justice: The Fight for Refugee and Migrant Rights 
(Pluto 2012); Morris L, Asylum, Welfare And The Cosmopolitan Ideal: A Sociology Of Rights (Routledge 2010); 
Chapters and journal articles include Sterett, (n2); Meili (n30) 
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ways in the US and France, as a result of the particular cultural histories and political 
settlements regarding judicial rights and courts’ interventions into political decision making 
in the two countries. Yet, at the same time, the fact that it is immigration policy being litigated 
also has an influence on how the litigation is perceived and the radiating effects it produces; 
another activist issue would not be framed in quite the same way or carry with it precisely 
the same narrative baggage.  
Kawar’s interest in the ‘radiating effects’ of political litigation lead her to largely dispense with 
a concern for the outcomes of cases and the particular policy changes that they have or have 
not achieved. She refers to this as ‘analytically decentering official case dispositions.’42 
However, this is largely because she starts from a premise that in the particular field of 
immigration policy, litigation has little influence.43 Yet, this is not the premise of the present 
thesis with regard to the particular context of the UK. The present thesis cannot entirely 
depart from the need to investigate the extent to which such litigation does have influence in 
the UK context and in particular, the extent to which migrants’ rights activists have achieved 
their policy goals through litigation. Thus the more concrete, some might think prosaic, 
concerns of the earlier analysts of political litigation must also be tackled.  
From Kawar, though, the present thesis draws a simple approach to the issue of political 
litigation for migrants’ rights, which is capable of encompassing both the ‘judicial impact’ and 
the broader legal mobilisation perspectives. This is to ask, what happens when immigration 
and migrants’ rights questions are litigated for political purposes in the UK? Put another way, 
what are the outcomes achieved and the consequences of migrants’ rights litigation in the 
particular politico-legal context of the UK? When formulated in this way, the thesis will be 
able to take into account both the need to address the issue of policy change and the wider 
concerns of litigation’s radiating effects. 
It also allows for the present thesis to make its primary contribution to the literature on 
immigration law and policy and migrants’ rights in the UK. As noted above, one of the lessons 
of the legal mobilisation scholarship is that the particularities of the context being studied are 
vital. As such, close attention to UK immigration and migrants’ rights scholarship would be 
                                                          
42 Kawar (n2) 23 
43 Kawar (n2) 153 
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necessary in any case, to effectively analyse politicised litigation on the issue. However, this 
perspective can also be reversed. The thesis will be able to make a more substantial 
contribution to an understanding of migrants’ rights and UK immigration policy development 
by showing how the fact of activist litigation as a force within the policy dynamic has 
influenced the development of this policy and its consequences for the human rights of 
migrants.  
By seeking to answer the question of what happens when immigration policy and migrants’ 
rights are litigated for political purposes in the UK, the thesis will use the tools and lessons 
provided by the cause lawyering and legal mobilisation scholars to expand and inform 
understanding of immigration policy development and migrants’ human rights in the UK. In 
so doing, it may also be able to make a smaller contribution to the wider debate on the role 
of legalised human rights in UK politics by providing a detailed analysis of one of the key areas 
of contestation in that debate; the rights of migrants and the legal enforcement of those 
rights. How the thesis will go about investigating these issues will be the subject of the next 
section. 
Methodology 
In his discussion of socio-legal research, Bradshaw states that,  
‘First, socio-legal research considers the law and the process of law (law-making, legal 
procedure) beyond legal texts – i.e. socio-politico-economic considerations that 
surround and inform the enactment of laws, the operation of procedure, and the 
result of passage and enforcement of laws. Second in studying the context and result 
of law, socio-legal research moves beyond the academic, the judicial and the 
legislative office, chamber, library and committee room to gather data wherever 
appropriate to the problem.44 
This provides a relatively neat summary of the approach that will be taken in this research. As 
has been discussed above, this thesis will examine the legal and policy outcomes that 
politically-motivated litigation for migrants’ rights produce for the operation of immigration 
control procedures, the development of immigration jurisprudence and the enforcement 
                                                          
44 Bradshaw A, ‘Sense and Sensibility: Debates and Developments in Socio-Legal Research Methods’, in Thomas 
P (ed), Socio-Legal Studies (Dartmouth 1997) 99 
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both of legislative and judge-made immigration law. It will also discuss the broader 
consequences of this litigation activism, in terms of its influence of the passage of legislation 
and on the wider public political debate around immigration and migrants’ rights that informs 
and motivates that legislation. While making extensive reference to the relevant academic, 
legislative and judicial documents the research will necessarily take an empirical approach to 
these questions. 
It will do so firstly through analysis of judgments in key migrants’ rights cases brought through 
this form of legal activism. As will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the cases include both 
those taken as ‘strategic litigation’ by activist NGOs and judgments arising out of the day-to-
day business of cause lawyering for individual migrants. The scope of the thesis does not allow 
for a complete sample of all such judgments; as is discussed in chapters 5 and 6 a key aspect 
of the migrants’ rights litigation dynamic is the sheer weight of case law that it generates. 
Instead, cases were chosen for detailed discussion that exemplified or contributed to 
particular aspects of cause litigation’s involvement in the development of the executive’s 
immigration policy and procedure. Cases are discussed in legal terms but also in relation to 
the role the litigators played in bringing them about and executive responses to them. Rather 
than a pure focus on jurisprudential developments, then, case selection reflected the thesis’ 
focus on the political and practical outcomes and consequences of the litigation. Legal change 
alone, though important, is only one element to be considered. 
The second leading empirical element of the research is a combination of semi-structured 
interviews with practitioners of the kind of litigation under discussion and other related 
actors,45 augmented by my own experiences in my professional life. 20 formal interviews 
were conducted with a range of actors in the sector. These included eight solicitors and 
barristers that take these cases, with a mix of lawyers working for charitable/not-for-profit 
enterprises and those working for private firms, nine senior NGO workers engaged in this 
work, two funding officers for institutional trusts that financially support this litigation, and 
an immigration judge and child-rights’ barrister who has had many years’ experience of 
hearing and representing migrants’ rights cases. While it was not intended that these 
interview subjects were to be a statistically representative sample of the community of 
                                                          
45 For discussion of semi-structured interview technique, Bryman A, Social Research Methods, 4th Edition, (OUP 
2014) 470 - 482 
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migrants’ rights activists that engage in litigation, they do present a reasonable cross section 
of experiences, relevant specialisms and approaches to the work.  
The interviews lasted between one and two and a half hours, depending on the availability of 
the interviewee and the issues being discussed. Most were conducted in person, with one 
done over the phone. The interviews were semi-structured in form, using what Taylor and 
Bogdan have described as an ‘interview guide’. As they explain, 
The interview guide is not a structured schedule or protocol. Rather, it is a list of 
general areas to be covered with each informant. In the interview situation the 
researcher decides how to phrase questions and when to ask them. The interview 
guide serves solely to remind the interviewer to ask about certain things.46 
The reason for taking this approach, as opposed to a structured list of set questions, was that 
the interviews were intended to draw out the interviewees’ own experiences and perceptions 
of their work, as well as the legal, institutional and political influences on their work. As such, 
the conversations were tailored to the particular individual and their role within the UK’s 
migrants’ rights sector. Questions were directed towards the practical realities of litigation, 
such as the influence of funding, professional responsibilities and procedural requirements; 
perceptions of political influence on their work, including in judicial decisions, policy 
development and sector priorities; and attitudes and expectations regarding the direction, 
influence and potential of the litigation that is being pursued for migrants’ rights. Interviews 
were given on condition of anonymity, with quotations used in the thesis being ascribed to 
generic descriptive names to assist the reader. 
Interviews were obtained through a combination of my own professional contacts and 
snowball sampling.47 Bernard has described this technique as  
‘using key informants and/or documents you locate one or two people in a population. 
Then you ask those people to (1) list others in the population and (2) recommend 
someone from the list whom you might interview.’48  
                                                          
46 Taylor S & Bogdan R, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: A Guidebook and Resource, (John Wiley 
and Sons 1998) 105 
47 Bernard HR, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Sage 2013) 168 
48 Ibid 
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He goes on to state that this technique is particularly suitable for interviewing people who 
‘are members of an elite group… and who don’t care about your need for data.’49 This is an 
apt description of the cause litigators who agreed to be interviewed for this study. 
As noted above, I have worked in this sector for a number of years and this facilitated the 
process of getting interviewees. Making lists was not necessary, but recommendations were 
used to gain access to interview subjects with particular specialisms or experiences that I did 
not already have connections with.  It also allowed me to follow up with interviewees to clarify 
issues outside of the formal interview setting and to discuss developments in the research 
and the issues it covers with a wider range of actors within the sector aside from the formal 
interview subjects. Working in the sector also enabled me to develop a clear picture of the 
structure of the sector, how the different actors fit within it and the extent to which they are 
able and willing to co-operate and coordinate with each other. It also allowed me to access 
web-based migrants’ rights forums and real-world seminars where legal and policy 
developments were discussed and debated. These opportunities allowed me to monitor 
practical developments in a field that is fast moving, informed the questioning of interviewees 
and aided in the development the analysis that the thesis presents.  
It was important to maintain an independent analytical approach to the issues, despite my 
direct involvement in the field. Many of the actors involved are strongly committed to the 
particular cause and/or are heavily embedded in an inherently adversarial relationship with 
the immigration control mechanisms of the state. This antagonism risks distorting perceptions 
or producing assumptions about third parties’ motivations, particularly the immigration 
service and judges, which might not stand up to sustained scrutiny. As such it was important 
not to take all assertions and explanations provided by interviewees and contacts within the 
wider sector at face value. To this end I would keep regular notes on trends and common 
perceptions amongst the litigation actors in order to test them through empirical or 
theoretical analysis. 
In addition to the leading elements of case law, interview data and professional contacts, the 
thesis also draws on archival research into parliamentary debates on relevant migrants’ rights 
issues, publications and speeches by politicians on migrants’ rights litigation, and media 
                                                          
49 Ibid 
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coverage of these issues. It will also make use of official data sources when available and 
appropriate, such as quarterly immigration and courts and tribunal statistics, to document 
certain impacts of legislative or policy changes. These data sources will be used in 
combination with the other empirical sources to provide an explication of the UK’s migrants’ 
rights litigation sector and the policy and political outcomes and consequences that it 
produces.  
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is made up of five substantive chapters, which themselves can be understood as 
being grouped together into two sections. The first section, consisting of chapters 2 and 3, 
provides a more detailed discussion of the scholarly framework for the thesis’ analysis and a 
contextual grounding in activist litigation for migrants’ rights in the UK.  From this starting 
point, the second section of chapters 4, 5 and 6 presents a detailed examination of the 
outcomes and consequences of this litigation, with each chapter taking an increasingly broad 
perspective on the issue. This is so as to synthesise the importance of practical legal and policy 
change as acknowledged by the first generation legal activism scholars with the focus on the 
wider consequences of such activism, what Kawar refers to as litigation’s ‘radiating effects’. 
As such, the second section moves from a discussion of the effectiveness of targeted strategic 
litigation, through a discussion of the impact of the much larger but more amorphous body 
of day-to-day cause litigation casework, to a discussion of the consequences of politicised 
litigation for migrants’ rights for the rule of law’s application to immigration policy and 
implementation in the UK. 
 
Chapter Two begins with discussion of two key bodies of theoretical literature for the present 
study; the influences on liberal states’ approaches to migration and constitutional debate 
around the rule of law and legalised rights charters in democracies. The chapter identifies 
some questions that this broader literature leaves unresolved and which a study of migrants’ 
rights litigation in practice will need to address. From there it moves to discuss the various 
forms of politicised legal action that have been identified by scholars over the years and 
assesses the extent to which their frameworks of analysis apply to the particular context of 
migrants’ rights litigation in the UK. From this the chapter proposes the term ‘cause litigation’ 
to encompass the particular form of legal activism the thesis deals with. The chapter then 
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goes on to consider the external elements that have been identified by political lawyering 
scholars to be the key influences and pressures the formation, the outcomes achieved and 
the consequences of political litigation. These are identified as constituting a broad three-
point framework of the resources available to the movement, the legal framework and 
judicial context it operates in and the political opportunity structures it faces.  
 
Chapter Three takes these three factors as a starting point and analyses how they play out in 
the context of cause litigation for migrants’ rights in the UK. In so doing the chapter discusses 
the formation and current make-up of the UK’s migrants’ rights movement and the 
practitioners of cause litigation for migrants’ rights in particular; the legal framework that is 
most commonly relevant to migrants’ rights cases and the development of the UK judiciary’s 
approach to implementing that framework; and the UK’s public politics on immigration and 
how it has led to the predominant current discourse guiding both policy and administrative 
conduct, which the chapter identifies as the ‘control imperative’. This imperative is shown to 
include both the location of dominant power over immigration decision making in the 
Executive and, perhaps more importantly, the need to overtly demonstrate possession of this 
dominant power. In so doing the chapter argues that while there are definite strengths within 
the cause litigation wing of the UK’s migrant’s rights movement, they are operating in a 
difficult environment. In particular, the power and reach of the ‘control imperative’ is 
identified as being the major obstacle to the UK’s cause litigators for migrants’ rights. 
  
Chapter Four examines the outcomes of targeted strategic litigation as a means of promoting 
and protecting migrants’ rights. This is litigation pursued with the deliberate aim of bringing 
about a change in a specific executive procedure or administrative practice of wider concern 
to the migrants’ rights movement. It normally involves a combination of cause lawyers and 
migrants’ rights NGOs. The chapter finds that while it can produce some positive changes, 
they tend to be limited to small technical adjustments in policy or practice. This is partly due 
to the relatively limited ambition of the cases that are taken. The chapter shows that 
migrants’ rights strategic litigation in practice tends to amount to a means of resolving 
technical disputes between an interest group sector and an administration over practical 
issues which in other less politically contested areas might be capable of being resolved 
without such regular recourse to the courts.  However, the chapter also shows that the 
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relatively limited returns for migrants’ rights that strategic litigation produces come about as 
a result of the capacity and inclination of the Executive, inspired by the control imperative, to 
evade or absorb the implications of adverse judgments.  
 
Chapter Five examines the outcomes that have resulted from the much larger but more 
amorphous body of day-to-day cause lawyering casework. The chapter shows that 
regularisation of irregular migrants has been the key activity of cause lawyers in this area. In 
particular it shows that through an incremental process, powerful and expansive forms of 
regularisation have been developed beyond and outside of accepted executive immigration 
policy in the fields of refugee status determination and Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to respect for private and family life. Thus despite its lack 
of specific or targeted goals, day-to-day cause lawyering has produced more significant and 
durable systemic change than its more celebrated strategic counterpart. However, the 
chapter shows that these developments have again been met by an adverse reaction from 
the executive. In contrast to the more subtle tactics the executive used against the technical 
changes brought about by strategic litigation successes, these systemic changes have been 
met with overt and aggressive legislative and rhetorical backlash, facilitated by the legislature. 
The chapter concludes by discussing the effectiveness of the backlashes that have occurred 
and what is required for the systemic progress won through day to day cause lawyering to be 
revived.  
 
Chapter Six discusses the consequences of cause litigation’s presence in the UK’s immigration 
policy dynamic and in particular its role as one of the primary obstacles to the control 
imperative in both its administrative and public political aspects. It focuses on the executive’s 
response to this role, and shows that this has been to institute a backlash targeting the 
resources and the legal framework that helped develop and sustain cause litigation. The 
primary obstacle to this backlash has been the constitutional concern to protect the rule of 
law. While all sides in the dispute have agreed that the rule of law as a notion is 
unquestionable, the question has nevertheless arisen as to what form of it is appropriate for 
the UK and what role it should take in regulating immigration policy. The chapter argues that 
the Executive has been able to succeed in this backlash to the extent that it has because it 
was able to appeal to a resurgent strain of nationalism that has developed in the UK’s political 
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discourse and unites concern about immigration with concern regarding economic and 
cultural precariousness. This underpins a turn against the ‘thick’ form of the rule of law and 
the kind of liberal universalism that cause litigation relies upon. The chapter concludes by 
discussing what remains of cause litigation following the backlash and its implications for the 
future. In particular it identifies possibilities for continuing intervention in the ‘process’ of 
immigration control, but limited influence on its ‘outcomes’. 
 
The findings of the previous chapters are then summarised in the concluding chapter 7, which 
seeks to answer the question of what happens when migrants’ rights and immigration issues 
are litigated for political purposes in the UK. It argues that legal protections for migrants’ 
rights and the broader role of liberal norms and the rule of law as impediments to restrictive 
immigration policy are not inevitable, but are the product of identifiable practical forces that 
result in certain cases being taken in certain ways by certain actors. This in turn means that 
certain rights and forms of migration benefit from such legal protection, which itself 
influences the direction in which the wider politics of immigration develops. In terms of 
practical protections for migrants’ rights, cause litigation in the UK is capable of bringing about 
intermittent progress rather than simple defence. That said, while day-to-day cause litigation 
has produced significantly more systemic change than the more celebrated strategic 
litigation, both are vulnerable to the executive taking steps to retrench their gains and 
reassert itself; leaving diminished but still non-negligible advancements. By playing its role in 
obstructing the executive’s immigration control policies, the chief consequence of cause 
litigation has been the ever increasing intensity of pressure on the executive to demonstrate 
control. Thus cause litigation inherently contributes to its own retrenchment and the broader 
strength of the control imperative that motivates the UK’s immigration politics. 
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Chapter 2: Litigation as Migrants’ Rights Activism 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter engages in more detail with some of the key literature referred to in the 
introduction. It will do so in order to layout the analytical framework by which the study 
proceeds and then to draw out from previous work the key factors that influence the 
outcomes and consequences migrants’ rights litigation produces.  
 
Firstly, the chapter examines elements from some broader theoretical literatures that 
intersect in the issue of political litigation for migrants’ rights. In particular, studies of liberal 
states’ relationships to migration and studies of rights and the due place of the courts in 
democratic decision-making. These broader studies provide a number of useful insights but 
also have shortcomings when applied to the questions this thesis addresses. These include 
how the role of liberal norms in forming state responses to migration might be affected by 
the deliberate co-option of those norms by activists, and how political and discursive 
representations of the UK’s constitutional settlement may influence the practical legal and 
political responses to legal activism. Following this the section moves on to the various 
approaches that have been taken to analysing legal action as a form of activism. It will identify 
the scope of the study, relating it to the body of work on legal mobilisation, and will consider 
the extent to which existing frameworks of analysis apply to the particular context of 
migrants’ rights litigation in the UK. As mentioned in chapter 1, the need for an alternative 
terminology, broader than the common focus on ‘strategic litigation’ but still narrower than 
overarching studies of ‘legal mobilisation’ is identified. Such an alternative is then proposed, 
with the concept of ‘cause litigation’.  
 
The second section of the chapter will then go on to consider the factors that can be seen 
from these works to be the key influences on political litigation and to set out how they relate 
to cause litigation for migrants’ rights specifically. These are shown to be  
 
i) The resources available to the social movement 
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ii) The legal framework and judicial environment in play in the issue  
iii) The political opportunity structures around the issue  
 
Section 1: Frameworks for Understanding and Analysis 
 
The first section of this chapter examines the broader contextual literatures that inform the 
thesis’ understanding of the issues in play in the debate around political litigation for 
migrants’ rights. It then looks at the key techniques and terminology that have been used in 
analysing legal activism of the kind this thesis focusses on.  
 
Framework of Understanding 
 
The numerous different aspects of social life that this issue touches on may be a partial reason 
for why it has proved so contentious in public political debate. This section will focus on two 
particularly important areas; the relationship that liberal states’ such as the UK have with 
migration and constitutional questions of the role of law and the judiciary in liberal-
democratic decision making. While each has been the subject of extensive study in their own 
right, the intention here is to discuss the key ideas and insights that this literature provides 
and how they interrelate with each other.   
 
i) Limits on Migration Control in Liberal States 
 
The migration scholarship of most relevance for the present thesis is the discussion of 
migration and migrants’ relationship to liberal politics and liberal conceptions of statehood 
and citizenship. Litigation for migrants’ rights relies, after all, on liberal principles of individual 
rights, constraints on government action, and the rule of law as the fundamental means of 
ordering a society.  
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In relation to migration and liberalism, numerous studies have focussed on migration as a 
primarily economic issue and a key element in the development of capitalist globalisation.1 
These debates initially sought to show that, through increased migration, the liberal state was 
losing yet another aspect of its traditional purpose and powers to the forces of globalisation. 
However, this view has been questioned by those who argue that migration in fact remains 
one of the few areas of state action in which liberal states in a globalised world are able to 
exercise considerable power. This power was directed towards attracting and facilitating 
certain forms of desirable migration and migrants (chiefly those deemed likely to provide 
economic advantage for the host state) and repelling and removing those deemed 
‘undesirable’. In fact, liberal states appeared increasingly prepared to engage in what could 
be described as thoroughly illiberal practices in the cause of keeping unwanted migrants at 
bay.2 Ellermann, for example, has documented ‘the progressive expansion of the socially 
coercive state in the advanced industrialized world’,3 that is, a state which ‘regulates 
individual behaviour in highly intrusive ways and, in the process, imposes severe personal 
costs on the regulated.’4 Deportation, she argues, ‘constitutes a type of public policy that, 
although at the heart of statehood, places extraordinarily high demands on the liberal state.’5 
The demands she is referring to are the paradoxical ones derived from competing notions of 
what it is to be a liberal state, including respect for the rule of law and the integrity of persons. 
These cannot be fully thrown off by liberal states and thus impede their ability to implement 
popular public policy in relation to immigration. 
  
The leading scholar to raise this issue of immigration control as containing a paradox for 
liberal states has been Christian Joppke. In his seminal paper ‘Why do liberal states accept 
unwanted immigration?’ Joppke focussed on Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield’s point that 
there is a ‘gap between restrictionist policy goals and expansionist outcomes.’6 This ‘gap’ 
                                                          
1 Hollifield J, ‘The Emerging Migration State’ (2004) 38 International Migration Review 885; Cornelius W and 
Tsude T, ‘Controlling Immigration: The Limits of Government Intervention’ in Cornelius W, Tsuda T, Martin P 
and Hollifield J, Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective (Stanford Univeristy Press 2004) 3-51 
2 Guild E, Groenendijk K & Carrera S, Illiberal Liberal States, Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU 
(Ashgate 2009); Gibney M, ‘Asylum and the Expansion of Deportation in the United Kingdom’ (2008) 43 
Government and Opposition 146; Wilsher D, Immigration Detention: Law History Politics, (CUP 2014) 256 
3 Ellerman A, States Against Migrants: Deportation in Germany and the United States (CUP 2009) 1 
4 Ibid 3 
5 Ibid 4 
6 In this regard Joppke particularly cites Cornelius W, Martin P and Hollifield J (Eds), Controlling Immigration: a 
Global Perspective (Stanford University Press 1994) 3 
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might be explained by external globalising forces such as the expansion of international law 
and in particular ‘the international human rights regime’. However, Joppke rejects these 
external causes as being ‘inflated’. In their place he develops the notion of internal ‘self-
limited sovereignty’ whereby liberal states, particularly European states that did not have a 
history of ethnically-based client politics as found in the USA, have developed ‘legal 
constraints in combination with moral obligations toward historically particular immigrant 
populations.’7  
 
An important aspect of Joppke’s claim for the present thesis is that of these two principle 
factors, legal constraints appear to be the more powerful source of ‘self-limited sovereignty’. 
His comparison of Germany and the UK makes this point by showing that a ‘strong 
constitution celebrating human rights’ in the German case, combined with ‘a negative 
history’, led to a very significant level of state tolerance of unwanted immigration. In contrast 
the UK, in the period Joppke was writing in, lacked anything of the kind; the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (HRA) was yet to come into force and as a result there was no equivalent in the UK’s 
legal framework of the constitutional constraints that appeared in its German counterpart. 
Thus any residual sense of ‘moral duty’ towards Commonwealth immigrants found in 
Parliament could be overridden by populist anti-immigration measures.8 What is not clear 
from this, however, is precisely how legal limits play the role that they do. Joppke’s primary 
interest appears to be in state policy making and the extent to which politicians take account 
of such legal/constitutional considerations in their own policy thinking. This process has been 
conceptualised in another context as ‘governing like judges.’9 However this thesis is more 
concerned with instances in which Executive or legislative decision making either overrides 
these constitutional concerns or does not perceive there to be any, and activists prompt the 
legal system itself to act as a significantly limiting factor on intended policy outcomes.  
 
Since his paper’s publication, Joppke’s notion has been built on and expanded. Most recently, 
Hampshire has shown that in fact the legal limits identified by Joppke as ‘self-limited 
sovereignty’ are only one aspect in the broader framework of influences on immigration 
                                                          
7 Joppke C, ‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration’ (1998) 50 World Politics 266 292 
8 Ibid 288 
9 Stone Sweet A, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford University Press 2000) 204 
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policy in liberal democracies, the UK included. Hampshire argues that liberal democracies are 
inevitably and irretrievably caught in a ‘paradox’ of competing forces integral to their status 
as liberal states; the realities of representative democracy and the continuing power of 
notions of nationhood acting as conservative or restrictionist influences on immigration 
policy, while the forces of globalised capitalism and, as per Joppke, the liberal commitment 
to constitutionalism (particularly regard for individual rights and the rule of law) acting as 
expansionist influences.10  
 
His study dedicates considerably more space to discussing the practical consequences of 
liberal constitutionalism for immigration policy outside of executive and legislative policy 
deliberation. For instance it highlights the commitment of liberal states to the UN Convention 
on the Status of Refugees11 (the Refugee Convention) and the resultant necessity of operating 
an asylum system that accommodates migrants who might otherwise fall into the ‘unwanted’ 
category.12 However, its central focus is on the existence and interrelationship between the 
four identified factors integral to a modern liberal state. As a result the study does not address 
the question of what effect the dedicated and deliberate use of legal constitutionalism as a 
bulwark against popular restrictionist policies, through activist litigation, may have on the 
preservation of the very liberal norms that this constitutionalism depends upon. As was noted 
in the previous chapter, an issue that this thesis will explore is whether these competing 
factors have outcomes not only for immigration policy, but also for each other, in that if legal 
constitutionalism is seen as being excessively influential, or hijacked for a particular purpose, 
it could produce a restrictionist-inspired backlash against it.   
 
The work of Benhabib, building on Arendt’s arguments regarding stateless people and the 
inherent vulnerability of rights,13 has shown that such a concern may be justified. They both 
show that even advanced liberal democracies can fail to afford ‘the right to have rights’ to 
individuals regarded as alien to their community. Benhabib argues that ‘democratic rule has 
been based on various constitutive illusions such as the homogeneity of the people and 
                                                          
10 Hampshire J, The Politics of Immigration (Polity 2013) 5 
11 The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
12 Hampshire (n10) 49 
13 Arendt H, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt Brace & Co 1976) 268 
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territorial self-sufficiency’ and that when confronted by ‘challenges arising in interpreting 
“the rights of others”, there occurs, ‘self-reflexive transformations on the part of the polity 
involved.’14 Thus, when compelled, through circumstance, to decide how far to encroach 
upon the rights of outsiders, societies develop and transform themselves in either universalist 
rights-respecting directions, or insular nationalist directions. Whether or not the 
transformations that occur are congenial to continued support for ‘the rights of others’ is 
therefore a crucial question. Benhabib’s answer is to argue for the development of a form of 
liberal cosmopolitanism as the desirable end-point of such transformations, so as to ensure a 
Kantian ‘cosmopolitan duty of hospitality’ prevails.15 Somek has described something similar 
in his analysis of ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’, which requires a form of ‘post-national 
citizenship’ that at its logical end point, 
 
‘guarantees that any polity is as good as any other for anyone even though their law 
will be inevitably marked by the particularity of national traditions. Arguably, these 
conditions are satisfied by, first, a system of human rights protection… and, second, a 
strong protection against discrimination on the grounds of nationality.’16 
 
Yet there is a clear risk that the democratic desire to maintain the ‘constitutive illusion’ of 
homogeneity, to borrow Benhabib’s phrase for example, may undermine such cosmopolitan 
hopes. Liberal norms, and the legal limits that solidify them, may be vulnerable when they are 
seen to be propping up unpopular, ‘unwanted’ and outsider individuals, such as those that 
are the concern of this thesis.  
 
The process by which this expansion and contraction of norms such as the rule of law takes 
place has been identified by Nash as that of ‘cultural politics’. This notion starts from the 
premise that while at any given point a society may operate under a dominant set of what 
Benhabib would term ‘constitutive illusions’, rather than remaining static political culture can 
always be contested in the pursuit of particular interests and ideologies, and thus be open to 
change. In this understanding, political culture is made up of  
                                                          
14 Benhabib S, Rights of Others (CUP 2004) 171 
15 Ibid 26 
16 Somek A, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (Oxford 2014) 26 
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‘symbols that frame what issues, events or processes mean to social actors who are 
emotionally and intellectually invested in shared understandings of the world.’17  
 
While a cohesive society will share a collection of symbols which play a major role in binding 
that society together, the meaning of those symbols and the relative weight to be attached 
to them will vary for different groups within a society. These rival interpretations will in turn 
compete, over time, for dominance in a society’s political culture, through representation in 
mass media, elite political discourse, activist rhetoric and mediated public opinion.18  
 
A related argument about the notion of rights as a symbol that carry particular meaning, can 
be found in Scheingold’s discussion of the role that rights, and by extension the legal process 
that goes along with them, play in American political culture. Scheingold’s notion of the ‘myth 
of rights’ posits that rights are a ‘myth’ in American society in an anthropological sense; a 
story America tells itself which possesses a totemic quality that can be used for a variety of 
political ends.19 What Nash shows, though, is that this contested symbolism around the 
meaning of rights in America or elsewhere revolves around competing visions for the general 
social order. As Nash says,  
 
‘Although social actors rarely if ever, imagine a fully formulated blueprint of a new 
society… in using or contesting symbols that are meaningful to them they are 
nevertheless engaged, more or less consciously, either in trying to bring one about or, 
just as likely, in defending what already exists.’20 
 
Thus in disputing the symbolic meaning of the notion of rights or the influence on a society of 
migration, competing cultural factions are in fact in a larger contest over what kind of society 
they wish to live in. Rights, for example, are for Nash inherently tied to notions of 
internationalism, universalism and cosmopolitanism. Yet they require nation states and 
                                                          
17 Nash K, The Cultural Politics of Human Rights: Comparing the US and UK (CUP 2009) 1 
18 Ibid 7 
19 Scheingold S, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change (2nd Ed University of 
Michigan Press 2004) p. X 
20 Nash, (n17) 2 
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domestic political and legal environments for them to be actualised. As Larking has 
commented on Nash in relation to rights law, ‘internationally recognised human rights 
influence and are in turn influenced by domestic law, leading to a situation in which 
international and domestic law are mutually co-implicated and can no longer be neatly 
separated.’21 Like the transnational movement of people that Benhabib is concerned with, 
Nash and others such as Anderson22 have identified the inherently globalised human rights 
regime as essentially a cosmopolitan social project aimed at the promotion of the concept of 
societies owing duties to non-citizens. This is a particular ‘blueprint for a society’, but a 
contestable one which is likely to attract significant opposition. 
 
In sum, the literature on liberal states’ responses to migration indicates that they contain 
inherent tensions that pull policy-making in competing directions. However, this discussion is 
principally had at the level of political norms, including universalism and nationalism, rather 
than the mobilisation and enforcement of such norms through activist litigation or 
government reaction. At the same time, the related literature on the cultural politics of 
human rights and the difficulties of the ‘rights of others’ indicate that such activist litigation, 
whether it is intended or not, will symbolise and promote a particular contested vision of how 
such liberal societies should be structured; principally around cosmopolitan notions of 
universalism.   
 
ii) Rights-Based Litigation in Democracies 
 
The reliance on legalised ‘liberal norms’, in the tangible sense of a written rights charter or 
the more generalised sense of a respect for the rule of law when exercising the state’s 
immigration control function requires there to be widespread agreement on the validity of 
such norms. There is therefore a need for a theoretical basis from which to approach the 
question of this legitimacy.  
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As noted above, one of the key developments in the UK since Joppke’s seminal essay has been 
the introduction of the HRA. As will be discussed in more detail in chapters 3 and 6, this was 
part of a set of substantial developments in the practical application of the rule of law both 
to immigration questions and the UK’s wider governmental activities. In the UK context, 
discussion of the notion of the rule of law often begins with the work of AV Dicey.23 Dicey 
identified three core principles that he claimed made up the rule of law as it existed in Britain; 
  
i) that only laws that have been properly and previously established and applied by 
properly constituted courts are enforceable;  
ii) that such laws apply to all regardless of social rank; and  
iii) that general constitutional principles such as rights are to be developed through 
judicial decisions rather than predetermined in constitutional documents.24  
 
His approach has come to be associated with the ‘thin’ form of the rule of law by theorists 
such as May and Tamanaha who have grouped subsequent analyses and possible alternatives 
or combinations of alternatives into ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ forms.25 ‘Thick’ versions have tended to 
include issues of importance to politicised litigation strategies, such as judicial enforcement 
of human rights and a greater role for international law in domestic adjudication.26 As will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapters 3 and 6, the expansion of the practical framework for 
cause litigation, including the HRA, can be thought of as a thickening of the rule of law in the 
UK. For present purposes it is enough to note that such a process has inevitably been 
contested in both scholarly and political debate. 
 
In particular, the UK has been brought into the long running dispute over the merits and status 
of written bills of rights and the resultant power they tend to give to judicial decision 
makers.27 A bill of rights such as the HRA is premised on the notion that there are some issues 
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which should be removed from ‘the ordinary cut and thrust of everyday politics’28 and that 
pure majoritarian decision making leaves underrepresented groups (such as migrants) 
vulnerable to having even their basic rights being overridden.29 However, opponents claim 
that reliance on judges to resolve disputes about which there is honest and reasonable 
disagreement undermines the respect for individual autonomy that democracy is built on,30 
and that in any case there is no particular reason to think that a panel of judges will be 
superior in any tangible sense at reaching a fair decision on a given subject than a chamber of 
elected representatives.31  
 
Various attempts at developing a theoretically sound middle-ground between these two 
positions have been made, the most prominent of which has been Tushnet’s identification of 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ form judicial review.32 ‘Strong’ judicial review is capable of overriding 
legislation and is therefore vulnerable to the charge of anti-democratic illegitimacy. ‘Weak’ 
form review allows various means for the legislature to override the rights-decisions of the 
courts and thus, it is said, protects fundamental rights while preserving democratic 
accountability and legislative supremacy. The UK’s HRA is often held up as a paradigm 
example of this weak-form judicial review.33 It was, after all, conceived as a compromise 
whereby a form of legal constitutionalism could be introduced into the UK system without 
fundamentally changing the primacy of Parliament and thus ultimately preserving the UK’s 
‘political constitution’.34  
 
Rights would be protected firstly by the Act compelling Ministers to issue statements to 
Parliament confirming whether or not the legislation that they wished to pass was compatible 
with European Convention rights;35 secondly by an instruction to courts that they were, as far 
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33 Kavanagh A, ‘What’s So Weak About ‘Weak-Form Review’? The Case of the UK Human Rights Act 1998’, IJCL 
(2015) 13, 1008  
34 Klug F, Values for a Godless Age: The Story of the United Kingdom's New Bill of Rights (Penguin Books 2000) 
35 Human Rights Act 1998 s.19 
31 
 
as possible, to interpret any legislation in line with Convention rights;36 and thirdly by making 
it unlawful for any public authority (including courts and tribunals) to act in a way that was 
incompatible with Convention rights.37 At the same time, though, in circumstances where 
legislation could not be interpreted in line with Convention rights, the courts were denied a 
‘strike down’ power, as available to the US Supreme Court. In its place, they were instead 
empowered to issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ intended to inform Parliament and the 
Executive that a legislative provision could not be squared with the requirements of the 
European Convention.38 This relationship has been characterised and defended as promoting 
a ‘democratic dialogue’39 between the judicial, legislative and executive branches of 
government which would promote the defence of rights but leave Parliament with the final 
say. 40 
 
However, the argument has been made, particularly by Kavanagh but also by others,41 that 
there is little practical difference between supposedly ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms of review, 
that ‘weak’ form review is nothing of the kind.42 Conservative commentators object to what 
they see as ‘rights contagion’ undermining ‘British liberty’43 and have claimed that 
‘parliamentary committees such as the [Joint Committee on Human Rights] are more 
committed guardians of our human rights than are the appeal courts.’44 Along similar lines 
there is a substantial body of work from the left which is of the view that progressive politics 
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has more to fear from judicial review and interpretation, what Loughlin has termed ‘a form 
of aristocratic rule’,45 than it does from elected MPs. Based on the works of Griffiths,46 
Ewing47, and Bellamy,48 contemporary political constitutionalism asserts that rights of the 
kind found in the ECHR, made more readily available to British claimants through the HRA, 
are really ‘statements of a political conflict pretending to be a resolution of it’.49 
 
The present thesis will not seek to resolve these constitutional disputes. One of the key 
practical upshots of it for migrants’ rights litigation is the ongoing dispute over whether or 
not the Human Rights Act should itself be abolished and replaced with a ‘British Bill of 
Rights’.50 This crucial debate will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, in particular 
regarding how migrants’ rights litigation figures in that debate. For now, though, it appears 
that constitutional notions about ‘the rule of law’, the due role of courts, and the place of law 
and litigation in political decision making are subject to both evolution and fashion; with the 
identification of orthodoxies enabling the development of productive challenges to those 
orthodoxies. This creates a series of representations of the ‘correct’, traditional or historically 
validated interpretation of the UK’s constitutional arrangements, that work to confer 
legitimacy on activities and outcomes that the favoured interpretation produces. For the 
present study these debates can be more fruitfully conceptualised as part of the competition 
of ideas seeking a dominant role in political consciousness along the lines identified by Nash 
above. In seeking to understand the consequences of litigating immigration policy on behalf 
of a political cause, the thesis will address how these theoretical representations of the UK’s 
constitutional settlement influence the practical legal and political responses to such 
litigation.  
 
iii) Conclusion 
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The above debates around liberal states’ relationship with migration and questions of rights 
and legitimacy of decision making in democratic societies contain important indicators of the 
broader issues that activists seeking political change through rights-based litigation in the UK 
face. Litigation for migrants’ rights exists at the point where these higher order concerns 
meet; where the liberal notions of respect for rights and the rule of law as political concepts 
are put into effect through a testing of constitutional relationships between arms of the State. 
There are potential problems posed, though, by the co-option and aggressive promotion of 
liberal rights norms by the migrants’ rights movement in the face of countervailing structural 
pressures. There are also real-world limits and opportunities presented by the discursive 
power of competing visions of the rule of law and the separation of powers in the UK.  
 
Framework of Analysis 
 
The theories discussed above provide a framework for understanding the issues that activists 
seeking to use the law to progress the cause of migrants’ rights face. The practical realities of 
activist litigation have themselves been the subject of extensive analysis and theorisation in 
their own right. This second part of the section discusses how such analysis has been 
approached and from this discussion, identifies appropriate techniques and an appropriate 
terminology for the particular form of legal activism that this thesis focusses on. 
 
i) Approaches to the Analysis 
 
The study of the relationship between the law and social movements has developed a number 
of different approaches over the years. As was noted in the previous chapter, in contemporary 
scholarship it is most commonly associated with the term ‘legal mobilisation’.51 The modern 
approach to this term began to be formulated by McCann, who specified that it involved 
‘activists with some measure of choice regarding both the general institutional sites and the 
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particular substantive legal resources that might be mobilised to fight policy battles and 
advance movement goals.’52 The approach therefore encompasses the work not just of the 
lawyers involved, but of wider activist groups. Most importantly, though, ‘legal mobilisation’ 
in this broad sense encompasses a legal activity that is much wider than simply engaging in 
litigation. As Vanhala has noted, it  
 
‘can include many different types of strategies and tactics; such as raising rights 
consciousness among particular communities or the public, delivering public legal 
education or specialised legal education, lobbying for law reform or changes in the 
levels of access to justice, providing summary legal advice and referral services.’53 
 
Moreover, a legal mobilisation approach must take account of wider considerations than 
simply winning and losing in court.54 
 
This thesis cannot encompass all the facets of legal mobilisation that Vanhala identifies. 
However, the approach’s engagement with issues outside of the jurisprudence that activist 
litigation produces will be integral to this thesis’ interest in the wider consequences of 
politicised litigation. As McCann notes,  
 
‘analysts should not ignore the potential for movement mobilisation of legal symbols, 
normative claims and procedures as powerful resources of counter-hegemonic action 
that are not necessarily dependent on judicial confirmation.’55  
 
Thus, while the present thesis comfortably falls within the broad meaning of legal 
mobilisation scholarship, analytical approaches more tailored to the specific issues that arise 
out of litigation, and litigation for migrants’ rights in particular, will also be needed. 
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As Harlow and Rawlings have shown, social and political movements, as well as individuals 
with their own political causes, have been applying ‘pressure through law’ in the UK for 
hundreds of years.56 Yet, there has been little by way of in-depth analysis of the specific role 
litigation plays in migrants’ rights politics in the UK. For example, there has been no book-
length equivalent of Kawar’s comparative study on the politics of litigating immigration policy 
in the US and France that focuses on the UK. This is not to say, though, that there have been 
no studies that dealt with migrants’ rights and litigation issues in Western-European states, 
or looked at such litigation in the UK context specifically.  
 
Dembour, for example, has taken a practical approach to the questions raised by Benhabib, 
discussed above, through her detailed focus on how the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has dealt with migrants’ rights and immigration matters. She has argued that, 
contrary to the claims of opponents of the ECtHR, the ECtHR has taken a predominantly state-
centric view.57 Similarly, Cornelisse has focussed on what aspects of immigration control, 
particularly immigration detention, demonstrate about the relationship between ‘universal’ 
rights and territoriality, and the limits, as she sees them, of internationalist human rights 
litigation to combat the rights abuses of migrants by sovereign states.58 On the domestic 
front, Legomsky,59 Morris60 and Travers61 have all engaged with the UK’s asylum and 
immigration system, and issues of how political considerations and legal decision making 
interact. However, their approach is either significantly time bound, primarily ethnographic 
in approach, or using an asylum or immigration context in order to make arguments related 
to broader theoretical issues related to globalised notions of rights. A further difficulty with 
these studies is that they provide little by way of a systematised approach to the study of 
litigation as a form of activism.  
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A key issue for scholars either studying politicised legal action in general or particular 
instances of it is often to explain why a particular social movement62 uses litigation as a tool 
in its campaigning armoury. This question is often referred to as ‘the turn to litigation’. 
Political disadvantages, such as representing an unpopular or minority group, and resource 
availability are perhaps the most common and longest standing explanatory theories that 
appear.63 Yet, while migrants’ rights campaigners certainly fall within the category of 
supporting an unpopular and/or marginalised group, many of the key issues this group faces 
are inherently legal in nature. A migrant’s life, at least until they have achieved settlement, is 
bound up in applications, administrative decisions, appeals and judicial reviews. As such it 
would be misleading to approach the question of litigation as if it were always a strategic 
choice for migrants’ rights activists, or something that can be ‘turned to’. Litigation will be 
occurring, whether or not it is conducted by activists or conceived of in activist terms. 
 
A potentially more useful approach is the notion of ‘legal consciousness’. In relation to activist 
use of the law, its primary function has been to explore how law shapes not just human 
behaviour but also self-recognition, identity and ideals, 64 such as Vanhala’s discussion of how 
engaging in legal activism brought about changes in the self-identification of disabled 
people.65 Outside of reflexive effects on activist communities, Kawar has made related 
findings regarding the ‘radiating effects’ of legal activism for migrants’ rights in France and 
the US,66 and in particular the notion of legal activism affecting the terms of debate around 
immigration issues and the manner in which immigration policy is framed in societal and 
political discourse. As was noted in the introduction chapter, this thesis’ primary focus is the 
litigation itself, rather than, for example, notions of the self-identity of migrants and as such, 
Kawar’s approach to the issues of litigation’s radiating effects is more pertinent. A sole 
concentration on radiating effects, though, would be inappropriate for this thesis, as it would 
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require a turn away from the more tangible questions of the practical outcomes produced by 
litigation. Both perspectives will be accommodated in the thesis going forward. 
 
An important perspective both for the practical outcomes achieved and the wider 
consequences of engaging in activist litigation for migrants’ rights is the notion of legal 
opportunity structures (LOS). Building on the longer-standing idea of political opportunity 
structures, which will be discussed in greater detail below, LOS work emphasises the ways in 
which the systemic and procedural functioning of the legal system promotes certain sorts of 
cases, and therefore certain sorts of legal activism, and impedes others. Evans Case & 
Givens,67 for example, have focussed on the rules of standing in different judicial contexts in 
the EU and how they produce certain types of case.68 Andersen, in her work on LGBT rights in 
the US, relies heavily on an LOS framework.69 Legal opportunity structures create certain 
types of participant, in the sense of the claimants, their representatives and their adversaries. 
These participants, or rather the idea of these participants, inevitably have social and cultural 
resonances that may be highly consequential for the practices of symbolisation discussed 
above in relation to Nash’s work on cultural politics. Chapters 5 and 6 will discuss the 
relationship between the types of claimant the relevant legal opportunity structures create 
and the policy and political responses to migrants’ rights litigation.   
 
ii) Terminology of the Analysis 
 
As previously noted, an extensive body of work has built up which addresses the core issues 
at the heart of the present study, but as Vanhala has pointed out, ‘Academics, activists and 
legal actors conceptualise the use of legal action by social movements in a wide variety of 
ways.’70 Vanhala herself uses the term ‘strategic litigation’, Kawar, meanwhile, uses the term 
‘legal activism’ to discuss essentially the same activity.71 Others have referred to ‘test case 
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strategy’,72 ‘public interest litigation’,73 or the ‘law reform movement’.74  The term most 
commonly used amongst UK practitioners is ‘strategic litigation’. It is a tool that is of growing 
significance and its use both in practical terms and as terminology is being heavily promoted.  
Innovative funding bodies have been set up to encourage it,75 training seminars are organised 
to spread awareness of its possibilities amongst campaigning NGOs76 and legal charities have 
been formed with strategic litigation as a core element of their work.77 Yet, even this relatively 
straightforward branch of political legal action does not benefit from a settled definition. 
Vanhala states that, ‘when an organisation purposefully turns to the courts to pursue its goals, 
its action can be classified as strategic.’78 The Strategic Legal Fund, which finances strategic 
litigation for migrants’ rights, describes it as ‘work where the impact is likely to go beyond an 
individual case and to result in changes to law, policy and practice that will benefit a wider 
group of people’79 Smith, in investigating the response to the introduction of the HRA by legal 
NGOs in general, has used the formulation of a ‘test case strategy’ which he describes rather 
cyclically as, ‘An agency or institution taking a test case strategy is deliberately seeking a 
strategic approach.’80 
 
Strategic litigation has attracted a large degree of interest from analysts who naturally view 
it as the primary means by which activists seek political change through litigation. It is the 
most overtly politicised and easily accessible form of litigation that external analysts can 
identify. Yet, as has already been noted, it is not only strategic litigation that has political 
consequences. This is a factor which is often missed or at least brushed over in studies that 
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focus primarily on strategic litigation,81 which tend to view it in isolation. To the extent that 
day to day litigation is mentioned it is dealt with as if it were a place holder, waiting for 
strategic opportunities to arise. This may be because in many contexts litigation is not such 
a daily event as it is in asylum and immigration matters. Indeed, it is in studies that most 
directly relate to immigration, particularly those by Sterett,82 Meili83 and Webber,84 that the 
most detailed exploration of the role of day-to-day litigation in the protection of rights can 
be found. As Sterett puts it, ‘working for individual clients, independent of a concern for 
long-term rule change, is crucial’.85  
 
Non-strategic day-to-day litigation on individual cases can also be conceptualised as a form 
of activism.86 Sarat and Scheingold have referred to it as an ‘act of resistance… carried out on 
behalf of powerless groups’.87 It can also be treated as politicised by the outside world. 
Moreover, non-strategic day-to-day litigation is also capable of producing the kind of legal 
change that strategic litigation strives for. This is particularly true in a heavily judicialised 
context such as immigration and migrants’ rights, where litigation is a regular feature of 
migrants’ interaction with the state.88 Purely as a result of weight of numbers, the vast 
majority of case law must be developed in a non-strategic way. An alternative term is 
therefore needed that encompasses both strategic and non-strategic forms of litigation for 
migrants’ rights.  
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Sociologists and socio-legal scholars have for some time now focussed on the professional 
relationships and performance as a legal representative under the term ‘lawyering’.89 
Traditional ‘lawyering’ is generally thought of as based on a cab-rank approach to client 
selection and an ethical commitment to nothing more than the professional duties expected 
of a legal representative.90 In contrast to this, scholars Sarat and Scheingold have pioneered 
the term ‘cause lawyering’.91 They and their contributors have identified cause lawyering as 
a distinct category on the basis of the motivations behind the practitioners’ work. Cause 
lawyers are, ‘lawyers who commit themselves and their legal skills to furthering a vision of 
“the good society” through ‘moral activism’.92 The work of such committed cause lawyers, 
though, is only part of the story. Activist litigation of this kind also involves campaigning NGOs, 
charities and other activist groups. They can act as claimants or intervenors in strategic cases, 
investigate issues, provide supporting evidence and act in supportive capacities for migrant 
claimants.93  
 
As such, an alternative term is necessary. The terms cause lawyering and strategic litigation 
will be combined to form the phrase ‘cause litigation’; meaning litigation that is motivated by 
a desire to support and promote the political cause of migrants’ rights. This terminology 
allows for a range of actors to be involved, both lawyers and non-legal campaign groups 
engaging in litigation and litigation support activities, unified by a shared participation in the 
movement and a political commitment to the ‘cause’ of migrants’ rights. While ‘cause 
litigation’ is a phrase that has appeared a small number of times within the literature, it 
usually goes undefined and is used without a detailed consideration of what legal and activist 
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work is and is not included under the umbrella of the term.94 The term’s use in the present 
study should be understood as a product of various different elements of the scholarly work 
that has gone before it, combined with an appreciation of the practical realities that the 
migrants’ rights cause in the UK operates with.  
 
iii) Conclusion 
 
This section has sought to provide an overview of the key literature that relates to both the 
broader theoretical issues that litigation for migrants’ rights raises and the practical business 
of analysing such litigation as a form of activism. The broader studies raised a number of 
useful issues, in particular, how the role of liberal norms in forming state responses to 
migration might be affected by the deliberate co-option of those norms by activists; and how 
competing representations of the constitutional settlement, and indeed the notion of there 
being a ‘settlement’ in the sense of a defined and ‘correct’ position, may influence how legal 
activism is received both judicially and politically. The literature on analysis of legal activism 
showed that opportunity structures and a wider conception of legal consciousness that takes 
into account societal attitudes to rights litigation, will be important approaches. It also found 
that the terminology of ‘cause litigation’ was most appropriate for the present thesis.  
 
Section 2: The Key Influences on Cause Litigation 
 
The outcomes and consequences of cause litigation are likely to be highly influenced by 
relatively intricate relationships between social, cultural, political and legal factors in the UK. 
As McCann has put it, ‘How law matters depends on the complex, often changing dynamics 
of context in which struggles occur.’95 Indeed, as was discussed in the previous section, the 
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need to develop the term ‘cause litigation’ itself stemmed from the particular circumstances 
of migrants’ rights litigation in the UK context. 
 
It is possible to approach the general literature on constitutional debate, social movement 
activism and political litigation with this contextual specificity in mind. In doing so, insights 
into what are commonly found to be the key influences on political legal action can be 
discussed and those particularly pertinent to the UK can be identified. Three key themes 
emerge, which are discussed in turn in this section.  
 
Three Key Themes 
 
i) The Resources Available to the Movement 
 
Scholars of social movements have for a long time focussed on the capacity of a given 
movement to mobilise resources, financial, human, intellectual etc, as a key determinant of 
their effectiveness.96 This ‘resource mobilisation theory’ has subsequently been applied to 
the particular resources required for successful activism through law.97 While this 
consideration is perhaps unsurprising, the literature does reveal a number of nuances to it 
that will be particularly important for a cause litigation approach. 
 
The first is that cause litigation requires not only a high level of legal capacity but also for it to 
be relatively abundant and geographically widespread. Numerous studies have highlighted 
the need for expert legal representation for social movements and campaigning NGOs 
embarking on a legal strategy. Morag-Levine’s study of conservationist NGOs turning to 
litigation98 and Bouwen & McCown’s examination of the strategies of interest groups in the 
European union99 both point to the crucial role that access to such expertise has on the shape 
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and direction of movement activities. In relation to the classic example of the NAACP in the 
US civil rights movement, Tushnet in particular has argued for the central importance of the 
organisation’s access to ‘extraordinarily talented lawyers’ in the success of its litigation 
campaign.100  
 
However, these studies were principally focussed on the limited contexts of single 
organisations and/or exclusively strategic litigation approaches. Cause litigation, which as 
discussed above includes the daily representation of cases with no particular strategic merit, 
certainly has need of such expertise, but it must also try to make it available to as wide a 
proportion of the movement’s constituency as possible. Epp points to the existence of a 
generation of dedicated lawyers as being a crucial element in his ‘support structure’ for a 
‘rights revolution’.101 Meanwhile, in relation to migrants’ rights specifically, Webber describes 
expert legal representation as ‘hugely important’, pointing to a substantial difference in 
success between represented and unrepresented cases and the particular vulnerability of 
migrants to ‘exploitation by profit driven firms and backstreet charlatans.’102 
 
This relationship between the movement at large and the lawyers that populate and work for 
it has also been shown to be potentially fraught with complications. Scholars have voiced 
concerns that a movement that becomes overpopulated or dominated by lawyers risks 
distorting its aims and disempowering and alienating its activists.103 As Barclay and Fisher 
have pointed out,  
 
‘one of the difficulties with using legal strategies to define or achieve movement goals 
is that it requires social movements to adopt fixed goals over extended periods of 
time….Scholars have long noted and argued about the tension between cause lawyers 
pursuing planned litigation and the fundamental need of a social movement to set its 
own direction.’104  
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However, while these concerns are clearly of substantial significance for cause litigation 
activism, there is a limit to the remedial steps that can be taken. Cause litigation exists in a 
context where legal representation and litigation are necessary for individual clients with day-
to-day needs distinct from the wider movement. Such a context is likely to lead to lawyers 
and legal concerns taking a dominant position within the movement as a whole. Yet this need 
not be an exclusively negative influence. As McCann has argued,  
 
‘legal mobilisation does not inherently disempower or empower citizens… Legal 
relations, institutions and norms tend to be double-edged, at once upholding the 
larger infrastructure of the status quo while providing many opportunities for episodic 
challenges and transformations in that ruling order.’105  
 
What will matter most, then, is the capacity for the legal and non-legal aspects of the 
movement to work in a coordinated manner. 
 
This coordination can involve activists in the wider movement contributing to the litigation 
that is being undertaken. Analysts of more sophisticated litigation strategies now regularly 
highlight the important role that activists peripheral to the strategic litigation itself can play 
in case identification, evidence gathering, claimant support and in the process of framing 
movement demands in terms most conducive to litigation. For example, McCann documents 
the practical support in terms of resources, evidence gathering and support of individuals 
whose litigation became leading test cases for pay equity provided by unions, feminist 
campaigners and civil liberties groups.106  Litigation coordination of this kind is likely to have 
a significant influence both on case outcomes, the choice of cases taken, in strategic 
circumstances where choice is possible, and a migrant claimant’s capacity to navigate the 
litigation process relatively smoothly. 
 
                                                          
105 McCann M, ‘Law and Social Movements’ in Sarat (n95) 519 
106 McCann, (n51) 116 - 124 
45 
 
Scholars, particularly sceptics of legal mobilisation approaches to activism such as Rosenberg, 
Klarman107 and Tushnet,108 have emphasised that it is at least extremely difficult (Rosenberg 
and Tushnet would argue impossible) for a litigation strategy to have positive outcomes for a 
particular client group without the extensive involvement of non-legal, non-litigation 
orientated activists engaged in influential public discourse and contestation. Litigation may 
be able to have a positive effect, but Rosenberg in particular argues that it is wrong to assume 
‘that courts can overcome political obstacles and produce change without mobilisation and 
participation.’109 A positive effect for litigation may come where mobilisation and mass 
participation have contributed to movements in the political environment discussed above. 
Thus litigation would need to be coordinated to follow up on more mainstream activism to 
be sure of being positively influential. Without this coordination, these sceptics warn, 
litigation risks having substantively negative consequences through generating a powerful 
backlash against the decisions that are being made and the manner in which they are being 
taken.110 
 
Given that cause litigation operates in and has influences on a public and political 
environment, it is likely to need to be part of a movement which as a whole is able to 
effectively respond to that environment. The thesis will therefore examine in chapter 3 how 
the UK’s migrants’ rights cause litigation sector is constituted. Then, across Section 2, the 
extent to which the UK’s cause litigators are able to co-ordinate to deliver both their litigation-
focussed activity and broader public engagement is explored. The focus of this analysis will 
be on the outcomes and consequences that such coordination, or lack thereof, produces. 
 
ii) Legal and Judicial Context 
 
A clear indication from the legal mobilisation literature is that the legal framework and the 
judicial context cause litigation operates within is a major influence on its outcomes and 
consequences. As was discussed above, these issues have in recent times often been 
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approached in relation to the ‘legal opportunity structures’ (LOS) that exist in a given context. 
That framework is not used here partly to avoid confusion with the political opportunity 
structures discussed below, but also because as a portmanteau term it tends to cover areas 
that are being separated out in the present analysis. In particular, the rules relating to the 
funding of cases are here dealt with under the ‘resources’ issues discussed above, but have 
often come into consideration in LOS-based analysis.111 An analytical division between 
resources, and what goes on in the courtroom, governed by the legal framework and judicial 
context they are working with, provides a clearer, if slightly overly neat, working distinction. 
 
Turning to the legal framework of cause litigation first, much of it will be made up of 
legislation which sets out the State’s engagement with a particular group or issue being 
supported by activists. For migrants’ rights litigation this will be the various statutes dealing 
with immigration law and related matters, such as citizenship and the increasingly large range 
of social and economic regulations which contain an immigration element. The powers such 
legislation grants to the state, and the duties it imposes upon them, will to a very significant 
extent provide the circumstances and form the basis for the arguments that cause litigators 
go on to contest.112 
 
However, it has been clear since the early days of legal mobilisation studies in the US that the 
presence or lack of underlying and fundamental constitutional rights that are amenable to 
litigation are of the greatest importance to cause litigators.113 This is most likely because 
unpopular and/or marginalised groups that require cause litigation support are unlikely to 
face a benign legislative environment.114 In contrast, as was noted above, the fact that US 
citizens have a Bill of Rights available to them that is legally enforceable is frequently cited as 
the fundamental basis for the development of a culture of legalised activism.115 Prior to the 
HRA’s introduction, comparative studies of the role of courts in US and UK politics or 
commentary on politicised lawyering in the UK would regularly cite the lack of a litigable rights 
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charter as an obstacle to the development of what this thesis is calling cause litigation.116  
However, while the fact of there being a legalised rights charter to turn to may well be a major 
influence on activists’ decisions to turn to litigation, the study of cause litigation engaged in 
here is specifically intended to relate to situations faced by those, such as migrants’ rights 
activists, who have little or no effective choice. Of potentially greater influence, therefore, is 
the nature of the rights that these charters enshrine. 
 
A key division in this regard is often identified as being between the classically liberal rights, 
often characterised as negative rights, provided in documents such as the US Constitution, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) on the one hand, and the more expansive social rights contained in 
more recent rights charters, most famously the post-Apartheid South African Constitution.117 
The nature of these rights documents influences not only the judgments that are made 
possible by them, but also the nature of the debate regarding legitimacy and the place of 
judicial rights promotion in democratic societies. In societies which reserve their 
constitutional rights protection for civil and political rights there is an assumption of a more 
limited role of rights and legal action. Even writers who strongly support the notion of social 
and economic rights, such as Gearty, tend to regard them as fundamentally belonging to 
political argument and as having no place in law;  
 
‘The least effective way of securing social rights is via an over-concentration on the 
legal process, with the constitutionalisation of such rights being an especial disaster 
wherever it occurs.’118 
 
In contrast, the more traditional and commonplace position regarding acceptable legal rights 
in the UK has perhaps been summed up best by Tomkins, who has stated that, 
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‘Judicially enforceable substantive rights may be deemed compatible with political 
constitutionalism when they are narrowly defined and absolute… It is those qualified 
political claims that are elevated to the status of substantive rights that are 
problematic.’119  
 
The rights that Tomkins regards as ‘qualified political claims’ particularly include Article 8, the 
right to respect for a private and family life. While this right derives from the ECHR and can 
be perceived as fitting within the classically negative rights position, it also contains sufficient 
ambiguity to be regarded by Tomkins, and many others as a political claim masquerading as 
a right. This point is vital for the present study as Article 8 plays a crucial role in migrants’ 
rights litigation.120 As will be discussed at greater length in chapters 3 and 5, the fact that the 
current legal framework available to cause litigators in the UK includes rights such as Article 
8, has had far reaching consequences for the migrants’ rights movement. The legal framework 
thus works not only to shape the nature of litigation that is able to take place, but also to 
condition the societal response to that litigation.  
 
The literature also indicates that of equal importance to the outcomes produced by cause 
litigation is the judicial context of judges’ ability and willingness to intervene in executive 
decision making and their approach to doing so. Viewing the judicial context as an influence 
on cause litigation indicates that it must be considered as a variable, rather than a constant. 
Yet the traditional notion of a judge’s role, referred to by Segal and Spaeth as the ‘legal 
model’, is essentially centred around the idea that ‘decisions of a Court are based on the facts 
of the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the 
framers, precedent, and a balancing of societal interests’.121 However, as was also noted 
above, critical analysists have long since recognised a gap between this ‘law on the books’ 
and law in reality. Legal process is not a machine for cases to be fed into for the ‘correct’ 
outcome to be reached. While Galanter long ago identified relative financial resources as a 
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key determinant of legal disputes, noting that ‘the haves come out ahead’,122 others have 
problematised judges and the judiciary as key determinants themselves.  
 
Some approaches to the critical reappraisal of the judicial role in litigation, such as that 
pursued by Segal and Spaeth, prioritise the personal politics of individual judges as key 
determinants.123 Others, have tended to approach the question in terms of the judiciary as a 
class.124 Whichever approach is emphasised, the problematisation of judges has served to 
show that the traditional ‘legal model’ cannot be relied upon. As Griffiths has argued, ‘judges 
must be judged by their policies, by which I mean their political attitudes, their views of where 
the public interest lies, as these affect their conclusions.’125 It is arguable, though, that it is 
not only judges’ final determinations of cases that are affected by these issues, but also 
preliminary determinations such as whether or not to grant permission to proceed with 
judicial reviews and the manner in which they conduct hearings. For cause litigation, then, 
there are three points at which the judicial approach to the litigation is highly influential on 
the outcomes it can produce. They condition what kinds of cases get heard and what progress 
can be made by cause litigators. They will also condition the tactics used and the types of 
argument that cause litigators submit in the first place, through professional experience and 
received wisdom. They are therefore fundamental to the cause litigation enterprise. 
 
The judicial approach to dealing with cause litigation, what Griffiths terms their ‘policies’, is 
largely governed by notions of ‘justiciability’. As McGoldrick points out, ‘an issue is considered 
to be justiciable in a particular forum if it is capable of being decided in that legal forum and 
it is considered appropriate to do so.’126 As McGoldrick goes on to note, though,  
 
‘Such a description has elements of circularity. If an issue is suitable for judicial 
determination it is said to be justiciable. If it is not so suitable it is said to be non-
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justiciable. However, conceptions of capability, fora and appropriateness may change 
over time.’127  
 
It is arguable, though, that it is not merely over time that judgments of ‘appropriateness’ may 
change, but also between individual judges and particular circumstances.  
 
Justiciability or ‘appropriateness’ decisions when dealing with cause litigation are often 
expressed in terms of what is ultimately law (and therefore within a judge’s remit) and what 
is politics (and therefore outside of such a remit). Granting or refusing permission for a case 
to proceed, or accepting or rejecting an argument during a hearing frequently involves a judge 
commenting on what they consider to be either ‘legal’ or ‘political’.128 These determinations 
are a practical manifestation of the debate, discussed earlier in this chapter, regarding 
conceptions of the rule of law and in particular the separation of powers. Just as in 
constitutional debate there is no fixed meaning of the content and application of the rule of 
law, judges’ personal adherence to thick and thin varieties of it may vary. This is where the 
analytical division between the judiciary as a class and judges as individuals becomes crucial, 
as while the judiciary as a class may have a common adherence to the rule of law, individual 
judges may be inclined towards greater interventionism while others may be committed to 
preserving a more traditional separation of powers. These divisions are likely to play a crucial 
part in the outcomes of particular cause litigation efforts, and will be discussed throughout 
this thesis’ analysis of cases. 
 
The approaches of individual judges in individual cause litigation cases to the justiciability of 
issues in dispute can also be aggregated to become trends that have the potential to produce 
broader consequences. A common view on such trends has been that UK judges have for 
many years operated a considerable degree of self-policing regarding contentious areas of 
social concern; whereby many areas were deemed to be outside, or largely outside, the ambit 
of judicial interference.129 Immigration, historically, has been shown to be one such area.130 
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However, as will be discussed in chapter 3, analysts have noted that areas previously regarded 
as falling within the ‘political’ realm, and therefore generally outside the judicial purview, 
have in recent times begun to receive closer judicial scrutiny.131 In its examination of cause 
litigation cases, section 2 will discuss whether and in what ways there has been increased 
judicial intervention in migrants’ rights and immigration issues. Any such increase would have 
important implications for the outcomes possible from cause litigation, but may also bring 
with it political consequences if the separation of powers in immigration issues has been 
altered by the judiciary. 
 
iii) Political Opportunity Structures 
 
The third clear indication from across the studies is that while the legal and judicial 
frameworks will have a clear influence on outcomes for all litigators, cause litigation is 
particularly susceptible to the mediated public discourse, electoral politics and policy-making 
processes that pertain to the issue they are litigating. In contrast to the legal opportunity 
structures discussed above, studies of the political influences on social movement activism 
have often used the rubric of Political Opportunity Structures.132  
 
As Koopman’s et al note, ‘each form of collective action is understood as part of a larger 
political process and as being shaped by the opportunities and constraints offered by its 
political environment.’ 133  However, they also identify a number of shortcomings in the 
traditional Political Opportunity Structure approach, including a bias towards institutional 
opportunities, such as the relative openness of policy processes, a tendency to over generalise 
outside of a particular context and a failure to grasp the notion of contentious politics as being 
fundamentally interactive and dynamic.134 The present study adopts many of the same 
considerations. The interactive and dynamic nature of the issue is at the heart of this study’s 
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concern with the consequences of cause litigation on the wider politics of migration and rights 
in the UK. Contextual specificity has been a theme of this chapter and will be dealt with in 
detail in the chapter 3. Likewise the nature of policy development and implementation 
processes will be discussed in an appropriate context below and in the next chapter.  
Koopmans et al seek to correct these shortcomings in their approach to POS by encompassing 
both ‘institutional opportunities in the form of the chances of access and influence in the 
decision making process’135 and the ‘discursive opportunities and constraints’, such as how 
an issue is framed and approached in political and media debate and public perception.136 
The same approach will therefore be applied here.  
 
Turning to the ‘institutional opportunities’ first, the most obvious manner in which they are 
influential on cause litigation is in relation to the policy development and legislative 
processes. Here, the executive produces potentially rights-affecting migration policy which 
then form the basis of the litigation that follows. To some extent, the ability of a social 
movement to influence these processes will depend on the movements themselves; the 
capacities of their constituent entities, the ideologies and other motivations of the 
participants and the lobbying connections that the movement are able to cultivate. However, 
the institutional political opportunity structures that Koopmans et al discuss indicate that 
there are structural factors in a society’s constitutional and political arrangements that locate 
decision making and oversight responsibilities in different areas of the state and determine 
their powers relative to each other. This arrangement in turn dictates the relative openness 
of a policy process to outside influence, including attempts at influence from social movement 
campaigns. In discussing the particular context that migrants’ rights campaigners in the UK 
face, chapter 3 will therefore address the ministerial, administrative and legislative 
relationships that govern the UK’s immigration policy processes. This will be in order to 
discuss the manner in which the state is able to develop policy in response to cause litigation 
and the extent to which the migrants’ rights movement is able to influence that process.   
 
It is not only in policy and legislative developments that institutional openness or closure and 
relative powers over decision making may influence the state’s response to cause litigation. 
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This question of the institutional reaction also arises in the manner in which the executive’s 
administrative arm responsible for the implementation of law in the particular policy area in 
question reacts to the cause litigation being pursued. Securing legal change through the 
courts is often intended to result in change in Executive behaviour towards the group or issue 
that activists are concerned with. However, the importance of administrative actors’ attitudes 
to the litigation comes because, as Rosenberg points out, ‘Court decisions, requiring people 
to act, are not self-executing’. Courts possess very little, if any, direct power to enforce the 
legal and social change that their judgments are said to bring about.137 Instead, administrative 
agencies are created to enforce the law governing their policy area and in principle should do 
so regardless of the source of that law, whether it comes through parliamentary legislation, 
executive policy or, crucially for the cause litigation perspective, expansions in judicial 
interpretation. However, they are also creations of and form part of the executive arm of 
government and may in some circumstances become dominated by executive policy concerns 
over other sources of law. Thus, in circumstances where the litigation outcomes happen to 
coincide with the aims of an executive policy then it is entirely possible for that litigation to 
be enthusiastically implemented and enforced by the administration.138 However, far more 
prevalent in the literature are instances in which administrative agencies have either outright 
refused to implement law change from the courts, or more commonly sought to circumvent 
it by interpreting rulings in a restrictive light and using them as a spur to new and varied forms 
of discriminatory or otherwise rights-damaging behaviour.139  
 
In relation to migrants’ rights in the UK the primary administration responsible for 
implementation of immigration law, and thus cause litigation judgements, is the Home Office 
and its immigration service. The second section of the thesis will examine its responses to the 
cause litigation to assess the extent to which judgments are whole-heartedly implemented. 
In light of Koopmans et al’s findings regarding the importance of discursive opportunity 
structures, though, this will not be the sole focus of the analysis. While the institutional 
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opportunity structures may govern the capacity of the executive to devise and implement 
rights-affecting policy and empowers its administration to be the primary enforcer of cause 
litigation decisions, the discursive structures are also crucial to the executive’s motivations 
and approach to these actions. 
 
In some respects, discursive POS are influential on cause litigation both prior to and during 
litigation activity being undertaken. Firstly, the mediated and governmental discourse on an 
issue or particular social group will influence its uptake as a cause worth fighting for by 
politically engaged litigators. It is the engagement with the politics of an issue which 
distinguishes cause litigation from the traditional kind engaged in by most lawyers. As 
discussed above, cause litigation is to a significant extent a question of motivation, with ‘belief 
in a cause and a desire to advance the goals of that cause’ being ‘the forces that drive cause 
lawyering actions.’140 Discursive POS also have the capacity to overlap with the judicial 
context discussed above, in influencing judicial decisions on justiciability. Describing 
something as ‘political’ can function as a convenient explanation for judges to refuse to 
engage with issues they know to be contentious in wider political debate.141 As will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5, moreover, judges may be sensitive to developments in 
public debate regarding their own judgements and, despite their institutional insulation, may 
be influenced by related political pressure.   
  
How an issue, such as immigration, is framed in mediated public discourse, though, is likely 
to be most directly influential on governmental responses to cause litigation successes. 
Writers such as Anderson,142 Somerville143 and Zackin144 have all identified factors such as 
media representation of an issue, public attitudes to that issue and the pressures of political 
party competition regarding that issue as likely to promote the development of rights-
                                                          
140 Hilbink T, ‘You Know the Type: Categories of Cause Lawyering’ (2004) 29 L&SE 657 659 
141 Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’ (Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur, 20 November 2013) 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf accessed 22 September 2016 
142 Bridgit Anderson, (n22) 45-46 
143 Somerville W, Immigration Policy under New Labour (Policy Press 2007) 119-139 
144 Zackin (n63) 368 
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damaging policies of concern to cause litigators. Hanson145 and Tichenor146 have also 
identified a tendency of administrators and policy makers in contested areas to rely on the 
direction of previous approaches as a defensive mechanism, known as path dependency. Thus 
there is a risk that rights damaging policies and practices may be adopted and then 
perpetuated by an executive under pressure from public discourse and unable or unwilling to 
challenge it. Moreover, the extent that the governmental wing of the executive exercises 
political control over the administrative exercise of policy and law implementation will also 
govern the possibility that discursive pressure influences administrative behaviour and 
decision making in response to cause litigation and migrants’ rights claims. Chapters 4 and 5 
will discuss the practical responses of the executive to various forms of cause litigation activity 
and the extent to which discursive POS drive those responses. 
 
One further important point regarding discursive POS is that the framing in mediated public 
and governmental discourse of the cause the cause litigators are fighting for, in this case 
migrants’ rights, will also impact on how judgments that are actually given on cause litigation 
cases are received and understood. If a particular cause is framed in heroic terms as righteous 
underdogs seeking justice then the activity of cause litigation in its name and the judicial 
outcomes it achieves are likely to be understood very differently to if a cause is framed in 
negative terms, as trivial, alien or threatening. This factor is particularly starkly revealed in 
discussion of the possible benefits to activist groups of losing cause litigation cases. Analysts 
such as Depoorter, have shown that where a cause is itself positively framed, legal failure can 
lead to upsurges in sympathy or support for what is perceived as a structurally unjust or unfair 
outcome, regardless of the legal correctness of the judicial decision in question.147 As chapters 
5 and 6 will discuss, though, where a cause is negatively framed, legal success may potentially 
bring with it a different set of risks if it promotes the interests of an unpopular group. 
 
                                                          
145 Hansen R, ‘Globalization, embedded realism, and path dependence: The other immigrants to Europe’ 
(2002) 35 Comparative Political Studies 259 
146 Tichenor D J, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton University Press 2002) 
11 
147 Depoorter (n54) 
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It is therefore vital for an analysis of the outcomes and consequences of cause litigation that 
both the institutional and discursive opportunity structures around immigration and 
migrants’ rights are understood, and this will be discussed fully in chapter 3. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out a number of points which will guide this thesis’ analysis. The first is 
that in order to understand activist litigation’s role in the UK’s immigration politics the 
analysis must engage with some of the main arguments in the theoretical study of human 
migration and the discussion on liberal rights and the due place of law in democratic 
constitutions. Political theorists of migration and liberal states have shown that there are 
inherent contradictions within the liberal framework which are likely to render migration as 
permanently controversial and lacking in mainstream support. Migrants have been shown as 
likely to struggle to be afforded the same as, or even comparative rights to, ‘native’ members 
of a community, owing to the inherent reliance on membership and citizenship for rights 
protection. At the same time, constitutional rights theorists have debated the extent to which 
it is even appropriate for members of minorities to have access to legally enforceable rights 
over the majority. The framework in which these debates occur and the issues they throw up 
both point to likely obstacles in the way of substantial gains being made for migrants’ rights 
through an approach that focusses on enforcing legal rights through litigation. They also 
indicate the terms in which much of the opposition to this form of activism is likely to be 
framed. 
 
The second is that the research must be centred in the learning from the growing school of 
socio-legal scholars concerned with the relationship between litigation, lawyers, social 
movements and political change. This involves the intersection of a number of factors which 
could be worthy of extended study in their own right and as a result there is no settled 
theoretical or methodological approach that can be adopted wholesale for the present 
concerns. While an analytical approach modelled on the notion of legal mobilisation is 
relevant, it has also been shown to be too broad to be used alone in the present study. As a 
result, the hybrid notion of cause litigation has been developed which is able to take account 
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of numerous factors, including the technical legal work that goes into activist litigation and 
the role that both strategic and non-strategic litigation can play as forms of activism. 
 
What has been kept from the legal mobilisation approach, however, is a major focus on the 
factors that surround the litigation, that influence its outcomes in a legal sense and its 
consequences in a political sense. Legal mobilisation is about significantly more than just the 
act of taking cases to court, and this is a lesson that will be reflected throughout this thesis. 
While court decisions are no doubt important for cause litigators, they are only one aspect of 
the role they play in the politics of migrants’ rights in the UK. The literature connected to legal 
mobilisation and cause lawyering has shown that there are in fact three broad factors which 
influence what cause litigation for migrants’ rights in the UK is able to produce. These are the 
financial, human and institutional resources available to the movement; the legal and judicial 
framework the litigators work with and the institutional and discursive political opportunity 
structures in which they operate and are a part of.  
 
Having identified these three key features, the next chapter will discuss the specific context 
of cause litigation for migrants’ rights in the UK and assess how these factors play out.
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Chapter 3: Cause Litigation for Migrants’ Rights in the UK Context 
 
Introduction 
In the late 90s there was a voluntary sector compact with the Labour government. 
They couldn’t agree one with the refugee field and the Home Office - they just couldn’t 
agree one...that was about the level of mutual hostility and distrust around the then 
IND and the refugee charities and lawyers in that field.1 
Drawing from the studies discussed in the previous chapter, it has been possible to identify 
three broad factors which act as the crucial influences on cause litigation as a strategy for 
migrants’ rights activism. These factors make it possible for cause litigation to function, 
provide its impetus and most importantly, shape the outcomes and consequences it 
produces. The factors identified were; 
 
i) the resources of the movement involved, 
ii) the judicial and legal framework in play in the issue, 
iii) the political opportunity structures the cause litigators operate within 
 
Taking these as a starting point, this chapter will analyse how they play out in the context of 
cause litigation for migrants’ rights in the UK.  
 
The chapter will discuss the extent to which the factors function in a way that facilitates 
positive outcomes for the movement and the migrants’ it seeks to support. It will also 
examine whether they contain problematic elements that are likely to limit the beneficial 
impacts of litigation for migrants’ rights and potentially even provide fertile ground for the 
kind of backlash that litigation-strategy analysts have observed in other contexts.2 It takes 
each of the three factors in turn and uses data gathered from activist and practitioner 
                                                          
1 Funding Officer Interview, 15th April 2014 
2 Rosenberg G, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (2nd Ed, University of Chicago Press 
2008); Klarman M, Brown v. Board of Education and the civil rights movement: abridged edition of From Jim Crow 
to civil rights: the Supreme Court and the struggle for racial equality (Oxford University Press 2007); Andersen E 
A, Out Of The Closets And Into The Courts: Legal Opportunity Structure And Gay Rights Litigation (University of 
Michigan Press 2006)  
59 
 
interviews, policy papers, media reports and academic analysis to discuss their nature and 
how they relate to and influence migrants’ rights litigation. In analysing the role of these 
factors in the UK context, the chapter will show that the picture is mixed. While there are 
some elements that indicate the potential for positive outcomes from litigation, these suffer 
from important limitations and are contrasted with some strongly adverse factors.  
 
These circumstances, the chapter concludes, suggest that cause litigation may be limited in 
terms of the positive outcomes and consequences for migrants’ rights that it can achieve and 
carries with it significant risks.  
 
The UK’s Migrants’ Rights Activists 
 
‘We've ended up relying on lords and judges and I have to say for me at my age it feels 
very peculiar… At one point I remember thinking 'who is that old person standing up 
and arguing our brief?' and it was Robert Carr, who had been Home Secretary for the 
Tories. It must have been in the Sixties, because I remember that the Angry Brigade 
bombed his house. And I was thinking, “Oh dear, when I was younger we didn't think 
that was necessarily such a bad thing and now here we are”.3 
 
This statement from a veteran of the migrants’ rights movement in the UK reflects both the 
origins of the cause and a key aspect of its current condition. The campaign for migrants’ 
rights has its roots in the radicalism of the sixties and seventies and in particular its struggles 
for racial equality. Since that time, as this section will show, the movement has to a substantial 
degree (although not exclusively) moved away from mass participatory social struggles, and 
become simultaneously more legalised and institutionalised.  
 
Inspired by the civil rights movement in the United States and responding to the first 
generation of post-War New Commonwealth immigration that brought large numbers of 
black and Asian people to settle in the UK, the liberal and radical left in the UK began to 
mobilise in opposition to the pervasive discrimination that marked the period.4 These 
                                                          
3 Migrants’ Rights Consultant Interview 27th August 2013 
4 Webber F, Borderline Justice: The Fight for Refugee and Migrant Rights (Pluto 2012) 6-7;  
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campaigns met with significant success in relation to domestic social and economic policy, 
particularly in the forms of the Race Relations Acts of 1965, ‘68 and ‘76 which set out to ban 
racial discrimination in the provision of housing, employment and services.5 However, as 
Spencer points out, during the same period the British state had developed a ‘bi-partisan 
consensus that firm immigration control is the prerequisite of good race relations’.6 
 
As Epp has put it ‘By the mid-sixties the issue of immigration became increasingly politicised, 
as well as increasingly defined in racial terms.’7 As a result, while those motivated by racist 
sentiment saw immigration control as key to stopping ‘the future growth of the immigrant-
descended population’,8 campaigners for racial equality equally saw the state’s immigration 
policy and practices as a major battleground for their cause. In 1967 the Joint Council for the 
Welfare of Immigrants was set up to act as ‘representatives of those communities which 
found themselves victims of a particular set of legal procedures… established not merely as a 
legal advice service, but as an anti-racist alliance.’9 In sympathy with this anti-discrimination 
movement was a related generation of ‘radical lawyers’.10 The JCWI was joined in 1984 by the 
Immigration Law Practitioner’s Association (ILPA), founded as a professional association for 
the nascent immigration legal profession with a mission ‘to promote and improve advice and 
representation in immigration, asylum and nationality law.’11 Such an association was badly 
needed in order to combat the widespread prejudice that immigration law was populated by 
‘bad lawyers arguing badly for dishonest clients.’12 As York recalls the period,  
 
                                                          
5 Epp C R, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (University 
of Chicago Press 1998) 113 
6 Spencer S, ‘The Impact of Immigration Policy On Race Relations’, in Blackstone T, Parekh B & Sanders P, Race 
Relations in Britain: A Developing Agenda (Psychology Press 1998) 75 
7 Epp, (n5) 113 
8 Enoch Powell, ‘Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech’ (Conservative Association meeting in Birmingham on 
April 20 1968, The Telegraph, London, 06 Nov 2007) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/Enoch-
Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-speech.html accessed 22 September 2016 
9 Martin I ‘Combining Casework and Strategy’ in Cooper J and Dhavan R (Eds), Public Interest Law (OUP 1986) 
262 
10 Harlow C & Rawling R, Pressure Through Law (Routledge 1992) 3 
11 Immigration Law Practitioners Association, ‘About ILPA’ (ILPA) http://www.ilpa.org.uk/pages/about-us.html 
accessed 22 September 2016 
12 Sterett S, ‘Caring about Individual Cases: Immigration Lawyering in Britain’, in Sarat A & Scheingold S (eds), 
Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, (OUP 1998) 299 
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For immigration casework (there were few asylum cases until the late 1980's when 
the first war started in Somalia) preparation and representation at appeal was not 
covered by legal aid and relatively few migrants received formal representation from 
qualified solicitors.13 
 
However, from the mid-1980s and onwards into the 1990s, while private cab-rank solicitors 
were rare in immigration and asylum cases,14 as Sterett has shown the sector developed into 
a small but growing group of dedicated cause litigators working in private practice and for 
NGOs like JCWI, the UKIAS and later the dedicated asylum legal charity Refugee Legal Centre 
(RLC). 15 These cause litigators regularly pursued cases through such tribunal appeals as were 
available at the time and the Administrative division of the High Court.  
 
The 1990s also saw a set of changes to progressive politics in the UK. A less radical and more 
institutional form of activism replaced much of the grass-roots activism that had previously 
occurred.16 Opponents of this development, such as Choudry and Kapoor, have critiqued it as 
‘the professionalisation of dissent.’17 However, the 1997 New Labour government sought to 
‘transform the [state’s] relationship with this ‘voluntary sector’18 by developing a contracted, 
professionalised civil society, termed a ‘Third Sector’, that would operate in the UK’s political 
economy alongside the State and Business. Newman describes this approach as ‘marking out 
terrain fundamentally different from both the economism [of Thatcherism] and the welfarist 
associations of Old Labour’.19 Re-framed as civil society organisations, activist and community 
groups were credited by Tony Blair with the ability to ‘promote citizenship…and make a 
crucial contribution to our shared aim of a just and inclusive society’.20  
                                                          
13 York S, ‘The End of Legal Aid in Immigration - A Barrier To Access To Justice For Migrants And A Decline In The 
Rule Of Law’ (2013) 27 JIANL 106, 124 
14 Martin (n9) 265 
15 Sterett (n12) 298 
16 Hilton M, Crowson N J & McKay J (Eds), NGOs in contemporary Britain: non-state actors in society and politics 
since 1945 (Palgrave Macmillan 2009); Whiteley P, Political participation in Britain: the decline and revival of 
civic culture (Palgrave Macmillan 2012); 
17 Choudry A and Kapoor D, NGOization: complicity, contradictions and prospects (Zed Books 2013) 
18 Williams F and Roseneil S, ‘Public Values of Parenting and Partnering: Voluntary Organisations and Welfare 
Politics in New Labour’s Britain’ (2004) 11 Social Politics 181 
19  Newman J, Modernising Governance: New Labour, Policy and Society (Sage, 2001) 144 
20  Blair, in Home Office ‘Compact on Relations between Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector 
in England’ (Home Office November 1998) available at  
http://www.compactvoice.org.uk/sites/default/files/compact_1998.pdf Accessed 31st August 2016 2 
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This process, of encouraging and rewarding the institutionalisation and professionalisation of 
activist and community groups through the provision of access, the prospect of influence and, 
in some circumstances, the allocation of funding had a significant effect on what began to be 
termed the migrants’ rights ‘sector’. The sector became constituted by a small number of 
relatively large national organisations, including the Refugee Council, Refugee Action, Migrant 
Helpline, The Refugee Legal Centre (RLC), the Immigration Advisory Service (IAS) Amnesty 
International UK, JCWI and The Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, who 
variously combined membership, lobbying and other campaigning activity with government-
contracted specialist service provision. As their names suggest, these larger organisations 
tended to be focussed on the specific questions of asylum seekers and refugees as during this 
period they represented the most overtly politicised and prominent forms of vulnerable 
migrant.  
 
To these were added a much greater number of small local groups. They tended not to be 
quite so focussed in their target demographic, and also tended to involve voluntary or 
majority-voluntary staffing, were funded independently of government, and derived from an 
‘organic’ development as a response to perceived need in their particular community.21 
Writing at the turn of the millennium, Zetter and Pearl described them as  
 
‘providing, for example, rights and advice-based counselling or material 
assistance…usually established by groups and individuals who are not refugees or 
asylum-seekers, for example through local churches and welfare groups… most of 
which enjoy registered charitable status.’22  
 
These roles are still performed around the country by an extensive web of small-scale groups. 
Some of these groups derive from ethnic, religious or refugee community groups.23  Others 
                                                          
21  Griffiths D, Sigona N and Zetter R, Refugee Community Organisations and Dispersal: Networks, Resources and 
Social Capital, (2005 Policy Press) 5  
22 Zetter R & Pearl M, ‘The Minority Within the Minority: Refugee Community-Based Organisations in the UK and 
the Impact of Restrictionism on Asylum Seekers’ (2000) 26 JEMS 675 
23 Zimbabwe Association, ‘Home’ (Zimbabwe association) http://zimbabweassociation.org.uk/ accessed 22 
September 2016; British Tamils Forum, ‘British Tamils Forum: Home’ http://tamilsforum.co.uk/ Accessed 31st 
August 2016 
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are based in religious conviction, with the Church of England and the Catholic Church being 
particularly prominent.24 Still others, from GARAS in Gloucester,25 to ASIRT in Birmingham26 
and RAMFEL in East London,27 continue to be based on notions of political solidarity with 
migrants. Since the turn of the millennium, the twin policies of ‘disbursement’ of asylum 
seekers away from the south east and the expansion of the use of immigration detention have 
been particularly productive of community and activist groups of this kind. It is currently the 
case that every dispersal town in the UK has an asylum seeker support organisation and every 
detention centre has an independent visitors’ group.28 These visitors groups are themselves 
represented by an umbrella organisation, the Association of Visitors to Immigration Detainees 
(AVID).29 
 
The majority of such small-scale groups do not have the capacity to act as legal 
representatives or to pursue legal challenges on behalf of migrants. Under Part V of the 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, immigration legal representation by such organisations is 
regulated by the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner, and requires a relatively 
high level of institutional capacity including the passing of exams, ongoing training, adequate 
record keeping and data storage etc.30 Such demands are sufficiently onerous to dissuade 
many groups from seeking to go down this path. Instead, organisations can flag up on-the-
ground issues that they feel need addressing through litigation, provide the evidence to 
support cases that relate to issues such as social provision for vulnerable migrants or 
immigration service conduct and, crucially, find the migrants necessary to act as claimants in 
individual test cases. They tend, therefore, to work in collaboration with external lawyers for 
the benefit of individual clients, or be contacted by lawyers pursuing strategic or test 
                                                          
24 The Notre Dame Refugee Centre, ‘Home’ (The Notre Dame Refugee Centre) http://www.notredamerc.org.uk/ 
accessed 1 September 2016 
25 Gloucestershire Action for Refugees and Asylum Seekers, ‘Home’ (GARAS) http://www.garas.org.uk/ accessed 
22 September 2016 
26 Asylum Support and Immigration Resource team (ASIRT) ‘Home’ (ASIRT) http://www.asirt.org.uk/ Accessed 
31st August 2016 
27 Refugee and Migrant Forum of Essex and London, ‘Home’ (RAMFEL) http://www.ramfel.org.uk/wordpress/ 
accessed 22 September 2016 
28 The Association of Visitors to Immigration Detainees (AVID), ‘Home’ (AVID) 
http://www.aviddetention.org.uk/, (Accessed 8th June 2014) 
29 Ibid 
30 Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner, ‘Regulations that immigration advisers must follow’ (OISC, 
17 December 2008) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulations-that-immigration-advisers-
must-follow--2/regulations-that-immigration-advisers-must-follow Accessed 17 November 2014 
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litigation. They are therefore well placed to engage in the information sharing and 
collaboration necessary for them to constitute a major part of what Epp has described as a 
‘support structure’ for legalised rights activism.31 
 
The legal sector in the UK immigration and asylum system also developed significantly during 
the New Labour years. It is important to note, first of all, that the funding possibilities 
improved with the extension of civil legal aid to immigration and asylum appeals under the 
Access to Justice Act 1999. These changes effectively broadened the possibilities for making 
a career in politicised legal practice of various kinds, and in the asylum and immigration sector 
in particular.32 The introduction of the Human Rights Act (HRA), that will be discussed in more 
detail below, had the effect of providing a name and a collective legal identity for the 
previously amorphous collection of lawyers who identified their professional practice with 
political principle. As Berlins commented after the HRA was passed into law, barristers’ 
chambers previously described as ‘radical’ are ‘today described as human rights chambers’.33  
 
These chambers, of which Garden Court, Doughty Street and Matrix, are the leading examples 
in the field of migrants’ rights cause litigation, are supported by a combination of solicitors 
working at private legal firms34 and the national network of Law Centres; not for profit 
community law firms set up, according to Webber,  
 
‘by radical lawyers working with community activists to ensure the same access to 
justice for benefits claimants, social housing tenants, compulsorily detained mental 
patients, parents threatened with removal of their children, sacked workers and 
immigrants as had by wealthy corporations.’35  
 
For many years the RLC and IAS provided larger-scale national charitable provision of legal 
representation to migrants, but collapsed in 2010/11 for financial reasons that will be 
                                                          
31 Epp (n5) 18 
32 Immigration and Welfare Barrister Interview, 9th April 2014; London Immigration Solicitor 1 Interview, 2nd April 
2014 
33 Alex Hern, ‘Who does early access to sensitive data really hurt?’ (New Statesman, 18 June 2013) 
http://www.newstatesman.com/node/134269 accessed 22 September 2016 
34 Such as Bindmans LLP, Birnberg Peirce and Partners; Wesley Gryk Solicitors and Wilsons Solicitors LLP  
35 Webber F, ‘Borderline Justice’ (2012) 54 2 Race & Class 39 39  
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discussed in more detail in chapter 6. In their place a number of smaller-scale independent 
migrants’ rights focussed legal charities have subsequently been set up, largely staffed and 
run by ex-RLC or IAS lawyers, to either perform specialist legal work such as strategic 
litigation36 or migrant children’s cases,37 or provide legal advice in areas of the country where 
there is a shortage of quality providers.38 This disparate group of cause lawyers is nevertheless 
relatively highly integrated and capable of coordinated action, owing partly to its London-
centric base and the active and widespread use of web-forums such as 
Freemovement.org.uk39 and the coordinating function of the ILPA. Perhaps above all, legal 
tactics and developments are shared and discussed in the web-based Refugee Legal Group, 
or RLG. As one veteran migrants’ rights barrister described it, 
 
You know RLG? Look at that... All the time people posting and exchanging, it’s 
amazing, just amazing. I don’t think you could replicate that with a legal issue in the 
UK and probably anywhere in the EU. Maybe in the US, probably, but it is the most 
active legal bulletin board in the EU.40  
 
The UK’s migrants’ rights cause litigation movement therefore, is substantially constituted by 
three interlinked groups. The first is a large array of small scale community groups whose 
raison d’etre is to respond to the practical consequences of specific government policies. The 
second is national charities that may conduct contracted service provision, although that 
particular role has been substantially curtailed recently,41 and also engage in lobbying and 
policy consultation as ‘stakeholders’. Finally, the politicised cause-orientated legal sector 
which is independent of these NGOs, as well as independent of each other, but who remain 
relatively cohesive and co-ordinated through a shared commitment to ‘the cause’ of migrants’ 
rights, which in turn maintains and encourages the use of practical co-ordination and 
information sharing tools. These three groups are also united in more or less conscious terms 
                                                          
36 Migrants’ Law Project (MLP) http://themigrantslawproject.org/ accessed 14th May 2014 
37 Migrant and Refugee Children’s Legal Unit (MiCLU) ‘Home’ (MiCLU) ://miclu.org/ Accessed 14th May 2014 
38 Migrant Legal Project ‘Home’ (Migrant Legal Project) http://migrantlegalproject.com/ Accessed 31 August 
2016; Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit (GMIAU), ‘Home’ (GMIAU) http://gmiau.org/ accessed 31 
August 2016 
39 Free Movement, ‘Home’ (Free movement) https://www.freemovement.org.uk/ accessed 22 September 2016 
40 Immigration and Welfare Barrister Interview, 9th April 2014 
41 Refugee Action, ‘The future of Assisted Voluntary Return’ (Refugee Action, 27 July 2015) http://www.refugee-
action.org.uk/assets/0001/2609/The_Future_of_AVR_briefing_27_July_2015.pdf accessed 22 September 2016 
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by a philosophical and political commitment to a rights-based cosmopolitanism. As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, this cosmopolitanism emphasises Benhabib’s notion of the 
‘cosmopolitan duty of hospitality’ to outsiders entering a community and, to various degrees, 
a universalist approach to rights and notions of justice.42  
 
The work of these groups has been transferred into a civil society model of activism, which 
largely seeks to play an ‘insider’ role in policy proceedings. Doing so allows for some degree 
of participation in the practical functioning and shaping of the systems, both judicial and 
administrative, that impact on migrants’ rights.43 However, this ‘insider’ model of activism has 
been adopted largely in place of broad-based membership-orientated public campaigning. 
While some of the national NGOs, such as Refugee Action and the Refugee Council present 
themselves as membership-based or grassroots organisations, they are not in a position to 
mobilise a substantial number of members or supporters amongst the general population. As 
a leading funder of charities in the movement put it,  
 
‘How many large member-led organisations are there? Virtually none… They certainly 
don’t punch above their weight on broad based alliance building and coalitions and 
lots of members.’44  
 
Moreover, civil society insider status makes it difficult, both from a practical and relational 
standpoint to engage in the kind of radicalism that characterised the movement in previous 
generations. The approach, after all, depends to a significant extent on maintaining 
professional relations with state agencies. This is not to argue that the migrants’ rights 
movement in the UK has lost all its radicalism. There continues to be a distinct strain of radical 
activism engaged with the issue, including from a no-borders perspective. Direct actions such 
                                                          
42 Benhabib S, Rights of Others (CUP 2004) 26 
43 Home Office, ‘Asylum Policy Instructions: Medico-Legal Reports from the Helen Bamber Foundation and the 
Medical Foundation Medico-Legal Report Service’ (13 July 2015), 
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child first responders Version 2’, (21st March 2016),  
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as protesters super-gluing themselves to security vans to prevent forced removals,45 or 
protesters surrounding and driving out immigration officers conducting immigration raids on 
ethnic-owned businesses46 continue to occur. Most recently the UK wing of the Black Lives 
Matter movement and the feminist movement ‘Women for Refugee Women’ have adopted 
deportation and detention practices as one of their key targets for protest and civil 
disobedience.47 However, such actions are rare, and formerly radical groups have begun to 
reconstitute themselves as more ‘respectable’ advice, research and advocacy platforms. The 
National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns, for example, has undergone a rebranding 
process and is now called ‘Right To Remain’. Explaining this decision they stated, 
 
Our work is increasingly around raising awareness of the legal processes, helping to 
make sure people understand the system, know their rights, and their options in the 
struggle to establish the right to remain.48 
 
This explanation is reflective the focus of activists on questions of law and policy rather than 
broad political principle. The term ‘Right to Remain’ itself represents a rhetorical engagement 
with the legal term ‘leave to remain’, the formal term for immigration status granted by the 
state.  
 
The UK’s migrants’ rights movement, then possesses many of the attributes that would 
suggest it is well placed to successfully engage in cause litigation. It has a substantial body of 
specialist and professionalised activist NGOs and access to experienced lawyers. These 
various groups are highly networked in with each other, capable of relatively coordinated 
action and relatively united in a philosophical commitment to rights-based cosmopolitanism. 
                                                          
45 Crawley News, ‘Protesters who stopped refugees from being deported from Gatwick Airport with help of 
superglue to face trial’, (Crawley News, Crawley, May 17, 2015) http://www.crawleynews.co.uk/Protesters-
stopped-refugees-deported-Gatwick/story-26487512-detail/story.html accessed 27 August 2016 
46 Colin Yeo, ‘Southall Black Sisters confront UK Border Agency’, (Freemovement, 2nd August 2013) 
https://www.freemovement.org.uk/southall-black-sisters-confront-uk-border-agency/ accessed 27 August 
2016 
47 Daily Telegraph, Black Lives Matter protests around the country: motorway route into Heathrow Airport 
blocked by activists lying on road, (5 August 2016) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/05/black-lives-
matter-protest-blocks-heathrow-airport-traffic/ accessed 22 September 2016; Women for Refugee Women, 
http://www.refugeewomen.co.uk/ accessed 26th September 2016 
48 Right to Remain, ‘Right to Remain was formerly known as NCADC, the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation 
Campaigns’ (Right to Remain) http://righttoremain.org.uk/about/name.html accessed 31st August 2016 
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However, national NGOs have very limited capacity to lobby and mobilise a grass-roots 
membership as a political force. As one interviewee engaged in this activity put it,  
 
‘You run around trying to find judges and bishops and other members of the House of 
lords. And that's an indication of the weakness of popular movements in general’.49  
 
As was noted from the literature in chapter 2, coordination of legal and activist activity is 
important for the delivery of litigation that is effective in court, but the inability to situate the 
litigation within a wider influential constituency or influential programme of public activism 
is a significant weakness.  
 
The Legal and Judicial Framework 
 
‘Immigration is the most complicated area of British law because you’ve got basically 
a multi-dimensional intersection between statutes, regulations, rules, published 
polices, secret policies, actual practices, EU law, Human Rights Law and that’s just 
about whether or not you get to stay. And then you’ve got social welfare law, 
employment law, criminal law. You know. Tax isn’t complicated. Tax is bloody 
transparent.’50 
 
As might be guessed, this is the view of an immigration barrister, rather than a tax specialist. 
It provides a neat summary of the myriad ways in which the issue of immigration is dealt with 
in the UK’s legal framework. However, it was not ever thus. The UK’s legal framework in this 
area has evolved substantially over time, to a contemporary situation of ever-changing and 
ever more detailed legislation. This expansion has coincided with a development and 
expansion of the wider judicial context, by which is meant both the infrastructure of law (the 
courts and tribunals responsible for it) and the role and approach of judges to relevant public 
law questions. From significantly restricted beginnings the legal framework and judicial 
context now appear more promising to cause litigators. 
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i) Legal Framework 
As noted above, contemporary immigration law in the UK is vast and fast-changing.  As a result 
it is not possible to do the full range of immigration law provisions justice here. Instead, the 
focus of this section will be on the broad development of the UK’s legal framework around 
immigration and migrants’ rights, with a focus on how this development has influenced cause 
litigation. More specific legislative and policy provisions relevant either to areas of particular 
concern to cause litigators or to the function of cause litigation itself will be dealt with directly 
across the analysis in section 2 of the thesis.  
The 1971 Immigration Act formed the central basis of UK immigration law and procedure, and 
continues to do so to this day.51 Amongst many other reforms, it introduced a fundamental 
distinction between those that possessed the ‘right of abode’ (related to but distinct from 
citizenship) and all other would-be entrants who would be ‘subject to immigration control’.52 
The Act has often been cited as an example of the UK’s definitive turn towards an extreme 
form of restrictionism.53 However, by formalising an immigration system that functioned 
under the rule of law rather than executive mandate it started the process of greater judicial 
involvement in immigration matters and allowed for the development of cause lawyering for 
migrants’ rights as an independent and self-conscious enterprise. The Act did so through the 
expansion of appeal rights to an independent judicial body,54 lawful powers of detention and 
bail for immigration purposes,55 the provision of funds to ‘organisations helping persons with 
rights of appeal’56 and perhaps most importantly, the formalisation of the ‘immigration rules’ 
as a published form of executive policy on immigration criteria that were both subject to 
parliamentary oversight and which could potentially be subject to judicial review.57  
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Outside of the opportunities presented by the 1971 Act, there was little for the nascent cause 
litigation movement to turn to. The British Nationality Act 1981 introduced strict citizenship 
criteria which cut access to the ‘right of abode’,58 and while the UK had been a founding 
signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (the 
Refugee Convention), there were an effectively negligible number of asylum claims during 
this period.59 However, the Convention became more relevant as in the mid-to-late 1980s this 
number began to substantially increase, from just under 4000 in 1988 to over 24,000 in 
1992.60 At this stage, as Care noted, ‘The Convention was not directly enforceable in the 
United Kingdom, despite the United Kingdom's accession to the Refugee Convention’.61 
Aspects of the Convention appeared in the Immigration Rules, but this did not provide asylum 
seekers with any justiciable rights. Crucially, ‘illegal entrants’ were not entitled to an in-
country right of appeal against a refusal under the immigration rules. A claimant regarded as 
an illegal entrant was expected to return to their country, notwithstanding the alleged risk of 
persecution, to pursue an appeal.62   
 
Absent an effective appeals process those seeking protection under the Refugee Convention 
were forced to rely on traditional judicial review proceedings to seek injunctions against 
removal on non-refoulement grounds. However, the increasing numbers of claimants 
resulted in an increased judicial review burden on the High Court. A combination of pressure 
from the judiciary to resolve the swamping of the High Court with asylum claims, public 
campaigning from Amnesty International, and cause litigation in the form of the European 
Court of Human Rights case Vilvarajah and Ors v UK, in which a group of Sri Lankan asylum 
seekers argued that the lack of an in-country appeal right was contrary to Article 3 and 13 of 
the ECHR,63 led to the UK government introducing the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 
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1993.64 This was the first UK legislation dedicated to refugee law. Although restrictive in a 
number of respects, s.2 of the Act required that the immigration rules not to be contrary to 
the Refugee Convention, and section 8 and 9 introduced in-country appeal rights for the first 
time.  These developments expanded a crucial area of migrants’ rights litigation and, as will 
be discussed in later chapters, gave judges greater powers to reach facts and merits decisions 
independent of Executive decision making.  
 
The next major shift would come following the General Election of 1997 and the enactment 
of legislation not overtly associated with immigration and nationality law at all; the Human 
Rights Act 1998. This would prove the single most important legislative change for the UK’s 
cause litigators. The HRA brought the rights set out in the ECHR into domestic UK law for the 
first time. For migrants this meant that through s.6 of the HRA it would be unlawful for the 
immigration service and the tribunals to make decisions or take actions that were 
incompatible with a person’s Convention rights when enforcing immigration control. As a 
result of the Strasburg Court’s development of Article 8 case law in particular, this opened 
the way for irregular migrants to resist removal and seek regularisation outside of the 
Executive’s Immigration Rules, an issue that will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.65 The 
interpretive and declaratory powers in sections 3 and 4 of the Act, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, were more fundamental still for cause litigators as they empowered judges to 
substantially change the effect of primary legislation and even to challenge, to an extent that 
is contested in the literature,66 primary legislation for the first time.  
 
Armed with these new powers, cause litigators brought cases of major significance for 
migrants’ rights. Many of these cases will be discussed in detail in the chapters to come. For 
now it is enough to note that the HRA empowered courts and cause litigators to deal with a 
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72 
 
number of issues that they had previously been reluctant or unable to address. For example, 
the Belmarsh case declared provisions in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 that 
enabled the indefinite imprisonment without trial of foreign national terrorist suspects 
incompatible with Article 5 (the right to liberty and security of person) taken with 14 (the right 
of non-discrimination). This was a highly unusual move for the UK’s courts who had a previous 
pre-HRA history of what Gearty has described as an ‘appallingly deferential approach’ to ‘the 
exercise by the executive of the swingeing anti-terrorism powers’.67 Likewise, the Limbuela68 
case, which will be discussed in the next chapter, was significant for its strong intervention 
into both immigration policy and government spending priorities, two other areas 
traditionally reserved to executive control. It was hailed as ‘transforming human rights’ 
through it’s ‘recognition of positive duties [on the State] and of the role of human rights within 
the welfare arena.’69  
However, the HRA has not proved to be the solution to some of the major issues migrants’ 
rights activists have been concerned about. It has, for example, provided no answer to the 
problem of indefinite immigration detention,70 or to cases where a critically ill migrant will 
die through lack of medical treatment if removed to their home country.71 Thus it appears 
that while the judges have been equipped by the HRA to take a far more independent view 
on migrants’ rights issues, there continue to be limits to how far they are willing to go, and 
thus to the opportunities presented to cause litigators. In acknowledgment of these 
limitations, in recent years cause litigators have begun to expand their repertoire with further 
regional and international sources of law.72 The hope here is to open up new approaches to 
old issues and to co-operate with the declared wish of the senior judiciary that arguments not 
be solely framed in HRA terms.73  
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A key area for the development of this work has been in the protection of victims of human 
trafficking. While such people had previously lodged claims for international protection based 
on risks on return to their home countries,74 and continue to do so, in December 2008 the UK 
finally ratified the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Trafficking in Human Beings, having 
previously been reluctant to do so for fear of the protections it offered acting as a ‘pull factor’ 
to ‘bogus’ claimants.75 The Convention itself was not justiciable domestically, but was 
implemented from April 2009 through a ‘national referral mechanism’ (NRM). Under the NRM 
all suspected victims of trafficking were to be referred for a decision as to whether there were 
‘reasonable grounds’ for thinking that the person was a victim of trafficking. An initial 
‘reasonable grounds’ decision entitled the person to a ‘reflection period’ amounting to 45 
days’ lawful status during which time a full ‘conclusive grounds’ decision would be made. This 
could in turn entitle the person to a renewable full year’s discretionary leave to remain on the 
proviso that the victim cooperate with any investigation and criminal proceedings.76 While 
‘reasonable’ and ‘conclusive grounds’ decisions are not in themselves appealable, cause 
litigators have pursued regular judicial reviews to contest deficiencies in the decision making. 
These have included issues around the role of expert evidence in trafficking determinations77 
and the question of ‘historic’ trafficking, when a person who had previously been trafficking 
is no longer under the control of their traffickers.78  
 
Outside of domestic law, the rights accorded by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights79 and 
the EU Qualification Directive80 have been drawn on extensively, while the various iterations 
of the Dublin Convention which regulates which EU Member State  has responsibility for 
processing an asylum claim has provoked a huge amount of ongoing litigation.81 The UN 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) has also begun to be applied to immigration 
cases in the UK as a result of Section 55 of the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 
(BCIA) and the subsequent Supreme Court case of ZH Tanzania. As Bolton explains,  
 
‘the UNCRC was signed by the UK but subject to various reservations, a number of which, 
including that providing for the non-application of the UNCRC to children subject to 
immigration control, were withdrawn in November 2008’.82  
 
Following the dropping of the reservation, Section 55 of the 2009 Act required that in 
discharging her immigration control functions, the Secretary of State must have ‘regard to the 
need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom.’ As 
will again be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, ZH (Tanzania) interpreted that 
provision in line with the UNCRC.83  
 
Despite a restrictive central line of immigration legislation, then, cause litigation was made 
possible by the legal formalisation of immigration control as part of this legislation and has 
since benefited from and contributed to the development of alternative sources of law. These 
alternative sources, most importantly the HRA, have made a crucial difference to the 
outcomes cause litigation is capable of. 
 
ii) Judicial Context 
 
As was alluded to above, one of the key outcomes of the legislative developments charted 
above has been the developments in the infrastructure of judicial engagement with 
immigration issues. The creation of tribunals engaged in merits appeals of immigration 
decisions independent of the executive, and their extension to asylum and other human rights 
and international protection claims, have been key influences on cause litigation becoming a 
significant force in immigration and migrants’ rights issues. They provide a venue for cause 
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litigation arguments to be heard and require a staff of judges who, over time, have the 
potential to provide a counter-point to executive decision making and the cultures that inform 
it. For these developments to have a truly significant effect, though, the judges must be willing 
to approach immigration and migrants’ rights issues in an independent and rigorous manner. 
 
The UK legal system was for a long time regarded as being inhospitable to legal activism. Boon 
has called it ‘a cold climate for cause lawyers’84 and, writing in the mid-90s, Epp regarded it 
as “an especially inhospitable site” for what he described as a ‘rights revolution’.85 In seeking 
to explain this situation, Kavanagh has noted that ‘belief in the value and importance of strong 
parliamentary government has been an important strand in British legal and political thought, 
which often goes hand in hand with scepticism about the desirability (and indeed, ability) of 
judges to enhance the protection of human rights and civil liberties.’86 Constitutional notions 
of Parliamentary sovereignty, like the traditional notion of the rule of law, commonly derived 
from the writings of Dicey87 produced a system of Parliamentary supremacy; what Young has 
described as the ‘legal fact’ that ‘Parliament has no legal limits placed on its law-making 
power.’88 This allowed an unabashed majority-rule principle to control legislative matters.89 
Bellamy has defended such an arrangement as offering  ‘a fair and impartial procedure that 
is unlikely to produce either irrational or tyrannical decisions.’90 However, decisions that are 
not regarded as ‘tyrannical’ by the majority may still have seriously rights-damaging effects 
for unrepresented minorities, such as migrants. 
 
The dominance of the parliamentary supremacist view, even amongst the judiciary itself, 
produced a distinctly limited conception of the due role of judicial review in the exercise of 
state power. Judicial review is itself a creation of the judges who, as mentioned in chapter 2, 
lacked, and continue to lack, any strike-down or in Tushnet’s phrase ‘hard review’ power; 
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meaning that primary legislation was effectively immune from judicial review. While relatively 
more willing to examine executive conduct, other than reviewing the legality and procedural 
propriety of an executive action the courts actively constrained their examination of the 
‘reasonableness’ of the executive following the famous Wednesbury judgment. 91 Some, such 
as Gearty and Ewing, have argued that this in practice produced a strong predisposition 
towards favouring the Executive.92  
 
Over time, though, this highly conservative approach to the judicial function has expanded, 
with judges becoming increasingly interventionist in executive decision making that impinged 
on what the courts regarded as ‘fundamental rights’. Judges developed increasingly 
demanding standards of judicial review of executive actions and policies. Lord Carnwath has 
recently summarised the history of these developments;  
 
In 1987, Lord Bridge introduced the concept of “anxious scrutiny”, implying a more 
intrusive review in cases involving the right to life or other basic rights. By 2000 the 
courts recognised the concept of a “sliding scale” of rationality review depending on 
the nature and gravity of the case. At the same time the Human Rights Act 1998 
required judges to apply a test of “proportionality”, derived from the European Court 
of Human Rights. There is now little to choose between the two principles. The actual 
decision in Wednesbury would be difficult to justify under the modern law, and its 
days as an authority may be numbered.93 
In relation to immigration specifically, the historic reluctance to intervene in Executive 
decision making was reputed to be particularly pronounced. Morris records that ‘Judicial 
decision-making in the field of immigration and asylum has traditionally been driven by 
deference to policy priorities and shaped to a degree by conservatism and constraint.94 This 
approach even extended to the senior judiciary expressing a degree of distaste for dealing 
                                                          
91 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1 
92 Gearty C & Ewing K, Freedom Under Thatcher, 268 
93 Lord Carnwath, ‘From Rationality to Proportionality in the Modern Law’ (UCL-HKU conference 'Judicial review 
in a changing society' Hong Kong University, 14 April 2014) https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
140414.pdf accessed 22 September 2016 
94 Morris L, Asylum, Welfare And The Cosmopolitan Ideal: A Sociology Of Rights (Routledge 2010) 47 
77 
 
with immigration matters. Writing before the introduction of the HRA, Sterett makes the 
point that up to that point,  
‘judges have argued that immigration cases do not belong in the general jurisdiction 
courts and would not be there if administrative adjudication were better.’95  
Only very occasionally would the UK’s senior courts of the 1970s and 80s produce rulings that 
presented a significant obstacle to the Executive’s exercise of immigration control functions. 
The high point was probably the case of Khawaja v SSHD [1984], a case on the scope of judicial 
review of the exercising of the Secretary of State’s power to detain illegal entrants. Relying 
heavily on what was described by Lord Scarman as ‘the jealous care our law traditionally 
devotes to the protection of the liberty of those who are subject to its jurisdiction’ the House 
concluded that, as Wilsher has put it, ‘the Executive bore the burden of proving that an alien 
was an illegal entrant to the court’s satisfaction and to a high degree of probability.’96 Other 
than this and a small number of asylum-related cases that will be discussed in chapter 5, 
though, the British judiciary was exceptionally deferential to executive decision making in 
immigration matters. Legomsky, who conducted an exhaustive comparative survey of 
immigration decisions in the UK and the US across the 1970s and 80s, concluded,  
‘the selective deference displayed in immigration cases, resting as it does on judicially 
preferred values and policies, is arguably a classic example of judicial activism.’97 
Mirroring the wider developments in judicial approach described by Lord Carnwath above, 
judges’ involvement in immigration issues have also developed substantially over time. 
Webber, for example, now notes that ‘senior judges have shown more willingness to castigate 
Home Office conduct as a public disgrace, and law lords have condemned proposed legislation 
as an affront to the constitution.’98 Her explanation for this rests largely on the make-up of 
the modern day judiciary, which includes a number of the previously radical lawyers of the 
1970s and 80.99 However, while this is no doubt an important factor that will be referred to 
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during chapters 4 and 5’s analysis of cause litigation in practice, it must also be due to the 
changes in legislation that the judges were empowered to enforce and that cause litigators 
were able to develop, as discussed above.  
Around the same period as the domestic courts began to take a more active approach in 
immigration matters, a parallel set of developments at the European level occurred which 
would prove hugely influential. Like the UK’s domestic courts, the European Commission on 
Human Rights, subsequently transformed into the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
had initially been reluctant to engage with immigration policy and control issues.100 The ECtHR 
first began to substantially overcome its previous reticence to engage with issues pertaining 
to immigration control in the 1985 case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK.101 This was 
a case that related to the rights of women to be joined in the UK by their foreign national 
husbands. While starting their deliberations with the finding that ‘as a matter of well-
established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a State has the right to 
control the entry of non-nationals into its territory’,102 the judgment for the first time 
concluded that Article 8 rights to respect for Private and Family Life alone could potentially 
override a state’s immigration control measures.103 This would become an issue of 
fundamental importance to cause litigators, and will be discussed in depth in chapter 5. 
 
Following this leap, though, the Strasbourg Court went on to produce what would become 
rulings of fundamental importance to cause litigators, particularly the triumvirate of Soering 
v UK 1989,104 Cruz Varas v Sweden 1991105 and Chahal v UK 1996106 which prevented in 
absolute terms extradition, administrative removal and deportation of non-citizens to 
countries where they faced a real risk of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (Article 3 ECHR). These rulings provided protection from removal and 
deportation of a wider range of migrants than were catered for by the Refugee Convention, 
particularly owing to their absolute nature which meant that the ‘exclusion clauses’ for very 
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serious international and domestic criminality that exist in the Refugee Convention did not 
apply.107 However, the opportunity to use them for cause litigation during this period 
remained restricted, as they were not yet incorporated into domestic law and thus at best 
could only be raised as persuasive authority. Indeed, when the Chahal case was being heard 
in the UK Court of Appeal, the issues relating to Article 3 ECHR were dismissed by Staughton 
LJ as being either ‘unnecessary’ or ‘difficult’.108 
 
At both the domestic and European level, then, the judiciary has moved beyond a position of 
institutionalised reluctance to intervene in executive actions regarding immigration and 
migrants’ rights. There certainly remain limitations to their approach to immigration 
questions; one such example which would prove important in litigation that will be discussed 
more in the next chapter is a general reluctance to closely interrogate the working of 
immigration control procedures unless extensive evidence compels it. As one experienced 
cause litigation solicitor explained,  
 
‘If you’ve got the SSHD saying ‘this is how it works’ [an immigration procedure], unless 
you’ve got a very clear picture that this is absolutely wrong you’re going to accept 
what the government says because you become a judge because you believe in the 
system’109 
 
Nevertheless, a more assertive judicial review in general has been coupled with specific 
doctrinal developments relating to migrants’ rights issues regarding the standard of review 
and the interpretation of ECHR rights. This has meant that, while always a struggle, cause 
litigation in recent times has operated in a relatively conducive judicial environment.   
   
The judicial and legal framework for migrants’ rights in the UK has developed considerably. 
After years of structural limitations the judicial infrastructure has improved with the 
development of a professionalised and large scale Tribunal system. The broader legal 
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framework has shifted in a significantly more promising direction for migrants’ rights 
litigators. In turn and over time this has encouraged greater judicial engagement with 
migrants’ rights issues. However, the current picture is not entirely positive for the litigators. 
As will be examined in more detail in chapter 4 and particularly chapter 5, judicial regard for 
the importance of immigration control and deference to the Executive on immigration issues 
remains significant. Nevertheless, it can be said that while the legal and judicial framework 
still has limitations for cause litigation, it is more promising than in previous periods. 
 
The Political Opportunity Structures 
 
“The politics of this is so toxic that you know, a steady state seems not unattractive.”110 
 
This view, expressed by a leading funder of migrants’ rights campaigns, speaks to a sense of 
embattlement that is pervasive in the contemporary UK’s migrants’ rights movement. This 
section will examine the political opportunity structures (POS) which migrants’ rights activism 
faces based on Koopmans’ et al’s approach to the POS, as discussed in chapter 2, which 
focuses on both the institutional and discursive structures in play. The section shows that the 
institutional structures locate predominant power over both immigration policy development 
and enforcement with the executive, with little institutional opposition. Legislative scrutiny 
of policy is diminished further by the discursive structures which compel both major parties 
to appear ‘tough’ on immigration. In this regard, the section shows that migration has been 
discursively characterised as causing a crisis and a threat. The section concludes by noting 
that the two POS elements are united in political and administrative imperative for the 
Executive, orientated around notions of ‘control’.  
 
i) Institutional Political Opportunity Structures 
 
While in constitutional principle there are clear divisions between Government and the wider 
legislature, this section will demonstrate that in relation to immigration and migrants’ rights 
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issues this division is far from clear cut, and in fact the Executive operates in a highly dominant 
position.  
 
A set of institutional factors exist that constrain the level of access and influence activists can 
have to immigration policy making and implementation outside of the litigation process. 
Despite the creation of devolved assemblies outside of Westminster and repeated 
governmental pledges regarding greater localisation, the UK still operates a heavily 
centralised state.111 The first past the post electoral system ensures that there is almost 
always a single party government, the 2010-2015 Coalition being a historic exception.112 
Moreover, party voting discipline within that single-party government is relatively strong.113 
Senior Government ministers are invested with significant Executive powers and by virtue of 
being made up of the political leadership of the majority party, the Executive arm of the state 
has a great deal of personal and political authority over their colleagues in the legislature.114 
While there is legislative oversight of new statutes from opposition parties, the capacity to 
intervene to amend rights-affecting legislation that the executive is committed to is distinctly 
limited. Moreover, much of the specifics of immigration control and rights-affecting policy is 
delivered through ‘immigration rules’, rather than primary legislation, which are subject to an 
even lesser form of Parliamentary oversight.115 While, as was noted above, the migrants’ 
rights sector has a level of participatory and ‘stakeholder’ influence, what one interviewee 
involved in this work referred to as ‘Parliamentary bill influencing and other forms of 
influencing of policy guidance, directive and regulatory frameworks’,116 the effectiveness of 
this influence is limited to the extent that the Executive concedes.117  
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Moving from policy development issues to their enforcement, writing prior to the HRA and 
many of the major developments that this thesis discussed, Joppke argued that the UK’s 
immigration-related,  
 
‘institutional arrangements entail a dualism of extreme legislative openness 
[Parliament being able to pass any law it likes] and executive closure, which, in the 
absence of a client machine, is detrimental to the interests of immigrants… Once a 
policy has been decided upon, there is executive closure in its implementation, with 
the Home Office firmly and uncontestedly in charge.118  
 
While this thesis will demonstrate it is no longer the case that the Home Office remains 
uncontestedly in charge, this description still fairly represents the institutional power 
relationships between the executive, its administrative agencies and the legislature.119 
Jennings has also shown that government is ‘able to intervene directly in bureaucratic 
activities through legislative, executive and administrative controls.’120 This is not to argue 
that the executive, or the Home Office specifically, is a highly-efficient and well-oiled machine 
in terms of immigration policy implementation; as will be discussed in more detail below this 
is far from the case. However, it does mean that the Home Office is highly responsive to 
political demands in its activities and any failures in this regard are likely to be as a result of 
resource, capacity and competence issues rather than institutional resistance to delivering 
rights-affecting political demands. 
 
Moreover, powers and responsibility regarding immigration related issues have been heavily 
centralised. There have been overt steps taken to exert greater direct Ministerial control over 
the department, with the then Home Secretary Theresa May stating that ‘UKBA was given 
agency status in order to keep its work at an arm's length from Ministers. That was wrong.’121 
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At the same time, while there has been much written in recent years regarding the 
phenomenon of ‘internalising borders’ bringing immigration issues into other areas of 
government policy,122 it remains the case that ‘the Home Ofﬁce holds a monopoly 
on immigration policymaking’ within government.123 The immigration service itself now has 
direct influence over the work of other departments of the State, particularly local authority 
housing and social service departments, through the provision (and therefore denial) of 
funding.124 These arrangements have implications for migrants’ rights, particularly children’s 
rights, as enforcement priorities may supersede legal and ethical duties towards the child. For 
example, an interviewee specialising in cause litigation for the rights of migrant children 
claimed that, 
 
The UK Border agency started to hold the purse strings for the local authorities who 
look after these kids. They've now been working together for so long they are 
convoluted…what was originally there to highlight the needs of these children and 
fund them and support them has now turned into a situation where these local 
authorities are now helping and supporting and working closely with the UKBA to think 
about ways of getting these children back to their countries of origin.125 
 
The institutional POS that confronts cause litigators is therefore highly problematic. A 
powerful executive is able to tightly control the extent of non-litigation influence that 
migrants’ rights campaigners are able to exert, and legislative arrangements are structured 
so as to allow for very limited intervention in the institution of government policy. Ministerial 
authority can be directly influenced over the administration and enforcement of this policy, 
which ensures that the immigration administration is highly susceptible to political pressures 
and the wider discursive political opportunity structures of the immigration issue. 
                                                          
122 Anderson B, Us and Them?: The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control (OUP 2013); Also Kesby A, ‘Internal 
Borders and Immigration Control: New Prospects And Challenges’ (2010) 2 EHRLR 176 
123 Consterdine (n118) accessed 22 September 2016 
124 UK Visas and Immigration, ‘Funding to local authorities Financial year 2016/17 Home Office funding: 
Unaccompanied asylum seeking children (UASC)’ (Version 2, UK Visas and Immigration, June 2016) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/426933/UASC_Funding_Inst
ructions_2015-16.pdf accessed 22 September 2016; Nadine Finch, ‘Always Migrants Sometimes Children’ 
(CORAM Children’s Legal Centre, August 2014) 
http://www.childrenslegalcentre.com/userfiles/UK%20mapping%20report%20CONNECT.pdf accessed 22 
September 2016 
125 Children’s Rights Solicitor Interview, 21st August 2013 
84 
 
 
ii) Discursive Political Opportunity Structures 
 
Immigration, particularly black and Asian migration, has been consistently opposed by 
substantial majorities of the British public for many years. Opinion polling from the 1960s, 70s 
and 80s demonstrates a predominance of the view that immigration was too high regardless 
of its actual levels and an abiding concern that immigration would cause potential ‘swamping’ 
and bring with it an amorphous but alien and dangerous ‘culture’.126 These views were 
responded to and encouraged for electoral advantage by political parties, and by the 1980s 
and into the 1990s state policy was dedicated to Britain being an effectively ‘zero-migration 
state’.127 It was in this context, then, that the New Labour government of the late 1990s faced 
two major immigration challenges during its time in office. The first related to asylum and the 
second to economic migration from the new Eastern European member states of the EU.  
 
Control of immigration during the early New Labour period of the late 1990s and early 2000s 
effectively meant gaining control of asylum, which rose to a historic peak of 84,000 individual 
claims in 2002 and was hugely controversial.128 Asylum was characterised as a dishonest 
means of evading UK immigration control and in response New Labour introduced a range of 
external and internal obstacles to asylum claims in the belief that they were in a ‘battle’ to 
gain control of the system.129 However, as Consterdine and Hampshire have shown, the 
second Labour government of 2001-2005 also instituted a policy of liberalising economic 
migration under the rubric of ‘managed migration’.130 Of greatest importance in this agenda 
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was the decision not to impose ‘transitional controls’ on economic migration from Eastern 
Europe, at a time when only two other EU states had not imposed such controls.131 This 
resulted in a major increase in immigration. In the years immediately preceding the 2004 
Accession, EU immigration averaged around 60,000 per year. In 2004 that number leapt to 
130,000 and then rose to 198,000 by 2008.132  
 
This historically high level of immigration, the majority of it labour migration without being 
subject to labour-market controls, began to put the rhetoric of ‘managed migration’ under 
considerable strain. This strain was further exacerbated by the economic crash of 2007/8. 
Inward migration continued at high levels at a time when the previous economic justifications 
for permitting such immigration appeared to no longer apply.133 This in turn showed up the 
executive’s lack of power to control and reduce it. Thus by the end of the New Labour period 
the twin waves of large-scale asylum seeking at the turn of the Millennium and large-scale 
labour migration from the EU Accession states of Eastern Europe created a growing 
representation of immigration as a chaotic and threatening force, which the UK government 
appeared to be powerless to resist and which above all, governmental authority was unable 
to even control. These concerns were heightened by the financial crash of 2007/8 and the 
subsequent economic stagnation and recessions of 2009 and 2012 which brought a growing 
sense of economic insecurity.  
 
The effect of fifteen years of large scale and what appeared to be unmanaged immigration on 
British public attitudes has been stark. Dennison and Goodwin have stated that by the 2015 
election immigration had become ‘one of the most salient issues in British politics’134 and 
survey and polling analysis bears this out.  
 
While the proportion of people indicating their opposition to immigration has always been 
relatively high, the strength of concern about the issue has never been higher. Immigration 
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became the issue most commonly identified as the single most important for the country in 
2015.135 Moreover, the scale of the issue is very substantially overestimated by the majority 
of the public, with the average guess for the percentage of the UK population being foreign 
born being 31%, when the actual figure is 13%.136 The most mentioned group of migrants’ in 
survey responses are refugees and asylum seekers, and the least are foreign students; the 
direct reverse of the reality that asylum seekers are currently the smallest intake group and 
foreign national students the largest. Thus, as IPSOS Mori have put it, ‘we hugely overestimate 
the scale of the immigrant population, and our “imagined immigration” is focused on groups 
we are more negative about.’137 The strength of public concern also appears to be distinct 
from other developed economies, with UK survey respondents indicating a higher level of 
agreement with the propositions that there is too much immigration and that immigration is 
a problem than any western European or North American state.138  
 
Mass-media reporting of immigration issues has also increasingly approached the issue in 
terms of crisis, threat and a loss of control. Media representation of immigration issues is 
particularly important in the UK context, as it has an unusually large and overtly politicised 
print media in comparison to other European states, the majority of which is politically 
orientated to the right of centre.139 Despite declining sales industry-wide, the UK’s print media 
is still relatively widely read and continues to be regarded as influential over the development 
of government policy in contentious areas, including immigration.140 Some of the most 
significant parts of the industry regularly engage in actively campaigning against immigration. 
The Daily Mail and the Daily Express, the two middle-market right of centre newspapers, and 
the Sun, the UK’s leading tabloid, who between them have a combined average daily 
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readership of around 3.8 million,141 have been particularly active in pursuing overtly anti-
immigration agendas.142  
 
Outside of this campaigning, scholarly studies of media discourse have consistently found a 
predominance of negative representation of immigration and migrants’ rights issues, 
particularly framing those issues in terms of threat, security and peril. A 2006 study by Gross 
et al into broadcast media coverage of asylum issues found that  
 
‘the word asylum now connotes negativity and is still constantly embedded in a 
network of negative contexts… There is confusion too about the difference between 
criminal justice and human rights issues.’143  
 
Philo et al’s media content analysis from 2011 identified eight key themes in the coverage 
provided by television and press news which included, ‘Numbers and exaggeration’, ‘Burden 
on welfare and job market’, ‘Criminality, threat, deportation and human rights’ and ‘the need 
for ‘immigration control’.144 They go on to note that their press sample  
 
‘was largely characterised by the use of superlatives… We found 25  instances [out of 
69 articles sampled] of pejorative language used to evoke ‘natural disaster’… for 
instance ‘an iceberg’, ‘swamped’, ‘soaring’, ‘waves’ and ‘flooding in’.145  
 
A similar study by Fox et al in 2012, this time focussing on newspaper reporting of A8 and A2 
migration, found that ‘reporting is not only anti-immigration, it is anti-immigrant.’146 Lawlor’s 
2015 comparative study of media framing of immigration issues in the UK and Canada found 
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that ‘threat of violence frames far outweigh [economic frames] in terms of sheer volume…. 
all papers use security frames in great numbers through the mid- to late 2000s’147 
 
These media ‘security frames’ have also appeared in government policy development and 
presentation. A number of analysts have noted that as part of the war on terror, immigration 
and asylum policy has become increasingly ‘securitised’.148 In some instances, this has meant 
addressing asylum and immigration issues in policy as a threat to the physical security of the 
UK.149 However, as Huysmans points out,  
‘Even when not directly spoken off as a threat, asylum can be rendered as a security 
question by being institutionally and discursively integrated in policy frameworks that 
emphasizes policing and defence.150  
Thus, while the media and public perception data discussed above reveal a dominant 
understanding of immigration and asylum questions as threatening and a source of peril and 
risk, state policy has reinforced this perception.  
At the same time, politicians’ rhetoric and party competition has hardened on immigration 
and migrants’ rights issues. The Liberal Democrats, a party who went into the 2010 election 
proposing an amnesty for irregular migrants now state that, ‘Liberal Democrats believe Britain 
must be open for business and growth but closed to crooks and cheats.’151 The UK 
Independence Party, a radical populist right wing party began to appear to be a significant 
electoral force during the 2010 election152 and were a major threat to both the Labour and 
Conservative voting base. UKIP’s primary policy positions were opposition to the UK’s 
continued participation in the EU and in favour of a drastic cut in immigration figures, 
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effectively seeking to return the UK to its previous zero-migration position. Following their 
defeat in the 2010 election, partly as a result of the UKIP vote, the Labour party issued a public 
apology for its previous immigration policy153 and underwent an internal review which 
emphasised the view that Britain’s ‘white working class’ had been poorly served by the 
previous approach.154 Meanwhile, Conservative politicians including Theresa May, with what 
would subsequently turn out to be a successful eye on party leadership ambitions, 
characterised immigration as an existential issue for British society, stating that,  
‘reducing and controlling immigration is getting harder, but that’s no reason to give 
up.  As our manifesto said, “we must work to control immigration and put Britain first.” 
We have to do this for the sake of our society.’155 
Yet, despite the institution of a ‘net migration target’ to reduce it ‘to the tens of thousands’,156 
and the institution of an overtly ‘hostile environment’ for irregular migrants,157 net migration 
itself has risen ever further.158 Government policies have thus targeted migrants’ rights 
without assuaging those sections of UK society that are concerned about immigration.  
 
iii) The Political Opportunity Structures combine in the ‘Control Imperative’ 
 
Immigration, then, has not only been consistently opposed by large majorities of the 
population, but it has been increasingly discursively characterised in terms of a peril and 
threat. This discursive POS is combined with the strong institutional position of the executive 
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in legislative and policy terms and the susceptibility of immigration administration to political 
influence in the performance of its functions. As a result, the notions that frame Executive 
understanding of the demands it faces and that in turn motivate policy and practical 
responses are crucially important. While the notion of ‘managed migration’ is still relevant for 
understanding the strategic principle behind UK immigration policy, regarding the day-to-day 
reality of policy development and implementation in response to the pressures discussed 
above a more useful frame is the notion of a political and administrative imperative for 
‘control’. 
 
The idea of the ‘control’ of immigration regularly appears in scholarly literature but is often 
subsumed into the term ‘immigration control’ as being a synonym for either cutting 
immigration or the broader notion of a state possessing an immigration policy.159 More 
sophisticated analysts have identified that control in this context is more closely connected 
to policy outcomes than policy itself, and have argued that the extent to which states are able 
to implement policy is indicative of the extent to which a state is able to exercise immigration 
control.160 Some of this theoretical discussion, however, risks neglecting the fact that the 
question of immigration policy is primarily an Executive concern. In this sense, a state does 
not have an immigration policy, a government does. Thus ‘control’ in the sense that will be 
focussed on in this thesis is less about cutting immigration necessarily, although clearly this is 
implied in much of the UK’s immigration politics, but primarily an issue of the location of 
authority and responsibility within a state. It is focussed on who, in the individual and 
institutional sense, has the responsibility and power to do the developing and implement 
policy.  
 
Clearly on a practical level control is imperative if the Executive’s strategic policy of ‘managed 
migration’ is to be put into effect.161 Migration cannot be ‘managed’ if inflows and exits are 
out of control. The executive’s immigration administration therefore operates from an 
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imperative that it monopolise, so far as is possible, decision making and enforcement powers 
within its area of responsibility. As was discussed above, institutional arrangements in the UK 
have allowed for this to happen internally within government, and so the only significant 
obstacles to this administrative control occurring are external, with the legal system and 
cause litigation being one of the most significant.  
 
However, the notion of ‘control’ also regularly appears in the public pronouncements of 
politicians and, indeed, judicial rulings. The rhetoric of control serves Ministers in seeking to 
assuage public concern over the peril that migration is perceived as posing them; modern 
societies accept that threats and crises may not be entirely avoidable, but they can be 
‘controlled’. At the same time, the control imperative binds and limits the political opposition 
of the day for whom the need to appear like a viable government in-waiting requires the 
demonstration of commitment to control. This is perhaps the most important element of the 
imperative behind the notion of ‘control’; to give the appearance of a strong and reliable 
Executive able to deal effectively with a formidable threat.  
 
The control imperative therefore is made up of two aspects  
i) the administrative needs of the Home Office immigration service to monopolise 
authority in their field and to be able to enforce policy. 
ii) The political need for the executive to be seen to be in control by the electorate. 
 
However, there have been permanent failures of control, including during the more liberal 
‘managed migration’ period. Over the last decade the immigration service at the Home Office, 
in its various incarnations,162 has experienced intense political scrutiny over its perceived 
failure to gain control. The immigration service’s reputation in this regard is so entrenched 
that the IPPR think tank was commissioned to conduct a study in 2013 into the question ‘Why 
does the delivery of UK immigration policy seem to go so wrong, so often?’ to which it 
concluded that ‘the Home Ofﬁce and the UKBA (in whatever form it is reconstituted) may 
never get it right’ and that ‘there does appear to be almost endemic ineptitude within the 
                                                          
162 The UK’s immigration service in recent years has been restructured and renamed four times in nine years. 
92 
 
UK’s immigration administration.’163 It has also been subject to extraordinary levels of 
criticism from its own Secretaries of State. It has been described as ‘not fit for purpose’ by the 
then Labour Home Secretary John Reid, and as possessing a ‘closed, secretive and defensive 
culture’164 by the then Conservative/Coalition Home Secretary Theresa May. 
 
These attacks are examples of tactical decisions on the part of Ministers to front up to 
immigration control failings and thus engage in overt displays of the reassertion of control. A 
similar approach can be identified in the near-constant stream of immigration legislation that 
the New Labour government engaged in from 1999 to 2009, with the purpose of legislating 
often having more to do with being seen to be reasserting control than in introducing 
meaningful new control powers.165 These steps are thus united in their purpose of giving the 
government of the day the appearance of control. They have occurred because the two 
aspects of the control imperative are interrelated. Gaps or failures in administrative control 
can undermine the executive’s public appearance of control.  
Likewise, though, the executive imperative to appear in control can increase pressure on the 
immigration service to conduct its business in an uncompromising manner; to constantly seek 
to maintain the control it is able to exercise, to intensify that control and if possible to expand 
it into areas that were previously out of reach. This can lead to changes in priorities for 
immigration service activities and is likely to shape immigration service responses to 
obstacles. Political pressures are therefore capable of directly influencing administrative 
conduct, with negative consequences for migrants’ rights and cause litigation. 
For example, much has been made over the years of the ‘culture of disbelief’ that pervades 
administrative decision making regarding asylum claims in particular.166 However, this culture 
was not created in a vacuum and can ultimately be associated with the imperative for control. 
The decision to disbelieve asylum claims is best understood as a reassertion of control over a 
right, the entitlement to refugee recognition, that as will be discussed in more detail in 
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chapter 5, presents a major challenge to the Executive’s capacity to control immigration. At 
the same time, a number of extensive interview and observation-based research projects 
undertaken in the 2000s both on behalf of the Home Office167 and by independent 
researchers168 reported on the existence of a range of systemically unlawful practices,169 and 
the prevalence of attitudes dominated by the need to ‘control entry to the UK’ rather than 
the application of law.170 More recent reports have found that ‘enforcement culture 
goes beyond areas where it might be appropriate (such as irregular immigration), and 
permeates the whole process of immigration policymaking’.171  
 
The immigration service’s own staff have occasionally expressed themselves in a way that 
indicates that pressure to demonstrate control over immigration can override duties to 
implement the spirit of law that protects migrants’ rights. In 2010, substantial media attention 
was given to the testimony of an immigration service whistle-blower who reported that 
officers in her department that granted refugee status to claimants were awarded the ‘grant 
monkey’ – a soft toy monkey that had to sit on their desk as a ‘mark of shame’.172 In 2014 the 
immigration service refused a Freedom of Information Act request for publication of Home 
Office training guidance to staff about the changes brought in by the 2014 Immigration Act 
on the basis that, 
 
The withheld training documents contain lines to take, which could assist a foreign 
criminal’s representatives in forming their arguments for appeal. If their appeals were 
                                                          
167 Woodfield K et al (eds) ‘Exploring the decision making of Immigration Officers: a research study examining 
non-EEA passenger stops and refusals at UK ports’ (Home Office, January 2007) 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jan/uk-ho-immig-decision-making-study.pdf accessed 22 September 
2016 
168 Weber L and Landman T ‘Deciding to Detain: The Organisational Context for Decisions to Detain Asylum 
Seekers at UK Ports’ (Criminal Justice, Borders and Citizenship Research Paper 2002) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520379 accessed 28 September 2016; Weber L 
Gelsthorpe L, Deciding to Detain: How Decisions to Detain Asylum Seekers are Made at Ports of Entry (University 
of Cambridge Institute of Criminology 2000) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520382 
accessed 28 September 2016 
169 Ibid Weber & Gelsthorpe 2000 71 & 84; Woodfield et al (n166) accessed 22 September 2016 
170 Weber & Landman 2002, 5 
171Consterdine (n118) 8 
172 The Guardian, ‘UK Border Agency investigation finds cause for 'significant concern' (8 August 2010) 
 http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/aug/08/uk-border-agency-investigation-concerns accessed 22 
September 2016 
94 
 
successful, then we could be prevented from deporting foreign criminals in cases 
where it would be appropriate to do so.173 
 
More recently still, in the case of Mohammed v SSHD [2016] the continued unlawful detention 
of a Somali national with serious criminal convictions was justified by the Home Office on the 
grounds that,  
 
‘If you are released from detention, our actions can [sic] lead to a negative view of the 
Home Office by the general public who may see the Department in failing in its duty 
to protect them from criminals.’174 
 
While these may be examples of unusual Home Office ineptitude in carrying out their control 
functions, they provide a window into the strength with which the control imperative is felt 
within the institution. They also mirror the experience of relations with the Home Office 
reported by interviewees. When questioned about the Executive’s conduct of litigation and 
responses to adverse court judgments, interviewees reported that in their experience;  
 
‘It doesn't have any interest in changing and it has a vast interest in maintaining the 
status quo’;175  
 
‘The moment the ink is dry on a judgment, the Home Office is trying to get round it’;176 
and, 
‘They’ve always been a law breaking department. Internally the culture is one that 
does not respect what they see as externally imposed laws or rules that they don’t 
agree with.’177 
 
                                                          
173Home Office, ‘Freedom of Information request (our ref: 32533): internal review’, (12 November 2014) 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/223785/response/594896/attach/3/32533%20Yeo%20IR%20res
ponse%202014%2011%2012.pdf accessed 22 September 2016 
174 R (Mohammed) v SSHD [2016] EWHC 447 (Admin) 
175 Children’s Rights NGO Officer Interview, 28th August 2013 
176 Migrants’ Rights NGO Director 1 Interview, 8th April 2014 
177 Immigration and Welfare Barrister Interview, 9th April 2014 
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While these litigators are likely to regard their opponent as having an institutional inclination 
towards obstinacy and law-breaking, overall the evidence indicates that as an administrative 
institution the Home Office’s immigration service is heavily dominated by an institutional 
imperative to assert ‘control’.  
 
The government of the day is under a strong imperative to demonstrate control, while it’s 
administration has both an institutional inclination and a strong political pressure to exert 
control over its policy field. Developing immigration law and policy through court judgments 
and cause litigation is likely to produce tension with this centralisation of ‘control’ within the 
executive. The effects of these tensions will be central to the issues examined in Section 2 of 
this thesis.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that, in the context of migrants’ rights activism in the UK, the 
influences on cause litigation are a mixture of strengths and some major difficulties. 
  
The UK’s migrants’ rights sector has developed significantly. Originally based in the anti-
racism and radical lawyering tradition of the 1960s and 70s it has evolved into a substantially 
NGO-based civil society movement. The movement continues to benefit from access to high 
level legal expertise, relatively close coordination and cooperation and at least significant 
levels of connectivity. However, broader non-activist support, mass participation and the 
capacity to mobilise supporters into substantial voting blocks continue to elude it. As such, 
cause litigation tends to take place in political isolation. The legal developments in the last 
fifteen years, particularly the Human Rights Act but also developments in international law 
may have freed up some of the UK’s ingrained judicial conservatism, particularly when it 
comes to immigration. This has been combined with institutional developments that have 
allowed for greater independent judicial engagement with immigration questions and provide 
a forum for cause litigators to do their work. However, the political opportunity structures 
cause litigators face are solidly negative. Public opinion on immigration in the UK has been 
strongly and consistently negative, and that hostility is increasing. Immigration (particularly 
but increasingly not exclusively, irregular immigration) has been problematised in public 
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discourse as a cause of crisis and threat. In response, institutional practices by the 
immigration administration and at the Ministerial level indicate the existence of an imperative 
to demonstrate control of immigration. 
 
The tension between cause litigation’s strengths and the political opportunity structures it 
operates in, in particular the control imperative, is likely to have a strong influence on both 
the practical outcomes that it is able to achieve and the wider political consequences of the 
continued reliance on it for migrants’ rights gains. Examining how this tension plays out in 
practice will be the focus of Section 2 of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Strategic Litigation for Migrants’ Rights 
Introduction 
“There’s no point negotiating with government when what they’re doing is clearly 
illegal and we could force them to stop doing it.”1 
The tension between cause litigation’s judicial expansionism and the Executive’s need to exert 
control is most overtly displayed in the conduct of strategic litigation. As was discussed in 
chapter 2, this form of legal activism has been given many different definitions, but in this 
thesis is being taken to mean the deliberate seeking out of litigation opportunities by cause 
litigators in order to progress a campaign goal. As such, in general it involves a clearly defined 
target and relatively clearly observable outcomes. What these outcomes tend to be for 
strategic litigation for migrants’ rights, and why they are as they are, will therefore be the 
subject of this chapter. 
The chapter finds that there is a range of strategic litigation activity based on the movement 
resources dedicated to it and policy impact it is intended to achieve. The first section of the 
chapter examines what it argues constitutes the majority of strategic litigation undertaken by 
the UK migrants’ rights movement, which is largely limited in scope to isolated technical issues 
of policy implementation or procedure, and discusses the practical outcomes these cases 
have achieved. The chapter then moves to examine an example where there has been 
commitment of greater resources and ambition; the recent litigation campaign against the 
detained fast track asylum system. 
The chapter then goes on to apply the three-point framework of analysis set out in the 
previous chapters to the practice of strategic litigation, to investigate why strategic litigation 
for migrants’ rights has taken the form that it has and why it tends to result in the outcomes 
it does. In doing so it argues that while the resources available to the movement and the 
judicial framework the movement operates in are receptive and enable regular courtroom 
success, they also tend to promote the kind of limited ambitions that the trend of strategic 
litigation represents. Most importantly, though, the chapter identifies the political 
opportunity structures the cause litigators operate in, and in particular the imperative of 
                                                          
1 Migrants’ Rights NGO Director 1 Interview, 8th April 2014 
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control that Chapter 3 showed motivated Executive responses to the immigration issue, as 
being the major obstacle to strategic litigation’s outcomes.  
The final section of the chapter then provides an assessment of strategic litigation’s role in 
migrants’ rights activism. It acknowledges that the picture is not exclusively one of 
disappointment for the cause litigators; different cases produce variable impacts and that 
persist for variable durations. Some of this variability can be put down to chance factors that 
are likely to be difficult to repeat, but the section argues that the extent of the Executive’s 
motivation to undermine a ruling is ultimately the main determining factor in the extent of 
this variation.  
 
Examining Strategic Litigation 
 
I think there is a lot of dangers with just focusing on litigation without working on the 
public understanding. Even if you do have a successful outcome in court, if people don’t 
understand that you’re not going to affect public opinion and then the Government is likely 
to come back with something else.2 
 
i) The study of strategic litigation 
 
As this chapter will discuss in detail, strategic litigation is a key activity for the UK’s cause 
litigation movement. Cause lawyers have seen migrants’ rights as an important area in which 
to professionally exercise their political concerns and strategic litigation has become the most 
overt means of doing so. NGOs acting as claimants or third party interveners regularly appear 
in higher court proceedings. Institutional charitable funders actively promote strategic 
litigation’s use3. It is therefore crucial for this thesis to analyse what outcomes this form of 
                                                          
2 NGO Legal & Policy Officer Interview, 27th August 2013 
3 The Strategic Legal Fund, ‘About the SLF’ (The Strategic Legal Fund) 
http://www.strategiclegalfund.org.uk/about/ accessed 22nd May 2015 
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cause litigation has achieved and the influencing factors that have brought these outcomes 
about.  
In attempting a similar analysis in relation to the US and France, Kawar argues that previous 
studies of strategic litigation on immigration issues from a range of different national contexts 
have emphasised ‘the weak coercive power of legal rules in the migration policy domain.’4 
Broader critiques of strategic litigation have also been made. Arguments from this perspective 
have tended to start with the claim that the impact of major litigation events have been 
greatly exaggerated. Tushnet has referred to this as the production of ‘law office history’ in 
which narrative and analysis stops at the judgment on the case and neglects the more 
ambiguous process of implementation. This, Tushnet argues, results in lawyers 
‘overestimating the importance of their activities’.5 Some analysts have gone further, 
however, and argued that while strategic litigation produces little by way of positive change 
for the causes it seeks to promote, it does have a tendency to produce a damaging backlash 
effect which may end up retarding progress that would otherwise have been achieved had 
litigation not intervened. As Rosenberg, pointing to examples related to gay marriage and civil 
rights in the US, argues ‘those who rely on the courts absent significant public and political 
support will fail to achieve meaningful social change, and may set their cause back.’6 
A unifying factor in the approach of most contributors to the debate around the efficacy of 
strategic litigation has been a focus on cases of major legal and political significance. Cases 
that overturn pre-existing doctrine, or can be shown to be at the beginning of a new doctrine, 
are afforded particular prominence. As Kawar says, ‘to the extent that court-centred activity 
has been discussed by scholars in this area, analysis has centred on high-profile judicial 
decisions that extend the set of formal rights available to noncitizens.’7 However, as the next 
section will demonstrate, there are very few migrants’ rights strategic cases that could be 
fairly considered ‘high profile’ in the UK. Such cases rarely achieve prominence in public 
debate and only a few have garnered substantial academic attention. This may partly be 
because the great majority of contemporary strategic litigation for migrants’ rights in the UK 
                                                          
4 Kawar L, Contesting Immigration Policy in Court: Legal Activism and its Radiating Effects in the United States 
and France (CUP 2015) 5 
5 Tushnet M, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education (1994) 80 VLR 173 
6 Rosenberg G, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (2nd Ed, University of Chicago Press 
2008) 
7 Kawar (n4) 3 
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has much smaller ambitions. Rather than attempting to bring about systemic change or 
challenge major aspects of policy, strategic litigation tends to be aimed at promoting or 
preventing particular conduct by the immigration service or altering technical aspects of 
Executive immigration administration. Strategic litigation thus effectively plays a regulatory 
role, by seeking to ensure that the practice of immigration control does not result in egregious 
rights violations. 
ii) Strategic Litigation in Practice 
The primary means by which strategic litigation is pursued by cause litigators is through a 
combination of cause lawyers and one or more of the myriad of NGOs and charities that make 
up the UK’s migrants’ rights movement and that were discussed in chapter 3. While there are 
some specialist strategic litigation organisations,8 for the most part the cause lawyers 
involved tend to be those doing cause litigation work on a day-to-day basis, which will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5, interspersed with the occasional strategic case. As one 
experienced litigator put it, ‘I’m not a strategic lawyer, I’ve fallen into it by mistake.’9 
Meanwhile, for the NGO’s involved, strategic litigation obviously offers an opportunity to 
target specific policy priorities. An NGO officer working in this area explained, ‘there’s a real 
energy and commitment from senior managers for us to continue to do it. It’s seen as being 
more tangible and finite in an area that I think sometimes people feel is too difficult.’10 
Single-issue NGOs typically act as either interveners or in some instances claimants, often 
targeting a particular aspect of policy and procedure that they have identified as problematic 
from their daily work with their client groups. While their specific forms of participation will 
vary from case to case, they often include the provision of detailed witness statements 
documenting a repeated procedural failing on the part of the immigration administration, 
commissioning or engaging in published research on an issue which is subsequently submitted 
as evidence, compiling evidence of the experiences of their client group, and in some 
circumstances providing expert perspective on relevant issues, such as mental or physical 
health, tangential to immigration control law.11 A large number of cases of this kind have 
                                                          
8 Migrants’ Law Project (MLP) http://themigrantslawproject.org/ (Accessed 14th May 2014) and the Public Law 
Project Public Law Project, http://www.publiclawproject.org.uk/ accessed 20 September 2016 
9 London Immigration Solicitor 2 Interview, 20th December 2015 
10 NGO Legal & Policy Officer Interview, 27th August 2013 
11 Migrants’ Rights NGO Director 1 Interview, 8th April 2014; NGO Legal Officer Interview, 29th April 2014; London 
Immigration Solicitor 1 Interview, 2nd April 2014, NGO Legal & Policy Officer Interview, 27th August 2013 
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taken place in recent years, and this section will set some of them out. This is to show the 
impact the mobilisation of resources by NGOs and their collaborative working with cause 
lawyers has had in practice, and to demonstrate the extent to which such cases have become 
a regular feature of the UK’s migrants’ rights movement activism.  
Strategic cases frequently target particular aspects of Home Office policy which, it is argued,  
are in some sense irrational, are otherwise unlawful in public law terms or are contrary to 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) standards. Here, NGO participants are often 
able to mobilise and dedicate research and monitoring resources to properly inform the court 
about the realities of how such policies play out in practice on a systemic basis. Three groups 
of strategic litigation cases involving direct NGO participation will be discussed below; cases 
regarding the specific application of technical Home Office policies, cases concerning 
migrants’ access to the courts, and a third group regarding the interpretation of significant 
rights-affecting legislative provisions. The cases and the NGO involvement in them, will be 
outlined here, while their legal and policy outcomes will follow later in the chapter. 
The first group, relating to technical Home Office policies, include a number of cases relating 
to immigration detention. In Das v SSHD [2014]12 the mental health campaigning charity Mind 
and the specialist immigration detention NGO Medical Justice argued that the interpretation 
of the Home Office’s policy on releasing immigration detainees on mental health grounds, 
which included a threshold of being so ill as to require in-patient hospital care, was inhumane 
and thus contrary to its objects and purpose.13 As a lawyer involved in the litigation explained,  
‘the focus of the intervention in that case was around what does it mean when we talk 
about serious mental illness? What does it mean to be satisfactorily managed? The 
interpretation that had been given… was an incredibly regressive approach.’14  
Medical Justice, who regularly provide independent medical care and assessment to people 
in detention, were able to present evidence of the failures to provide effective mental 
healthcare in detention and the effect that this threshold had had on detainees, while Mind 
                                                          
12 EWCA Civ 45, For discussion Marenah K, ‘The Immigration Differential In The Treatment Of Mental Illness’ 
(2015) 29 JIANL 41 
13  R (Das) v SSHD & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 45 
14 NGO Legal Officer Interview, 29th April 2014 
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was able to present a broader perspective on the provision of mental health care and 
commonly accepted good practice outside of the immigration context.  
Lumba v SSHD [2011]15 was a case concerning the immigration detention of foreign national 
offenders who had served their prison sentences and were awaiting deportation. It involved 
as interveners the immigration detention NGO Bail for Immigration Detainees (BID), giving 
evidence as an independent third party monitor of systemic Home Office conduct in relation 
to the operation of the power to detain. It was led by a large number of significant cause 
lawyers including Raza Hussain QC and Michael Fordham QC, who will both appear again in 
chapter 5 in relation to cause litigation on Article 8 ECHR, instructed by the specialist cause 
litigation charity the Public Law Project. In the case, the Supreme Court addressed a number 
of issues relating to legal principle, but specifically in relation to Home Office conduct it found 
that it was both unlawful in public law terms and constituted the tort of false imprisonment 
for the Home Office to operate a secret policy presumption in favour of detaining such people, 
while publishing a public policy that purported to operate a presumption against such 
detention. As Lord Collins summarised,  
‘a deliberate decision was taken to continue an unlawful policy. As Lord Dyson says, 
caseworkers were directed to conceal the true reason for detention, namely the 
unpublished policy, and to give other reasons which appeared to conform with the 
published policy.’16   
Aside from immigration detention, welfare support for asylum seekers has been targeted.17 
Refugee Action v SSHD [2014]18 involved the refugee and asylum seeker support charity 
Refugee Action as a claimant, but also was conducted by a specialist strategic litigation 
organisation, the Migrants’ Law Project, who will appear later in this chapter in relation to the 
litigation against the Detained Fast Track asylum system.19 The case involved a judicial review 
of the Secretary of State’s decision to freeze the special welfare payments claimed by asylum 
                                                          
15  Lumba (WL) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 12, For discussion, Ruck Keene A, Dobson C, ‘At What Price Liberty? The 
Supreme Court Decision In Lumba And Compensation For False Imprisonment’ [2012] PL 628 
16 Lumba, para 220  
17 Also Mulumba v First-tier Tribunal (Asylum Support) and SSHD. 
18 R (Refugee Action) v The SSHD [2014] EWHC 1033 (Admin) For discussion, Bales K, ‘The "essential living needs" 
of asylum seekers: lessons learned from R (Refugee Action) v SSHD’ (2015) 37 Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law 247 
19 Migrants’ Law Project (MLP) http://themigrantslawproject.org/ (Accessed 14th May 2014) 
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seekers who are otherwise prevented from working or claiming mainstream benefits. It 
turned on the duty under Regulation 10 of the Asylum Support Regulations 2000 to ensure 
that the ‘essential living needs’ of asylum seekers in these circumstances were met. Refugee 
Action was permitted to bring the claim by the court ‘in the interests of all asylum seekers’ 
on account of its charitable purposes being ‘to support and work with refugee communities 
in order to facilitate the successful resettlement in the UK of refugees and asylum seekers’.20 
In practice the organisation was able to provide extensive evidence of what in reality 
constituted the ‘essential living needs’ of asylum seekers that had not up to that point been 
taken into account.   
The second key area of strategic litigation activity has been in relation to cases that asked the 
courts to defend access to their own procedures. Here, NGO participants have worked to 
identify and support individual claimants with appropriate cases. Finding the right claimant 
can be crucial to a successful strategic challenge. For example, a lawyer involved in some of 
these cases pointed to Gudanaviciene v Director of Legal Aid Casework & Or [2014],21 which 
ruled that policy guidance issued to the Legal Aid Authority caseworkers on when to grant an 
exceptional entitlement to legal aid under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) was not compatible with Article 8 in immigration cases. 22  Here,  
we had to look for someone who had a level of complexity to their case. If it’s simple, 
they can do the application themselves, or an NGO can do it.23  
Local groups and NGOs therefore had to coordinate to identifying claimants whose cases were 
sufficiently complex to require legal assistance, but not so unusual that their circumstances 
could be distinguished away from the broader range of claimants or fall to be granted under 
policy as it stood at the time.  
There will also be cases where an NGO substitutes themselves for an individual or group of 
claimants, when for systemic reasons individual claimants were not available or not 
                                                          
20 (n18) para 2 
21 R (Gudanaviciene & Ors), v The Director of Legal Aid Casework & Or [2014] EWCA Civ 1622. For discussion, 
Mountfield H, ‘Judicial review and human rights: challenges to court fees and legal aid changes which limit or 
effectively exclude right of access to court’ (2014) 19 Judicial Review 217; and Spurrier M and Janes L, ‘Litigating 
to save legal aid’ (2016) Legal Action 12.  
22 Gudanaviciene (n21) para 74 
23 London Immigration Solicitor 2 Interview, 20th December 2015 
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appropriate. For example, Medical Justice v SSHD [2011] 24 successfully challenged a Home 
Office policy of removing irregular migrants’ who were recognised as a suicide risk or had 
other serious mental health problems without any advance notice, on the grounds that it 
denied such people the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of their removal. Here,  
‘it needed to be an NGO [claimant] because the whole argument was that to give 
somebody no notice of removal meant that you couldn’t access court, so if you had 
an individual claimant who was accessing the court, well, you know…”25   
Likewise, in The Public Law Project v Lord Chancellor [2016],26 in which the specialist cause 
litigation NGO PLP obtained a ruling from the Supreme Court that a residence test for 
entitlement to legal aid barring access to anyone who had not been lawfully present in the 
UK for at least a year was ultra vires the powers granted under LASPO. Here, an NGO claimant 
was necessary as the Residence test was only a proposal at the stage the litigation was 
brought and so there were no individuals who had yet been effected by it. 
To these cases, and a number of others, can be added a third class of case that are arguably 
more significant, both in terms of scale of ambition and impact achieved. In contrast to the 
above cases, rather than targeting a particular Executive policy, these cases focussed on the 
interpretation of statutes. They are the cases of Limbuela & Ors [2004]27 and ZH Tanzania 
[2011].28 Limbuela represented a full-frontal attack on what was regarded at the time of its 
introduction as a key element of immigration control; the denial of housing and financial 
support to asylum seekers who failed to lodge their claims immediately upon arrival in the 
                                                          
24 R (Medical Justice) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 1710. For discussion, Ramage S & Everett K, ‘Case Comment: 
Unlawful creation, publication and operation of Government policy without proper consultation or public 
information: R (on the application of Medical Justice) v Secretary of State for the Home Department’ (2011) 201 
Criminal Lawyer 1  
25 London Immigration Solicitor 1 Interview, 2nd April 2014 
26 R (The Public Law Project) v Lord Chancellor [2016] UKSC 39 For discussion, Fouzder M, ‘Residence test in 
limbo after challenge upheld’ (2016) 113 Law Society's Gazette 3. 
27 R (Adam) v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 66 There has been extensive discussion of many aspects and implications of 
the Limbuela judgment. For some examples, Morris L, Asylum, Welfare And The Cosmopolitan Ideal: A Sociology 
Of Rights (Routledge 2010); Sweeney J, ‘The human rights of failed asylum seekers in the United Kingdom’ [2008] 
PL 277; Fredman S, ‘Human rights transformed: positive duties and positive rights’ [2006] PL 498; Pillay A, 
‘Economic and social rights adjudication: developing principles of judicial restraint in South Africa and the United 
Kingdom’ [2013] PL 599 
28 ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4. Likewise, this case has generated a great deal of academic analysis.  Fortin 
J, ‘Are children's best interests really best? ZH (Tanzania) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department’ 
(2011) 74 MLR 947; Bolton S, ‘Promoting the best interests of the child in UK asylum law and procedures’ (2012) 
26 JIANL 232 
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country. S.55(1)(b) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act (NIAA) 2002 required the 
Home Office not to provide accommodation to an asylum seeker if the ‘Secretary of State is 
not satisfied that the claim was made as soon as reasonably practicable.’ However, the cause 
litigators successfully asserted that this policy in its bare terms, enforcing homelessness in a 
context where asylum seekers were denied permission to work or access mainstream benefits 
and couldn’t leave the country until their asylum claims had been decided, would in many 
circumstances meet the tests of inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR. This 
was done using evidence from Shelter regarding the realities of homelessness and the lack of 
alternative means of support for asylum seekers29 while Liberty provided legal arguments on 
the Strasbourg case law on Article 3 of the ECHR.30 As was noted in the previous chapter, the 
House of Lords ruled that the subsequent subsection s.55 (5)(a) of the 2002 NIAA, which 
stated that s.55(1) ‘shall not prevent the exercise of a power by the Secretary of State to the 
extent necessary for the purpose of avoiding a breach of a person’s Convention rights’ meant 
that at least a minimum of support had to be provided if the only alternative was street 
homelessness.  
In contrast, ZH Tanzania was a not a challenge to any particular aspect of immigration control 
policy. The case involved a mother with irregular status in the UK but two young British citizen 
children. The question was, then, how s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 
2009 (BCIA), which placed a duty on the Secretary of State to safeguard and promote the 
welfare of children while discharging her immigration functions, was to be interpreted. The 
cause litigators’ had two main priorities here. Firstly, to try to ensure that s.55 BCIA would 
have as robust and wide reaching influence as possible across the full range of immigration 
issues involving children.31 To this end they succeeded in focussing the interpretation of the 
duty to ‘safeguard and promote the welfare of children’ on article 3(1) of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and its assertion that the ‘best interests of the child’ must 
be a ‘primary consideration’ in all actions concerning children. Secondly, to establish that 
children were to be treated as rights-baring individuals in immigration proceedings and not, 
as one cause litigator involved put it, as ‘merely attachments to their parents.’32 This point 
                                                          
29 SSHD v Limbuela & Ors [2004] EWCA Civ 540 paras 26-31 
30 Ibid para 87 
31 Children’s Rights Solicitor Interview, 21st August 2013 
32 Ibid 
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was emphasised by Just for Kids Law taking the highly unusual step in immigration 
proceedings of representing the children’s interests independently of their parents.  
iii) The Results Achieved 
While all of these instances of strategic litigation achieved success in court, this is not to claim 
that all strategic litigation succeeds. As one example in 2013, Mind and Freedom from Torture 
intervened unsuccessfully in the case of SL v Westminster City Council [2013]33 to argue that 
migrants receiving outpatient mental health support should be considered as receiving ‘care 
and attention’ such as would entitle them to accommodation under the duties on local 
authorities contained in s. 21(1) of the 1948 National Assistance Act.  More recently, strategic 
cases against the heightened financial requirements for family migration34 and against the 
more stringent tests for ‘adult dependent relative’35 migration introduced in 2012 were 
brought by cause litigators including Richard Drabble QC, Manjit Gill QC, the Migrants’ Law 
Project and JCWI. These cases were of potentially similar significance to Limbuela, targeting 
key aspects of current executive immigration policy, however, both have so far been rejected 
by the judges on grounds that the immigration rules are not unreasonable and are at least 
capable of being operated proportionately.36 
What is clear, though, is that strategic litigation is both regularly pursued and is regularly 
successful, at least initially. As was noted above, a major reason for this may well be the ability 
and willingness of the movement to martial significant resources into making this happen. 
However, as Tushnet noted earlier in this chapter, judicial success can only be one part of the 
assessment. Given that, as was noted in chapters 2 and 3, there is not necessarily a straight 
correlation between a judicial ruling and the intended policy change being put into effect, it 
is necessary to understand what the practical outcomes of these judicial successes have in 
fact been.   
Taking the examples given above, we can see that there is a range of practical outcomes that 
have occurred. Some cases have effectively produced no meaningful change despite their 
initial legal success.  For instance, while Lumba compelled the Home Office to maintain a 
                                                          
33 [2013] UKSC 27 
34 R (MM & Ors) v SSHD (Rev 1) [2014] EWCA Civ 985 
35 R (Britcits) v SSHD [2016] EWHC 956 (Admin) 
36 MM & Ors para 153; BritCits para 143. At the time of writing the appeal of MM & Ors to the Supreme Court 
has been heard, but no judgment given. 
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published policy presumption against detaining ex-foreign national offenders prior to their 
deportation, in practice such individuals continue to be routinely detained.37 This has been 
achieved by asserting that, while a presumption of release exists, this can be outweighed by 
other factors particularly absconding risk and potential risk to the public. Ex-foreign national 
offenders are routinely viewed as high risks on both counts and thus detention is 
maintained.38 
Likewise, Refugee Action [2014] produced a detailed ruling that found ‘the information used 
by the Secretary of State to set the rate of asylum support was simply insufficient to reach a 
rational decision’, on the basis that the decision had failed to take into account the wide range 
of ‘essential living needs’ identified by the charity.39 However, the Home Office response was 
to issue a new decision, formally taking these ‘essential living needs’ into account but 
calculating that no increase in payments was necessary. The new calculations found that all 
the major essential living needs identified in the judgment could in fact be accommodated 
within the rate as it had previously been set.40 This litigation was criticised by one interviewee, 
an institutional funder of cause litigation, as ‘a good example of where strategic litigation may 
be a useful campaigning tool but in and of itself is overstated. It’s a positive ruling but the cost 
of the litigation through the various levels has been quite significant.’41 
Similarly, following the Das decision on detention of the severely mentally ill, the Home 
Office’s formal policy was revised to take account of the ruling.42  However, subsequent 
independent reviews of detention practices have found that practical identification of the 
severely mentally ill and their subsequent release has not improved. The Shaw Review into 
the Welfare of Detainees in particular found that this procedure, known as Rule 35, ‘does not 
do what it was intended to do – that is, to protect vulnerable people who find themselves in 
                                                          
37 Home Office, Enforcement Instructions and Guidance 55.1.2 Criminal Casework Cases, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/552478/EIG_55_detention_
and_temporary_release_v21.pdf accessed 28 September 2016 
38 Migrants’ Rights NGO Director 1 Interview, 8th April 2014 
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41 Funding Officer Interview, 15th April 2014 
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detention.’43 The reason given was that, ‘the Home Office does not trust the mechanisms it 
has created to support its own policy.’44   
Other cases have achieved some initial or longer term success, yet have subsequently met 
with significant difficulties. Medical Justice’s success in their challenge to no-notice removals, 
in Medical Justice v SSHD [2011], was longer-lived in that all those facing removal were given 
72 hours’ notice of any intended removal, the minimum the Court of Appeal considered 
necessary. However, in 2014 this principle was eroded by a new Home Office policy of 
notifying a person that they would be subject to removal proceedings but with no identified 
date or time, other than that it would occur in more than 72 hours from the date of the 
notice.45  
Gudanaviciene too produced a revision to the wording of formal policy. Previous instructions 
to legal aid decision makers were altered to make them less exclusionary, by removing 
references to a ‘very high threshold’ in Article 8 ECHR cases which were found to be 
inconsistent with the Strasbourg case law and therefore unlawful.46 Cause litigators report 
that this has freed up the decision making to grant exceptional case funding from its previous 
position of near blanket exclusion. However, while this is undoubtedly a meaningful success, 
it does not resolve the fact that the requirement to go through the highly bureaucratic and 
time consuming ECF application process for legal aid funding continues to constitute a 
significant obstacle to Article 8 claims. 
Of the cases discussed above, Limbuela and ZH Tanzania have had the most long-lasting and 
significant impact in policy and procedural terms. The immediate effect of the Limbuela ruling, 
was to effectively bring to an end the widespread use of section 55 NIAA to deny asylum 
seekers support. This policy had been a key point of principle for Ministers. As Morris reports, 
it was described by the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, as ‘an important part of our 
                                                          
43 Home Office, Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons: A report to the Home Office by 
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https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/510261/DSO_03-
2014_Service_of_Removal_Directions.pdf accessed 31st August 2016  
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asylum reform programme which is dealing with widespread abuse of the system.’47 ZH 
Tanzania’s impact, as a result of the interpretive nature of the judgment and the sweeping 
nature of the section 55 BCIA provision, have been more wide-ranging still. This has included 
increasing the possibilities for regularisation of legal status under Article 8 for irregular 
families with children, strengthening procedural protections for unaccompanied children in 
the asylum system,48 and enabling greater access to permanent settled status in the UK.49 
However, while these developments are clearly important and of considerably greater 
significance and duration than some of the other cases under discussion, their impact should 
not be overstated. For example, in relation ZH Tanzania, subsequent litigation efforts by the 
Home Office have succeeded in securing the ‘clarification’ that while a child’s best interests 
must be a primary consideration, in deciding on regularisation decisions under Article 8 where 
the parents would otherwise be being removed, a child’s best interests will ordinarily be to 
remain with their family and thus be removed alongside them.50 Meanwhile, as was discussed 
above in relation to the Refugee Action case, since Limbuela the levels of financial assistance 
and standard of accommodation provided has been gradually eroded over time. The asylum 
support provisions of the 2016 Immigration Act, not yet brought into force at the time of 
writing, also appear likely to test the limits of what the Limbuela ruling will allow. 
iv) Conclusion 
All of these cases featured NGOs as either claimants or intervenors and all were pursued with 
a view to them forming part of a wider strategic goal. Interviewees from NGOs involved in 
some of these cases gave examples where they had taken the case on after recognising a 
systemic failing that their beneficiaries were consistently confronting,51 while others cited 
principles that their organisation had campaigned for for many years and were now 
concerned might be eroded by Home Office policy.52 Nevertheless, the majority of strategic 
litigation for migrants’ rights tends to be limited both in the scale of its ambition and in the 
practical outcomes that it achieves. It is orientated around technical changes to procedure or 
                                                          
47 Blunkett, quoted in Morris (n27) 53 
48 R (AN & FA (Children)) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 1636 
49  SM & Anor v SSHD [2013] EWHC 1144 (Admin) 
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practice. Cause litigators report that for even these limited aims to be achieved, strategic 
cases require ongoing enforcement through attentive and repeated cause litigation on a non-
strategic basis in individual cases.53  
Given this assessment, it is necessary to understand why this limited role for strategic 
litigation has come about. Of the three primary influential factors described in chapter 3, the 
legal and judicial framework and the political opportunity structures that the cause litigators 
operate under remain relatively constant in the period under discussion. This leaves a possible 
reason being the relatively small scale of the movement resources committed to them. The 
majority of these cases have tended to be isolated, either conceived by or arising out of the 
work of independent NGOs pursuing a discrete issue. It is notable, for example, that the most 
ambitious of the cases discussed above, Limbuela, was also the one that achieved the most 
substantial and durable outcomes for migrants’ rights. To understand strategic litigation’s full 
potential, the second section of this chapter will look at a scenario where the ambition of 
what was being targeted and the resources dedicated to it in terms of coordination and 
movement engagement was at its maximum. 
 
The Detained Fast Track 
“It’s the golden boy of the asylum system.”54 
Between 2013 and 2016 a coordinated and complex campaign of strategic litigation was 
undertaken by cause litigators, targeted at the Detained Fast Track (DFT) system for 
determining asylum claims. Rather than one-off litigation events, this involved a number of 
different judicial review challenges over an extended period, targeting different aspects of 
the system. A previous set of challenges, when the DFT system was first being developed, had 
failed. As will be shown, the more recent cause litigation effort represents one of the most 
ambitious and resource-intensive examples of strategic litigation in this area to date. As such 
it provides an opportunity to understand the extent to which greater commitment of 
resources, in the form of long term and coordinated activity between cause lawyers and the 
                                                          
53 London Immigration Solicitor 1 Interview, 2nd April 2014; and Funding Officer 2 Interview, 28th February 2013 
54 Migrants’ Rights NGO Director 1 Interview, 8th April 2014 
112 
 
wider NGO sector, can overcome the restrictions placed on strategic litigation by the other 
influencing factors. 
i) The Origins of the DFT 
As was discussed in chapter 3, for much of the 1990s and into the 2000s, the issue of asylum 
and refugee determination was at the forefront of the UK’s immigration politics. Consecutive 
governments wrestled to institute an asylum processing system that could control and then 
cut the growing asylum intake, which by 2002 and had reached record figures of 84,000. This 
agenda was embodied in the Detained Fast Track (DFT), the first iteration of which was 
introduced into the UK’s asylum processing system in 2000.55 Based at the Oakington 
Reception Centre, the 2000 fast track was designed to last no longer than seven days, during 
which time an asylum applicant would be held in immigration detention in order to facilitate 
a greatly accelerated asylum procedure. The central difference brought by the Oakington fast 
track system therefore, was that it used immigration detention for ‘the administrative 
convenience’ of the immigration service to process potentially viable claims.56  
From the start the fast track system was targeted by cause litigators for strategic litigation, in 
the House of Lords judgment in Saadi v SSHD [2002]57 and then the ECtHR judgment in Saadi 
v UK [2008].58 However, these cases were ultimately unsuccessful, with both the House of 
Lords and a majority of the Grand Chamber of the European Court ruling that Article 5.1(f) 
ECHR allowed for ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country’ and that, ‘until a State has “authorised” entry to the 
country, any entry is “unauthorised”.59 As such the Oakington system was said to comply with 
ECHR standards, provided that it was ‘closely connected to the purpose of preventing 
unauthorised entry of the person to the country’ and that ‘the place and conditions of 
detention should be appropriate’.60 Wilsher has described these cases as serving both ‘as a 
guide and a warning to the government in relation to future policies of detention on arrival.’61 
                                                          
55 Saadi v The United Kingdom App no 13229/03 (ECtHR, 29 January 2008) para. 23 
56 R (Saadi & Ors) v SSHD [2002] UKHL 41 para 27 
57 Ibid 
58 (n55) 
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However, the warnings were not heeded. In 2003 the Home Office announced a pilot 
‘detained fast track procedure’ at Harmondsworth detention centre. The key development in 
the new DFT was the introduction of immigration detention during the appeal stage of an 
asylum claim as well as the initial claim stage, combined with a further speeding up of the 
system.62 Once again cause litigators challenged this development. The Refugee Legal Centre 
(RLC) decided to act as the claimant in a judicial review of the announcement of the pilot. In 
R (Refugee Legal Centre) v SSHD [2004], the argument moved from the use of detention, as 
in Saadi, to a greater focus on the determination procedure used during that detention. RLC 
argued that, ‘the system was inherently unfair and therefore unlawful because the decision-
making process was so compressed.’63 However, despite some evident reluctance on the part 
of Sedley LJ, renowned as a former radical lawyer, the Court of Appeal again ultimately ruled 
that the DFT did not fall below the ‘irreducible minimum of due process’ necessary in asylum 
cases, and was therefore lawful.64 
Following the determination of RLC the Harmondsworth pilot was officially adopted as 
permanent policy and expanded to include women (at Yarl’s Wood detention centre). The 
Oakington facility was closed down. The terminology of ‘potential for a quick decision’ was 
emphasised. In practice though, a ‘quick decision’ became synonymous with a refusal. 
Anonymous Home Office caseworkers, speaking to the LGBT campaign group Stonewall, 
stated that  
‘In fast-track there’s pretty much an expectation that almost everyone will be refused. 
We don’t put any old case into fast-track. We put ones which are removable and don’t 
appear to have an asylum claim.’65  
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported,  
‘Decisions made within the DFT often incorrectly apply and inaccurately engage with 
refugee law concepts and adopt an erroneous structural approach to asylum decision 
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making. UNHCR is concerned that the speed of the DFT process may inhibit the ability 
of case owners to produce quality decisions.66 
The DFT averaged a 99% refusal rate since its 2005 roll-out.67 In the subsequent litigation it 
was found that during that time the screening process used to decide whether or not a case 
was suitable for the DFT ‘did not seek or have the information necessary … to decide whether 
a case was capable of quick decision or suitable for the DFT on a consistent basis.’68 The range 
of cases that ended up in the DFT,  
‘included cases previously thought of as inherently too complex for a quick decision: 
FGM, homosexuality, domestic violence from countries such as Pakistan, torture and 
rape.’69  
Having been rejected at every turn, strategic litigation ceased. Cause lawyers focussed on 
representing individual cases, with all efforts being directed towards getting their clients’ out 
of the DFT.70 Migrants’ rights NGOs engaged in long term monitoring, research and lobbying 
in an attempt to bring the effects of the DFT system to wider media and political attention, 
but with little success.71 In particular, the voluntary detainee visitors group for the fast-track 
detention centres, the London Detainee Support Group, re-constituted itself as a campaign 
group under the name Detention Action. In 2011, Detention Action published detailed 
research noting, amongst other things, that the modern DFT was operating in a manner very 
different from that which had been validated by the Strasbourg Court in Saadi and was doing 
so in a policy climate that was radically different.72  
ii) A Return to Strategic Litigation 
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This central insight was taken up by cause litigators as the basis for renewed attempts to 
litigate the DFT.73 In 2013 a strategic judicial review of the operation of the DFT was lodged, 
this time with Detention Action as the claimant. In Detention Action v SSHD [2014] the cause 
litigators argued that the DFT in its modern form fell below the standard set in RLC. In making 
these arguments the lawyers for Detention Action submitted evidence of failures at every 
stage of the DFT process, including in the length of detention, unsuitable claims not being 
identified, failure to remove identified unsuitable cases, failures in allocation of legal 
representation and failures at the appeal stage.74 This litany of failures was said to 
demonstrate a system that was, in the language of RLC, so unfair as to be unlawful.  
However, while the judge, Ouseley J, delivered a decision which largely accepted the 
criticisms of the DFT made by the cause litigators, he did not regard them as individually or 
cumulatively unlawful.75 Only in relation to the specific failures to provide adequate legal 
representation did the challenge clearly succeed. 76 The ruling found that the small amount of 
time lawyers had with their clients meant that this safeguard was not functioning as it should. 
As Ouseley J, summarised, ‘it is the failings elsewhere which lead to the allocation of lawyers 
as the point at which something has to change.’77 It was thus a relatively simple matter for 
the Home Office to introduce a new policy permitting greater time for duty solicitors to meet 
their clients before the substantive asylum process began.78 
Things did not end there, however. The new time-scales meant that claimants’ lawyers were 
better able to perform their proper representative functions. One consequence of this was a 
substantial increase in the number of referrals of potential victims of torture, sexual violence 
and other serious mistreatment to the therapeutic foundations Freedom from Torture and 
the Helen Bamber Foundation (HBF). In turn, these referrals led to victims of torture and/or 
human trafficking bringing further challenges to their detention in the DFT. They did so on the 
basis that the DFT operated with a systemic risk of unfairness in that it failed to identify those 
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vulnerable or potentially vulnerable claimants the Ouseley judgment had found were 
unsuitable for a quick decision and therefore unsuitable for the DFT. 
These challenges were grouped together, with the HBF providing detailed further evidence 
regarding their case load and some individual clients and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ 
Association (ILPA) acting as a formal intervener.79 In a coordinated action, Detention Action 
renewed their challenge to the functioning of the DFT, this time focussing on the Appeal stage 
of the asylum process and arguing that the DFT Tribunal procedure rules which allowed for 
specially speeded up appeals processes and for individuals to be detained for the duration of 
their asylum appeal were inherently unfair. Thus both entry into and appeal from the DFT 
process were being targeted at around the same time. 
The Detention Action challenge was heard first and succeeded on all grounds. In Detention 
Action v First Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) & Ors [2015]80 Nicol J ruled 
that the fast-track rules incorporated structural unfairness and put the Appellant at a serious 
procedural disadvantage.81 Following this, in early July 2015, the Secretary of State made a 
last minute concession to HBF, accepting that the DFT ‘created an unacceptable risk of 
unfairness to vulnerable or potentially vulnerable individuals.’ In his statement of reasons for 
the agreed concession Blake J stressed that the DFT had operated with an unacceptable risk 
of failure to identify vulnerable and potentially vulnerable individuals, including but not 
limited to those who might have been victims of torture, human trafficking, or who might 
have been suffering from mental disorder or other physical or mental impairment.82 
Following this series of defeats and faced with both the entry and appeals stages of the 
process being ruled unlawful, the Immigration Minister announced the complete suspension 
of the DFT while an ‘urgent review of all the evidence about any possible unfairness in the 
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DFT’ was undergone and ‘any shortcomings identified’.83 The announcement made clear that 
the Government’s intention to pursue appeals against the decision of Nicol J regarding DFT 
appeals vigorously. An expedited appeal was heard in July 2015 by the Court of Appeal, but 
was rejected. In the leading judgment, the Master of the Rolls found that, 
In my view the time limits are so tight as to make it impossible for there to be a fair 
hearing of appeals in a significant number of cases. For the reasons that I have given, 
the safeguards on which the SSHD and the Lord Chancellor rely do not provide a 
sufficient answer. The system is therefore structurally unfair and unjust.84   
A subsequent application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court by the Home Office 
was refused in November 2015.85 The DFT remained suspended.  
The Executive’s last possibility for renewing the DFT relied on securing a revision of the 
procedure rules for appeals in the DFT that would take account of the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment and still allow the DFT to function. However, in May 2016 the Procedure Rules 
Committee of the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal, made up of senior members of the UK’s 
immigration judiciary, declined to make new Fast Track appeals rules.86 Without procedure 
rules, appeals could not be heard while a person was in detention, which in turn undermined 
the Executive’s control objective of processing and removing asylum claims as quickly as 
possible. As a result, the DFT was brought to an end.  
This appeared to be a momentous event for the UK’s migrants’ rights movement and for cause 
litigation in particular. The DFT had become a central element of the Executive’s immigration 
control efforts over this period and thus a major cross-Party governmental priority. The 
coincidence of the DFT’s introduction and the decline in asylum numbers during the 2000s 
was seen by the Executive as evidence of its efficacy as a tool of control.87 As Stefanelli has 
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shown, preserving the DFT was cited by the government as one of its main reasons for 
refusing to opt in to the revised EU Asylum Procedures Directive.88 Despite this governmental 
commitment to the DFT, it appeared that coordinated and concerted strategic litigation, well 
evidenced, backed up with long term research and campaigning material and targeted at 
specific weak points in the process, had brought down a structural element of the immigration 
control regime. Cause litigators described the result as something ‘to savour’,89 and stated 
that ‘The gravity of this finding cannot be overstated.’90  The litigators concerned were 
nominated for awards.91  
iii) Outcomes 
However, on the same day that the suspension of the DFT was announced the Home Office 
introduced an ‘interim instruction’ termed ‘Detained Asylum Casework’ (DAC).92  
Under this new policy, initial asylum claims would continue to be processed while claimants 
were held in immigration detention. The requirement for a case to be ‘suitable for a quick 
decision’ was removed. Instead the DAC process was intended for what were termed 
‘enforcement cases’.93 These are asylum claims that are made after a migrant is apprehended 
by immigration officers. They are regarded as inherently suspect by the Executive94  and are 
considered likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s.94 of the 2002 NIA Act and 
thus deprived of an in-country right of appeal.95 However, the same safeguards for detecting 
cases requiring further investigation and vulnerable claimants that were accepted as being 
defective in the DFT litigation were to operate in the new DAC system.  
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Strategic litigation against the DAC was commenced, citing amongst other things reports from 
Freedom from Torture and HBF that high numbers of potential victims of torture and 
trafficking continued to be detained under the new DAC and arguing that the process should 
also be considered to be so unfair as to be unjust. However, on this occasion the cause 
litigators were not successful. The case of Hossain & Ors v SSHD [2016]96 was heard by 
Cranston J, a former MP who had served as Solicitor General in the New Labour government 
that introduced the Oakington Fast Track. Cranston J accepted the necessity and validity of 
the DAC system, accepted the implication that enforcement cases were necessarily suspect 
and even went as far as to cast doubt on the integrity of medical practitioners who reported 
potential victims of torture amongst the detainees.97 Crucially, and extraordinarily, 
proceedings in the case were halted by the judge halfway through at the Home Office’ 
request, to allow it more time to submit over 800 pages of witness evidence from a range of 
senior officials. This evidence attested to the necessity of the DAC and asserted the invalidity 
of the claims that it dealt with. It was this evidence, which went untested owing to the 
restrictive rules on cross examination in judicial review,98 combined with the judge’s vocal 
reluctance to deal with a situation where ‘a whole system of public administration is on 
trial’,99 that produced the result.100 The decision has subsequently been approved by the 
Court of Appeal.101 
The DAC is in essence a new form of detained asylum procedure and its use is expanding. 
Between 3 July 2015 and 31 January 2016, 1,413 cases were entered into the DAC.102 This 
new system represents a significant undermining of the DFT cause litigation’s initial success. 
The level of long-term commitment, coordination, dedication of resources and ambition 
displayed by the cause litigators was able to secure a major defeat for a procedure which was 
considered to be a key element of the control imperative in immigration policy. However, it 
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appears that even with this heightened commitment the impact of strategic litigation can be 
absorbed and undermined. Why this is will be the subject of the next section. 
 
Understanding Strategic Litigation’s Outcomes 
Occasionally if we’re lucky we get in a sharp kick to the shins, rather than cutting off 
below the knees. I don’t think that happens. They go away and nurse their little wound 
and come back and kick you back much harder.103 
Very few strategic litigation cases that succeed in court seek to challenge a structural element 
of the immigration control system in the way the DFT cases did. Limbuela could be said to 
have had an effect of this kind, imposing, as it did, a minimum standard or safety-net on the 
trend of policy developments in the period which emphasised the ‘harnessing of the benefits 
system as a means to deter arrival’.104 As a result Limbuela produced an angry reaction from 
Ministers. David Blunkett, Home Secretary at the time of the original High Court ruling, made 
headlines by announcing himself ‘personally fed up with having to deal with a situation where 
Parliament debates issues and the judges then overturn them.’105 This dynamic, of Executive 
criticism and delegitimisation of judicial decision making, is an important issue in its own right 
and will be returned to in chapters 5 and 6.  
Understanding how the diminished outcomes that are often produced by strategic litigation 
come about requires a focus on elements of the three key influential factors discussed at 
length in chapters 2 and 3; the resources available and involved, the legal and judicial 
framework that applies and the political opportunity structures that cause litigators face. As 
will be seen, these factors interact to place unavoidable limits on the cases taken and the 
outcomes that are achieved that cannot completely be compensated for by cause litigators 
simply applying more resources.  
i) The Resources Available to the Movement 
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The particular make-up of the UK’s cause litigation sector tends to act as a limiting factor on 
the types of cases that are taken, while at the same time facilitating successful courtroom 
outcomes.  
As the above has demonstrated, the majority of strategic litigation for migrants’ rights in the 
UK is engaged in on an isolated basis, targeting a discrete aspect of administrative practice or 
technical interpretation of a published policy or statute. Even the more significant examples, 
such as Limbuela, were limited to a particular case and did not form part of a wider campaign. 
Only the DFT litigation could be said to have involved long-term coordinated activism. To a 
significant extent this limited ambition comes as a result of the fact that cause litigation is in 
general engaged in through a combination of independent cause lawyers representing 
claimants in coordination with a range of charities and NGOs. As Sarat and Scheingold say, 
‘causes and movements both invigorate and constrain lawyers.’106  
As will be discussed in the next section, the size of the groups involved is significantly 
influenced by the financial implications of going to court. For now, though, the important 
factor is that these civil society groups tend to be single-issue concerns, specialising on a 
particular human rights or medical issue or a particular subset of vulnerable migrants. The 
organisations in the cases discussed above, such as Detention Action, Refugee Action, Medical 
Justice, Freedom from Torture, the Children’s Society and Shelter, would all fit this 
description. As a result, the particular expertise and policy focus of the NGOs engaging in 
strategic litigation as claimants or leading interveners will have a strong influence on what 
issues are targeted for litigation. Such groups’ exposure to immigration policy, either through 
interacting with their client group or in a more institutionalised capacity as a service provider, 
will tend to be at the level of technical administrative implementation; the daily business of 
asylum support allocations, decisions to release or maintain migrant’s detention or the 
handling of traumatised migrants’ in immigration and asylum procedures.107 This is the work 
for which they receive funding from charitable grant making bodies or supporters; orientated 
around the service delivery or gap-filling model of charities in contemporary liberal welfare 
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states.108 It is also this work which provides them with the appearance of sufficient expertise 
to persuade a court to grant them standing to participate in a case.109  
The particular institutional competences and service provision model of the organisations 
that participate in strategic litigation is not solely a limiting factor. They also have the positive 
effect of enabling the delivery of high quality litigation. The challenges to the DFT, which 
involved a group of specialised single-issue organisations, Detention Action, Bail for 
Immigration Detainees, HBF and ILPA all targeting specific aspects of the system, 
demonstrates that well-informed groups able to dedicate limited but sufficient resources are 
able to contrast their on-the-ground experience with the Executive’s characterisation of the 
realities of particular administrative decisions or policy programmes.110 This contributes to 
the regular successes of the cause litigators in strategic litigation described above; successes 
which in turn generate an incentive to continue with and further refine this strategic 
approach.111   
While the NGO-based model of strategic litigation may act to limit the range and scope of 
such challenges, it also helps to ensure that the litigation that is taken is well-prepared and 
strongly presented in court. NGO and cause litigator expertise alone, though, would not be 
sufficient to secure regular strategic litigation success. This also requires a relatively 
benevolent judicial environment.  
ii) The Legal Framework and Judicial Approach 
As was noted above, these resource issues overlap with the role of the judicial and legal 
framework in relation to the financial implications of entering the court system. While NGOs 
may regularly be able to secure their own legal representation on a pro-bono or conditional 
‘no win no fee’ agreement,112 NGO claimants face a significant financial risk from the costs 
liability of losing a judicial review claim against the Executive.  
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This may mean that some organisations limit themselves to acting as third-party interveners 
in individual claimants’ cases, as Shelter did in Limbuela, rather than pursuing cases directly. 
Another means of resolving this issue is to seek a Protective Costs Order from the court.113 
The current law on PCOs will be discussed more in chapter 6, but for now it is enough to note 
that PCOs were originally a creation of the courts and an application involves convincing a 
judge that the issues raised are of general public importance, that the public interest requires 
that they be resolved and that, amongst other things, if the Order is not made then for 
financial reasons the applicant will probably discontinue the proceedings.114 The rules around 
PCOs to a large extent determine the type of NGO or charity that can bring a case directly. 
Given that the level of a PCO is determined based on what the judge considers the NGO could 
be reasonably expected to risk, established charities or NGOs with substantial financial 
resources are likely to have the level of a PCO set very high. This in turn makes it very difficult 
for a charity’s trustees to justify putting such levels of income at risk for an uncertain legal 
outcome when it could be being spent on more immediate priorities and services.115 This 
effectively means that PCOs are far more likely to be attractive to smaller NGOs and charities 
with relatively limited financial resources.  
Once cases make it into court, the attitude and approach of judges hearing strategic migrants’ 
rights cases have also been crucial in rewarding strategic litigation efforts and in shaping the 
kinds of cases that are brought. As was discussed in chapter 3, the UK’s judicial framework of 
immigration judges and senior civil judiciary have developed in their approach to immigration 
and migrants’ rights issues.116 To an extent this reflects a generational shift amongst the 
judges, particularly the increasing presence of former radical lawyers and cause litigators on 
the bench. It is notable, for example, that at various stages of the DFT campaign, key cases 
were heard by Lord Justice Sedley and Justices Blake and Nicol, all of whom have a past history 
of involvement with cause lawyering of various kinds. Blake J was a former leading migrants’ 
rights cause litigator involved in many of the key cases in the 1980s and 90s.117 Sedley LJ was 
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a prominent radical lawyer, member of the Haldane Society and one-time member of the 
Communist Party.118 Nicol was a cause lawyer who, while practicing, had co-published 
‘Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others’, a history of British citizenship and immigration law and 
policy. The book documented a history of ingrained administrative discrimination in 
immigration, arguing that,  
‘It is possible…even for functionaries to apply the law differently to different 
individuals or groups…through the functionaries’ prejudices and practices.’119 
However, while the presence of these justices might indicate an evolution that has reflected 
a wider trend in judicial review more generally, it does not mean that a radical reinvention of 
the traditional separation of powers in the UK has occurred. As Wray has noted, ‘the courts 
are acutely conscious of their constitutional role’120 and judges continue to demonstrate a 
commitment to policing the distinction between their role and what they regard as the proper 
territory of the Executive in relation to immigration policy questions.  
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, this evolving approach has meant that where 
judges consider that they have a role to play, they are willing to engage in relatively intense 
review of Executive conduct and frequently find the immigration service or an aspect of Home 
Office policy wanting. In combination with the high quality of the litigation undertaken by the 
cause litigators, this leads to the repeated court room success of strategic litigation that this 
chapter has discussed. The issue, though, is in where the judiciary considers it should and 
shouldn’t be operating, a point which, as was mentioned in chapter 2, is sometimes referred 
to as ‘justiciability’.121 Judicial decisions on the justiciability of an issue are not fixed, but can 
be influenced by prevailing traditions, previous jurisprudence and judges’ political awareness. 
As was seen in cases such as Refugee Action, such decisions depend to a large extent on what 
cases a judge can be persuaded to hear and rule on.122 The regulating of technical aspects of 
administrative policy appears to fall within what a sufficient number of judges regard as their 
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proper role, and this has in turn influenced the tactical sense of experienced strategic 
litigators on how best to approach migrants’ rights issues.123 
  
Beyond this, though, there appears to be a notable tendency for the courts to be willing to 
defend what they can be persuaded to perceive as their own territory. As has already been 
mentioned, the cases of Medical Justice, Gudaviciene and Public Law Project all centred 
around arguments on access to the courts and thus access to justice. Gudaviciene and PLP are 
all the more notable in this regard in that they involved questions of public expenditure, 
through the provision of legal aid, which have been traditionally thought of as firmly political 
questions outside of the courts’ field of competence.124 What appears to have provided the 
courts with sufficient justification to overcome this problem was the characterisation of the 
issue in terms of access to justice and the functioning of the court system, rather than welfare 
state principles. 
The crucial role of framing migrants’ rights issues in terms of justice is best displayed in the 
DFT cases themselves. Viewed from the perspective of the Executive, the DFT was a crucial 
procedural element in its immigration control policy. Immigration policy and control has been 
another area that was traditionally regarded by the courts as to be largely left up to the 
Executive. This was how the issues were interpreted in the initial unsuccessful litigation 
challenges of Saadi at the House of Lords and ECtHR. The determinations of the human rights 
arguments under Article 5 ECHR here were imbued with discussion of the policy issues and 
the perceived imperative, faced with the sharp increase in asylum numbers during the 
relevant period, for the Executive to exert control over the numbers coming in.125 From this 
the courts determined that detention for ‘administrative convenience’ only was acceptable 
under Article 5, in so far as it was a proportionate response to a legitimate policy aim.  
However, the DFT could also be understood (and was presented as such by the cause 
litigators) as an exercise in the application of law and procedure that was obliged to be 
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conducted in a manner commensurate with wider standards of justice. The effect of the move 
from the immigration control perspective to the justice perspective was begun in RLC and can 
be seen in Sedley LJ’s comments that, 
The choice of an acceptable system is in the first instance a matter for the Executive, 
and in making its choice it is entitled to take into account the perceived political and 
other imperatives for a speedy turn-round of asylum applications. But it is not entitled 
to sacrifice fairness on the altar of speed and convenience, much less of expediency’126  
While this assertion did not prove sufficient for the cause litigators to succeed in the RLC case, 
by the time of the renewed attack on the DFT this pointed the way towards fully framing the 
challenge in terms of legal procedure and ultimately notions of justice.  
The original Detention Action challenge again lost on the Article 5 arguments before Mr 
Justice Ouseley, again for immigration policy reasons.127 However, presenting the DFT as an 
issue of justice in the subsequent cases against the Lord Chancellor more readily appealed 
both to judges’ expertise and their ingrained sense of judicial territory. Their expertise in the 
practical business of case management allowed them to appreciate what the time limits and 
realities of detention would mean both for an asylum seeker in the DFT and an immigration 
judge trying to hear their appeal. As the Master of the Rolls commented in response to the 
MoJ’s argument that the appeals system could not be systemically unfair if there was a power 
for them to be adjourned, 
‘There is bound to be a reluctance to postpone or transfer an appeal on the day of the 
hearing when time has been allocated for the full hearing of the appeal and the parties 
and witnesses have come to give their evidence and advance their submissions… there 
will be a momentum in favour of proceeding with the hearing which it will be difficult 
for an appellant to stop.’128 
This was a rare admission by a senior judge that the realities of the judicial process sometimes 
overpower the pure pursuit of justice. Locating the DFT challenge in the issue of justice, 
combined with reiterating the accepted importance of the issues at hand and the depths to 
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which the DFT had fallen, compelled the judges to overcome any reluctance they may have 
had regarding the justiciability of an immigration control issue of such significance.  
The strengthening of judicial willingness to engage in review of the Executive overall, then, 
has been a key contributor to strategic migrants’ rights litigation. The regular court wins come 
as a result and are a major element in the perpetuation of the strategic litigation approach. 
However, most important has been the judicial approach to these strategic litigation cases, 
which has tended to reward those cases that either focus on relatively straightforward 
questions of interpretation or administrative procedure or on questions of justice and the 
administration of the courts. This in turn encourages the taking of cases that fit, or can be 
made to fit, this paradigm and constrains cause litigators from successfully venturing into 
alternative, more expansive terrain.  
iii) The Political Opportunity Structures 
Political opportunity structures are the most important influencing factor from the point of 
view of the practical outcomes, both positive and negative, that strategic litigation brings 
about. This is because of the particularly disadvantageous POS the migrants’ rights movement 
faces. 
Strategic litigation would be understood by many analysts to be a natural response to 
migrants’ rights activists’ political disadvantage in terms of public opinion and the lack of 
mass-movement support for its agenda.129 Strategic litigation in this context is an attempt to 
secure policy change without the need for mass participation, and litigation on the kind of 
technical issues chiefly discussed above is one of the main means by which the migrants’ 
rights movement seeks to influence the conduct of the immigration administration. However, 
the principles it achieves are developed through legal argument and judicial decision rather 
than consensual negotiation and subsequent administrative ownership. 
As such, much of it can be usefully conceptualised as a form of lobbying, or ‘stakeholder 
engagement’, by other means. Strategic litigation of this kind either takes the place of, or in 
some instances follows on from failed, negotiations with the Executive which in other 
contexts might reasonably be expected to be resolvable without recourse to the courts. One 
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interviewee whose organisation had ended up pursuing strategic litigation explained this 
decision as,  
‘a failure of advocacy and politics, absolutely… We spent two years really working on 
an advocacy basis … working with Home Office officials… And we just got nowhere. 
We got absolutely nowhere.’130 
However, the Executive response to adverse rulings is frequently to evade or minimise the 
effect of judgments secured through strategic litigation. This approach in turn is likely to 
prompt further litigation from the cause litigators following up to seek enforcement of the 
letter and spirit of judgments that they secure. As a funder of strategic litigation explained, ‘if 
the practice doesn’t change, you still need the [individual] cases to keep pushing away’.131 
This dynamic results in the use of strategic litigation as a form of compulsory negotiation. In 
this negotiation, an Executive which is either unwilling or unable to accommodate the 
demands of the migrants’ rights movement is compelled to institute technical changes, and 
then modify those changes, as a result of the court process. Thus the outcomes strategic 
litigation achieves are almost always partial and often temporary. 
This situation poses a great difficulty for strategic litigation. As Rosenberg identified, ‘the 
placing of the power to enforce court decisions in the Executive branch leaves courts 
practically powerless to ensure that their decisions are supported by elected and 
administrative officials.’132 Strategic litigation appears to rely for its enforcement on an 
Executive arm that is under extreme pressure and is dominated by a policy imperative of 
control that is in permanent tension with the principle of enacting migrants’ rights-protecting 
court judgments. The act of compelling the Executive to participate and publicly imposing 
decisions on migrants’ rights issues on it undermines not only the Executive’s attempts to 
exert control but, crucially, undermines the ability to give the public appearance of exerting 
control. In this context, it is understandable why ‘imposed’ changes might be resisted. 
The reality of this tension can be seen in the regularity with which the UK’s courts have ruled 
in very strong terms against the Home Office, not just for unlawful actions but for conduct 
that lacks respect and regard for judicial oversite and the courts. In particular, courts have 
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made repeated findings of failings to abide by either published Home Office policy or judicial 
case law,133 the unlawful use of secret unpublished policies134 and the displacement of 
politically unpalatable but legally necessary decisions onto the Courts.135 Immigration officers 
have even been found to have submitted ‘false and misleading’ evidence to the courts136 and 
to have ‘deliberately concealed important evidence and lied on oath.’137 
This does not mean to say that the Executive routinely ignores judgments that conflict with 
its priorities; adherence to the notion of the rule of law appears to be strong enough in the 
UK administrative system that such overt illegality is relatively rare, although not unheard 
of.138 However, what it does mean is that the administration has available to it a variety of 
techniques to minimise, evade or manipulate judicial rulings that conflict with the underlying 
immigration policy frame of exerting and being seen to exert control. In another context 
Conant has referred to this approach as ‘contained compliance’.139 
In the administrative responses to the courtroom success of migrant rights strategic litigation 
discussed above, numerous instances of this ‘contained compliance’ were identified. Some, 
such as Lumba and Refugee Action resulted in the same policy that had been declared 
unlawful being pursued by a relatively seamless transition to different, lawful, means. Others, 
such as Gudanaviciene and the Article 8 implications of ZH Tanzania, had the full implications 
of their rulings diminished or absorbed through further litigation or policy interpretation. 
Others still, such as Medical Justice and Mahmood, achieved a measure of substantive change 
but were diminished or undermined through the development of entirely new policies. It 
seems likely that the DFT challenge will join this part of the spectrum. The introduction of the 
DAC system shows signs of impacting on comparatively similar numbers of asylum claimants, 
and with similar failings in terms of filtering out the particularly vulnerable claimants amongst 
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them. However, it nevertheless is effectively restricted to those cases that do not attract an 
appeal and may, as a result, prove easier to be extricated from for those claimants with viable 
refugee claims. Time will tell. 
What this indicates is that notwithstanding the skill with which strategic litigation is brought 
by cause litigators, and the courts’ frequent willingness to look favourably on such cases, 
strategic litigation is only one forum in which migrants’ rights issues are decided. This forum 
operates within a much larger and more influential arena, the political opportunity structures, 
which, ironically, strategic litigation is intended to avoid. It is clear from the control 
imperative-inspired contained compliance of the Executive, however, that the POS cannot be 
avoided and continues to dictate the extent to which migrants’ benefit from the strategic 
efforts of the cause litigators. 
 
Strategic Litigation’s Impact on Policy Affecting Migrants’ Rights 
‘Of all the government departments the Home Office is the one who is most casual 
about losing court cases, they do all the time.’140 
These factors in combination, then, have produced the current form of the majority of 
migrants’ rights strategic litigation. The limited ambition and scope, its technical nature and 
dedication to securing practical administrative and policy changes can best be understood as 
replacing the kind of negotiation that ‘stakeholder’ groups in other sectors might reasonably 
expect to be able to successfully carry out with the Executive outside of the courtroom. Cause 
litigators and the Executive are thus engaged in a semi-perpetual process of involuntary 
negotiation, conducted largely away from public understanding or engagement, with the 
judiciary empowered to compel a reluctant Executive to concede to the migrants’ rights 
movement’s requests. 
This reluctance on the part of the Executive is the key determining issue in the extent to which 
strategic litigation is capable of producing substantive migrants’ rights outcomes. As the 
replacement of the DFT with the DAC showed, it is not enough to raise the level of ambition 
and long-term coordination and activism amongst the cause litigators. Court room success is 
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regularly followed by leading cases being undermined through the ‘contained compliance’ of 
the enforcement process. In turn this requires further follow up litigation by cause litigators 
at the individual case level to try to ensure that the headline wins that are secured and 
enforced as far as possible. Such a process is inherently unreliable. That said, it is relatively 
rare for a strategic litigation success to be rendered completely irrelevant through the evasion 
tactics of the Executive. Some successes are secured for a period of time, or are enacted in a 
partial way. Such marginal gains are not negligible in a context where, as a result of the control 
imperative, the Executive would not otherwise have conceded them.  
Yet, while the Executive’s inclination to evade strategic litigation outcomes is ultimately the 
determining factor in the extent to which such litigation achieves positive outcomes for 
migrants’ rights, it is also the case that different types of case require different levels of 
political effort on the Executive’s part for this evasion to be successful. It appears that some 
challenges, particularly those that focus on a procedural issue, can be evaded relatively simply 
through adjustments in immigration officer practice. The cases of Lumba and Das are 
examples of this. Others, including those that involve challenges to immigration rules or 
formal published policy, can likewise be responded to without significant public or 
parliamentary comment. The cases of Refugee Action and Medical Justice met this fate. 
Ultimately, despite the scale of the work involved, this is also what occurred to the DFT 
litigation. While it is true that a parliamentary announcement was necessary for the original 
suspension of the DFT, the introduction of the DAC has received no such oversite or criticism. 
What appears to be most durable are those strategic litigation successes that involve 
interpretation of primary statutes. The case of Limbuela and ZH Tanzania have been subject 
to some efforts on the part of the Executive to diminish their impact. However, the core of 
their findings regarding the meaning of Section 55 BCIA or Article 3’s relationship to 
homelessness and social provision have remained, as doing away with them completely 
would require the passing of legislation to repeal Section 55 (5) BCIA and replace it with 
legislation specifically incompatible with Convention rights. This would require the relevant 
Minister to make a statement under section 19 (1)(b) HRA that ‘although he is unable to make 
a statement of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with 
the Bill’. Up to this point the Executive has not felt sufficiently motivated to take these steps, 
satisfied perhaps with the diminishment of these ruling’s implications it has been able to 
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achieve. Such significant steps may well seem beyond it at the moment, and so the underlying 
outcomes of these particular cases may be more secure than their non-legislative 
counterparts. 
However, as the demands of the control imperative continue it is also clear that demand for 
further restrictive measures will rise while the political costs of instituting ever more 
substantial measures will lower. The 2016 Immigration Act comes close, by terminating the 
support arrangements for asylum seekers, including asylum seekers with children, that were 
being defended in Limbuela, albeit replacing them with a greatly reduced alternative.141 This 
was achieved with little opposition in Parliament, although at the time of writing it has yet to 
be brought into force.142 Even securing legislative interpretations may not guarantee that 
migrants’ rights progress will be secured through strategic litigation in the future.  
Conclusion 
Strategic litigation has been shown to be a major element of cause litigation activism for 
migrants’ rights in the UK. Its regular successes in court no doubt provide important morale 
boosts for a permanently embattled movement.143 More importantly, it can produce practical 
changes to immigration service conduct and procedure that are non-negligible from a 
migrants’ rights perspective, particularly given that the control imperative militates against 
the Executive conceding these changes through more voluntary negotiation. However, these 
cases have been shown to often be limited in scope and ambition and the practical changes 
they achieve to be fleeting and compromised.  
While there are other factors, to do with the resources available to the movement and the 
judicial framework they are operating under that produce this limited role, it is the response 
of the Executive to strategic litigation which is ultimately determinative of it. Strategic 
litigation does not benefit from the support of a politically significant mainstream 
constituency and nor is it part of a major mass movement, two factors which were discussed 
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in chapter 2 as being crucial to positive implementation of judgements by the executive. This 
chapter has shown that the control imperative identified in chapter 3 results in a consistent 
pattern of evasion and absorption of court decisions that contradict Executive policy 
intentions. This pattern appears to only be limited by the level of motivation the Executive 
feels to obstruct the implementation of a strategic litigation case, in combination with the 
political effort required of the Executive to achieve that obstruction. Some strategic litigation 
wins appear more insulated than others from retrenchment, but all are potentially vulnerable 
to a sufficiently motivated Executive.  
Given the broadly unreceptive political environment that the movement operates in, cause 
litigation’s primary defence against such ‘contained compliance’ is to pursue further litigation. 
This form of enforcement of strategic litigation wins requires a vibrant and active non-
strategic cause litigation sector, and the role played by this cause litigation in individual cases 
will be the subject of the next chapter. As was noted in this chapter, however, this process 
renders litigation as a process of compulsory negotiation, whereby policy or procedural 
change is imposed on a largely unwilling administration that then resists it to the extent that 
further court hearings permit.  
In the face of the ever increasing pressure on the Executive to demonstrate control in relation 
to immigration, the tension caused by strategic litigation risks incentivising the Executive to 
turn to ever more major and draconian reform and brings cause litigation itself to the 
forefront of immigration controversy. This chapter has already discussed one manifestation 
of this tension, in the ministerial response to the Limbuela judgment. This is an issue which 
will need to be considered further in the next two chapters.  
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Chapter 5: Day-to-Day Cause Lawyering for Migrants’ Rights 
Introduction 
‘We’re talking about quite political individuals who’ve chosen to be lawyers because 
they want to make a difference and they are making a difference to individuals’1 
This chapter will study the day-to-day work of cause litigators for migrants’ rights, pursuing 
the same broad goals of defending and progressing migrants’ rights, but doing so by 
representing migrant clients on an individual basis. What Sarat and Scheingold have referred 
to as ‘acts of resistance when carried out on behalf of powerless groups.’2. As chapter 4 
showed, strategic and day-to-day cause litigation cannot be entirely separated. Strategic 
litigation relies on the day-to-day litigation for its enforcement. Many of the actors involved 
are the same, with cause lawyers in particular pursuing day-to-day litigation for their clients 
while occasionally becoming involved in a strategic challenge. Also, possible strategic 
challenges are frequently identified and developed through day-to-day casework.3 However, 
a distinction can be made between strategic litigation, which deliberately targets a distinct 
executive policy or persistent practice, and the day-to-day business of representing individual 
clients and seeking to secure their rights through litigation.  
 
The structure of this chapter varies slightly from the previous chapter, in that the role of the 
three key influencing factors on cause litigation permeate through the analysis, rather than 
being discussed individually. This is because, as will be argued, the interrelationship between 
the resources available to the movement, the legal and judicial framework it operates in and 
the political opportunity structures it confronts is crucial to the policy and political 
developments that the chapter charts. It shows that through the weight of cases being 
pursued by cause lawyers who are compelled to operate at the edges of the immigration law 
envelope, the legal framework around migrants’ rights has been substantially developed. In 
particular, routes for the regularisation of irregular migrants have been developed outside of 
                                                          
1 Immigration and Welfare Barrister Interview, 9th April 2014 
2 Sarat A & Scheingold S (eds), Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, (OUP 
1998) 18 
3 London Immigration Solicitor 2 Interview, 20th December 2015 
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and to a greater extent than executive control-orientated policy would otherwise have 
permitted.  
 
The chapter looks at two examples of systemic change in the legal framework brought about 
through day-to-day cause litigation. These are the developments in the UK’s refugee status 
determination system under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 
Refugee Convention) and the system of claims based on Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to private and family life. Both of these can be understood 
as primarily acting as routes to regularisation for irregular migrants. The chapter argues that 
without strategically targeting defined end-goals, day-to-day cause litigation has expanded 
refugee protections significantly beyond the executive’s policy tolerance, while regularisation 
through Article 8 was effectively developed in the courts into a parallel regularisation system 
independent of executive policy.  
 
However, the chapter then shows that these systemic advancements in the legal framework 
made through day-to-day cause lawyering are themselves vulnerable to the executive’s 
responses. In contrast to the standard responses to strategic litigation discussed previously, 
this chapter shows that the political opportunity structure of the control imperative has at 
times compelled the executive to engage in a much more overt backlash. The latter part of 
the chapter goes on to discuss the effect that these backlashes have had, why they have been 
engaged in and what prospects there might be for the protections to survive and be 
revitalised. 
 
The chapter begins by further discussing the nature of day-to-day cause litigation, and what 
it has achieved.  
 
The Role of Day-to-day Cause Lawyering 
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“Because the politics is so toxic and the debate goes in one direction, defence and 
obstructionism is a highly effective tool because the debate isn’t there to be had.”4 
 
i) Day-to-Day Cause Lawyering: The Resources of Expertise and Commitment 
 
Cause litigation’s human resources of legal expertise and institutional resources of NGO 
capacity and coordination are as highly influential in day-to-day litigation as in strategic 
litigation, but martialled in a different way. In contrast to the strategic litigation discussed in 
the previous chapter, rather than acting as formal claimants or interveners, NGOs may 
provide expert supporting evidence, either on medical matters such as evidence of torture,5 
or background research evidence on relevant human rights conditions in countries of origin.6 
They may also provide social, emotional and practical assistance to the migrants themselves 
while they are going through the process. This leaves the bulk of the casework in the hands 
of cause lawyers alone. As was discussed in chapter 2, cause lawyers are to be distinguished 
from ‘cab-rank’ lawyers and have been variously defined as ‘lawyers who commit themselves 
and their legal skills to furthering a vision of “the good society” through ‘moral activism’;7 as 
‘lawyers who consciously seek social or political goals while simultaneously pursuing the 
interests of their individual clients’;8 and as lawyers who, ‘have something to believe in and 
bring their beliefs to bear in their work lives.’9  
 
Chapter 3 discussed the nature of the UK’s immigration sector in detail, and set out the fact 
that it is populated by a combination of both traditional ‘cab-rank’ lawyers and cause lawyers. 
Although it is not possible to provide comparative data with other countries, it is a notable 
                                                          
4 Funding Officer Interview, 15th April 2014 
5 Helen Bamber Foundation ‘Legal Protection’ (Helen Bamber Foundation) http://www.helenbamber.org/how-
we-work/hub-protection-work/ accessed 22 September 2016; and Freedom from Torture, ‘Make A Referral’ 
(Freedom from Torture) https://www.freedomfromtorture.org/make-a-referral/5175 accessed 1 September 
2016 
6 Amnesty International, ‘Our work on refugee and migrant rights‘ (Amnesty International) 
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/refugee-asylum-seeker-migrant-human-rights Accessed 27 August 2016; 
Freedom from torture, ‘Sri Lanka - Out Of The Silence’ (Freedom from torture, May 2011) 
https://www.freedomfromtorture.org/feature/out_of_the_silence/5979 accessed 27t August 2016   
7 Sarat A & Scheingold S (n2) 3 
8 Meili S, ‘UK Refugee Lawyers: Pushing the Boundaries of Domestic Court Acceptance of International Human 
Rights Law’ (2013) 54 Boston College Law Review 1123 1128 
9 Sarat A and Scheingold S, The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure And Agency In Legal Practice, (Stanford 
University Press 2005) 1 
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feature of the UK’s immigration sector that cause lawyers have historically made up a 
significant proportion of it. In addition to their numerical significance, cause lawyers have also 
been highly influential in how the sector and how the legal framework it operates in has 
developed. Cause litigators routinely push at the edges of the law, rather than taking the law 
as it is. Meili, for example, notes ‘a legal strategy long practiced by cause lawyers in litigation: 
pushing the boundaries of precedent to establish revised standards.’10 Or, as Underhill LJ has 
put it in less complimentary terms, seeking ‘to exploit even the faintest ambiguity’11 in the 
relevant legal framework.  
 
Where Meili slightly overstates the case, though, is the implication that the primary intent of 
cause lawyers in their daily work is to establish revised standards. Cause lawyers interviewed 
for this thesis were clear that while their overarching motivations were certainly to defend 
and promote migrants’ rights, their immediate priority was always the interests of their client. 
As one interviewee put it,  
 
‘you can’t use them for your ends and not look after their interests. There’s probably 
times when people have got a really good point but they’ve not been able to run it 
because then it’s not [in their client’s interests]’.12  
 
It is perhaps better, then, to understand the work as pushing the boundaries of precedent for 
the advantage of their client and the cause.  
 
This inclination to seek to expand the legal framework beyond what executive policy would 
voluntarily allow for the benefit of their clients and the wider cause partly derives from cause 
litigation’s motivating ethos. However, it is also a consequence of related practical factors 
around the development of the legal framework and funding structures. This interrelationship 
will be discussed in more detail below. For now, though, it is enough to note that this 
interrelationship has also meant that cause lawyers have come to dominate particular areas 
of immigration work in comparison to their cab-rank colleagues. While the work of cause 
                                                          
10 Meili (n8) 1143 
11 Singh v The SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 74 para 66 
12 London Immigration Solicitor 2 Interview, 20th December 2015 
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lawyering throws up a large number of ancillary issues, cause lawyers’ most significant role 
has been in the active development and expansion of the legal framework of regularisation 
for migrants with no lawful status, or those facing having it stripped from them. 
 
The first area which will be discussed, where this role has been most pronounced, is in refugee 
recognition and protection. As Meili notes, in this area cause lawyers, ‘keep pushing the 
boundaries of domestic resistance, confident—or at least hopeful—that they will eventually 
experience breakthroughs’.13 
 
ii) Developing the Legal Framework of Refugee Regularisation 
 
As chapters 3 and 4 have already discussed, asylum has been a major issue within UK 
immigration politics for the last thirty years and a priority area for the migrants’ rights 
movement. As a result, the legal framework of refugee status determination has been one of 
the most significant areas of day-to-day work for cause litigators. While traditional cab-rank 
lawyers have been involved in the asylum field since the expansion of legal aid in the later 
1990s, as was noted in chapter 3 it is an area that has been traditionally dominated by cause 
lawyers. This is partly a result of financial resource considerations, but was also due to the 
inherently politicised nature of this work, which appealed to radical, activist and human rights 
lawyers. As a veteran cause litigator explained,  
 
‘I found most of my spare time was on politics and I found it very attractive because I 
spent a lot of time working with political exiles and here I was helping them stay in the 
country.‘14 
 
Given this political and moral context, asylum seeking and refugee status is often viewed as 
distinct from other forms of migration and legal immigration processes. However, as it exists 
in the UK it is in effect a legal framework whereby irregular or otherwise precarious migrants 
seek to regularise their status. They do this through asserting that they face a risk of 
persecution on return to their home countries, under Article 1A(2) of the Refugee 
                                                          
13 Meili (n8) 1147 
14 Immigration and Welfare Barrister Interview, 9th April 2014 
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Convention.15 While the state has more or less willingly signed up and remained bound by the 
requirements of the Refugee Convention, introducing a legal framework through legislation 
implementing many of its key obligations,16 day-to-day cause litigation has been at the 
forefront of expanding its regularisation function. 
 
In the early days of cause litigation it did so by contributing to the development of asylum as 
a viable means for relatively mass migration. As was mentioned above, in the mid-to-late 
1980s, the ‘early days’ of large-scale asylum seeking in the UK, the lack of funding, 
infrastructure and professional prestige meant that what asylum litigation that there was was 
almost exclusively carried out by cause litigators. 17 During that period a series of Tamil asylum 
cases gained significant political attention18 and brought about important legal 
developments. One of them, Sivakumaran v SSHD [1987],19 began as an ordinary day-to-day 
case but ended up being taken to the House of Lords by solicitor David Burgess, regarded with 
near legendary status in the cause litigation sector20 and a group of barristers including Louis 
Blom-Cooper QC, one of the founders of Doughty Street Chambers and also one of the 
founders of Amnesty International. It was opposed for the government by John Laws, later to 
become Lord Justice Laws, who as First Treasury council led for the government in a number 
of crucial migrants’ rights cases during this period.  
 
The case dealt with how the stipulation in Refugee Convention 1A (2) that a refugee claimant’s 
fear of persecution on return had to be ‘well-founded’ was to be interpreted. The case began 
as an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to argue that a ‘well-founded fear’ meant ‘on the basis 
of objective facts, [a claimant’s] fear was reasonable and plausible’ instead of the more 
rigorous position of the Secretary of State, that the test was solely an objective one to be 
based on the known facts of the relevant circumstances in the home country at the time. 
                                                          
15 UN Refugee Convention Art 33 
16 As discussed in chapter 2 this would be regarded as an act of ‘self-limited sovereignty’ Joppke C, ‘Why 
Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration’ (1998) 50 World Politics 266 
17 York S, ‘The End of Legal Aid in Immigration - A Barrier To Access To Justice For Migrants And A Decline In 
The Rule Of Law’ (2013) 27 JIANL 106 124 
18 Joppke C, Immigration and the Nation State: the United States, Germany and Great Britain (OUP 1999) 130 
19  R (Sivakumuran) v SSHD [1987] UKHL 1 
20 Webber F, Borderline Justice: The Fight for Refugee and Migrant Rights (Pluto 2012) 19; Also, Frances 
Webber, ‘David Burgess – An Appreciation’ (IRR, 4th November 2010) http://www.irr.org.uk/news/david-
burgess-an-appreciation/ accessed 22 September 2016 
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However, in losing this argument the cause litigators nevertheless succeeded in convincing 
the Lords that while the objective test of risk on return might be applied, the standard of 
proof of that risk ought to be set at the low level of ‘a reasonable degree of likelihood’ rather 
than the ordinary civil standard.21 This argument was arrived at on the basis of reference to 
domestic authority regarding extraditions under Fugitive Offenders Act 1967, where the 
Lords’ previous acknowledged that a lower standard of proof than ‘more likely than not’ was 
appropriate in circumstances where ‘the relative gravity of the consequences’ of getting the 
decision wrong were very serious.22  
 
Obtaining judicial recognition of the ‘gravity’ of the decisions in question, which in asylum can 
potentially include life and death, was in itself a crucial success for the cause litigators in a 
context where, as Joppke has shown, there was already significant political debate around 
the ’bogus’ nature of most asylum claims.23 In fact, the judgment was an early example of the 
important strain in judicial reasoning regarding refugee status discussed in the previous 
chapter where the courts have instituted a robust legal framework by formally recognising 
the important and fundamental nature of the issues at risk in asylum cases, often in the face 
of political discourse of the time. Of more immediate practical importance, though, were the 
procedural implications of this determination. Without this interpretation the Refugee 
Convention could not have become a means of providing international protection on a large 
scale, other than to prominent figures. This is because, as Sweeney points out, most 
‘applicants will tend to have little in the way of documentary evidence, and a lot will depend 
on what they say and how they say it.’24 Only a lower standard of proof could accommodate 
such limited evidence of risk that a person would face persecution on return to their home 
countries and still allow claims on a reasonably regular basis.  
 
Thomas has also shown that around the same period day-to-day cause litigation contributed 
to the practical infrastructure of the asylum legal framework, through the development of the 
first in-country appeal rights for refused asylum seekers at the immigration tribunal, in the 
                                                          
21 (n19) 994f 
22 (n19) 994h 
23 Joppke (n18) 130 
24 Sweeney J, ‘Credibility, proof and refugee law’ (2009) 21 International Journal of Refugee Law 700 
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ECtHR case of Vilvarajah v UK,25 discussed in chapter 3.26 The Immigration and Asylum 
Tribunal’s independent asylum decision making in practice removes from the Executive the 
monopoly on determining whether or not a person should be recognised as a refugee. From 
a policy perspective this point has become more pressing from the early 2000s onwards with 
the Tribunal’s own pioneering jurisprudential development, ‘country guidance’ (CG) cases.27 
These are asylum determinations which give the Upper Tribunal’s general assessment of the 
relevant human rights conditions in a country of origin and related general categories of 
person likely to be entitled to international protection.28 They were developed to counter the 
repeated complaints of both cause litigators and the judiciary that ‘the outcomes of decisions 
on asylum claims differ widely irrespective of their essential similarity’.29 CG cases’ findings 
bind Tribunal judges when determining individual asylum claims unless compelling counter 
evidence of a change of circumstances is presented. CG cases have thus become important 
for cause litigators, as by bringing to bear the collective research resources of the NGO sector 
and the experience of the cause lawyers they provide an opportunity to directly influence 
how the UK’s refugee policy is developed, away from the Executive and through the 
Tribunal.30  
 
Country guidance is not the only means by which through their work in individual cases, cause 
litigators have been able to provide regularisation opportunities outside of the intended 
policies of the Executive. Cause litigators have been able to push at the edges of the Refugee 
Convention itself to enable it to provide migrants a broader basis through which to secure 
legal status in the UK. An important area for this work has been the application of the 
‘membership of a particular social group’ (PSG) criterion in Article 1 A(2) of the Refugee 
                                                          
25 Vilvarajah and Others v The United Kingdom App no 13163/87 13164/87 13165/87 13447/87 13448/87 
(ECtHR, 30 October 1991) 
26 Thomas R, ‘The Impact of Judicial Review on Asylum’ [2003] PL 479 488 
27 Blake N, ‘Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the national court: the emergence of a country guidance system for 
refugee and human rights protection’ (2013) 25 International Journal of Refugee Law 349  
28 Recent CG cases include assessments of the risks posed to Christians in China QH (Christians - risk) (China) 
CG [2014] UKUT 86 (IAC); gay men in India MD (same-sex oriented males: risk) India CG [2014] UKUT 65 (IAC); 
and failed asylum seekers on return to Sri Lanka GJ and Others (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka CG [2013] 
UKUT 00319. 
29 Thomas R, ‘Consistency in Asylum Adjudication: Country Guidance and the Asylum Process in the United 
Kingdom’ (2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 489 489 
30 London Immigration Solicitor 1 Interview, 2nd April 2014, Human Rights NGO Officer Interview, 8th July 2014 
and London Immigration Solicitor 2 Interview, 20th December 2015 
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Convention. This clause has been characterised as ‘the Convention ground with the least 
clarity’31 in comparison to its counterparts such as political opinion or religious belief. As 
Chaudhry notes, 
  
‘As a result of its ambiguity, the courts have grappled to delimit the boundaries… This 
has led to an unstructured legal framework in which the courts have been vested with 
a wide discretion in the application of the Convention.’32  
 
This level of discretion available to the courts has provided a fertile environment for the non-
strategic work of cause litigators, particularly in the period of mass asylum seeking from the 
late 1990s onwards. The case of Shah and Islam [1999],33 which found that in some 
circumstances, including the particular circumstances of Pakistan, women could be 
considered as a social group for the purposes of the Convention, has been hailed as ‘paving 
the way for a 21st century expansion of PSG in all categories’.34 Kelly has identified the 
categories of gender, sexuality and family as being particularly key themes around which the 
PSG criteria has been developed.35  
 
Shah & Islam itself was focussed on gender issues, in circumstances where two married 
Pakistani women had been abandoned by their husbands and the evidence indicated that 
they would be at risk of being perceived as having engaged in immoral activity.36 Its reasoning 
opened up the possibility for claims based on extreme gender discrimination where societal 
and or legal regimes result in potentially persecutory treatment of women and girls. These 
have included Afghanistan37 and Sudan.38 It has also facilitated claims that relate to gender-
                                                          
31 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Guidelines On International Protection: 
“Membership Of A Particular Social Group” Within The Context Of Article 1A(2) Of The 1951 Convention 
and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating To The Status Of Refugees’ (UNHCR, 7 May 2002) 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58de2da.pdf accessed 22 September 2016 
32 Chaudhry M, ‘Particular social groups post Fornah’ 2007 21 JIANL 137 
33 Islam v. SSHD Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, Ex Parte Shah, R v. [1999] UKHL 20 
34 Kelly B, ‘What is a ‘particular social group’? A review of the development of the Refugee Convention in 
England’ 2010 JIANL 9 12 
35 Ibid 9 
36 (n33) para 2 
37 NS (Social Group, Women, Forced marriage) Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00328 
38 FM (FGM) Sudan CG [2007] UKAIT 00060 
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based abusive practices, such as risk of FGM,39 domestic violence40 and trafficking for the 
purposes of sexual exploitation.41 Meanwhile, regarding family issues, PSG has been 
developed to apply to the family members of individuals who themselves are subject to 
adverse attention. Family members of individuals arrested and disappeared by the Iranian 
regime,42 members of families caught up in blood feuds43 and Chinese families violating the 
state one-child policy44 have all benefited from these rulings. The leading sexuality case HJ 
(Iran) & HT (Cameroon) [2010],45 found in favour of the cause litigators’ argument that not 
only did a person’s homosexuality place them in a PSG for the purposes of the Convention 
but that the executive’s longstanding defence against such claims that a person could be 
expected to return to their country of origin and live ‘discretely’ was illegitimate.46 Instead, 
cause litigators argued, a person who would live ‘discretely’ out of fear of persecutory 
consequences was entitled to refugee protection as they would not be able to ‘live freely and 
openly’, which was considered a fundamental right that the Convention was intended to 
protect.47 These particular social group arguments have been described as ‘a comprehensive 
defeat’ for the government.48  
 
The line of argument in HJ & HT has also subsequently been applied to more expansive 
interpretations of Convention grounds other than PSG. Cases involving religious belief, such 
as those brought by Ahmadis who face extreme forms of legal and societal discrimination in 
a number of Islamic countries, have applied the same test of whether or not a person would 
suppress their religious faith and practice out of fear of persecutory reprisals.49 Cause 
litigators have also been able to apply the ‘freely and openly’ rubric to questions of political 
opinion. In the case of RT Zimbabwe [2012] it was ruled that a person who did not hold a 
political opinion (in this case, strong support for the ruling Zanu-PF regime) should not be 
                                                          
39 SSHD v. K [2006] UKHL 46 
40 KA and Others (domestic violence risk on return) Pakistan CG [2010] UKUT 216 (IAC)  
41 AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC) 
42 (n39) 
43 EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 348 (IAC) 
44 Liu v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 249 
45 HJ (Iran) v SSHD (Rev 1) [2010] UKSC 31 
46 Ibid para 35 (b) 
47 Ibid para 65 
48 Kelly B, ‘Law Lords v New Labour: did the highest court frustrate the Government's attempts to control 
immigration’ (2011) 25 JIANL 146 152 
49 MN and others (Ahmadis - country conditions - risk) Pakistan CG [2012] UKUT 389 (IAC) 
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expected to fabricate an opinion in order to avoid persecution; essentially that the person 
should be able to live ‘freely and openly’ in their political neutrality.50 More recently still, the 
case of MSM (Somalia) [2016] found that an investigative journalist (a dangerous occupation 
in Somalia) could not be expected to change his profession in order to avoid persecution.51  
 
None of these groups would have been awarded a route to leave to remain through 
mainstream policy channels. These cause litigation efforts effectively expanded the legal 
framework of regularisation presented by a refugee status determination system that the 
executive had chosen to implement, and took them beyond what executive policy would 
otherwise have allowed.  
 
iii) Creating the Legal Framework of Article 8 Regularisation 
 
“So, what sort of leave have you got here? Well none, so the starting point is you've 
got no entitlements. We then cut a human rights swathe through that to look at what 
everyone is entitled to.”52 
 
As was noted in chapter 2, the fact that the current legal framework available to cause 
litigators in the UK includes human rights such as Article 8 has had far reaching consequences 
for the migrants’ rights movement. Article 8 ECHR has been used by cause litigators on an 
individual case-basis to ‘cut a human rights swathe’ through a number of barriers to social 
entitlements for migrants, including access to education,53 healthcare54 and housing.55 
However, Article 8’s primary role since the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) 
has been as a means of status regularisation. In contrast to the previous section, where cause 
litigation in refugee status determination was discussed as expanding and developing a legal 
framework of regularisation the executive put in place, this section will discuss how Article 8 
                                                          
50 RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38 
51 SSHD v MSM (Somalia) & Anor [2016] EWCA Civ 715  
52 Immigration NGO Legal Director Interview, 12th September 2013 
53 R (Tigere) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] UKSC 57 
54 Akhalu (health claim: ECHR Article 8) Nigeria [2013] UKUT 400 (IAC)  
55 Birmingham City Council v Clue [2010] EWCA Civ 460 
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ECHR has been used as a tool that effectively, although without being strategically intended, 
created an independent legal framework of regularisation. 
 
Article 8 proved vital to cause litigators pursuing the individual interests of their clients partly 
because in most circumstances the other rights protected by the European Convention were 
not available to them as a result of the ‘foreign cases’ test. The test was extensively discussed 
in the House of Lords case of Ullah v SSHD [2004]56 , where the question arose of,  
 
‘Whether any article of the ECHR other than Article 3 could be engaged in relation to 
a removal of an individual from the UK where the anticipated treatment in the 
receiving state will be in breach of the requirements of the Convention, but such 
treatment does not meet the minimum requirements of article 3 of the Convention.’57  
 
The test was summarised by the House of Lords as meaning that only a real risk of a ‘flagrant 
breach of the very essence of the right’ in the receiving state would cause a Convention state 
to be in breach of its duties under the Convention.58 Ullah as a case also developed important 
principles regarding the correct interpretation of the s.2 HRA duty on courts to take into 
account’ Strasbourg case law that will be returned to in chapter 6. A migrant, though, is able 
to develop a family life or a settled private life in their host society and thus in many 
circumstances the ‘foreign cases’ test did not apply. As was mentioned in chapter 3, since 
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali in 1985 the ECtHR recognised that a state’s exercising of 
its otherwise lawful immigration control policy raises the prospect of a migrants’ Article 8 
rights being violated directly by the host state.59 
 
By the turn of the millennium and the dawn of the HRA regime the ECtHR had begun to loosen 
what Dembour has shown to be its ‘relative closure… to the predicament of migrants’.60 In 
Bensaid v UK 2001 and then Slivenko et al v Latvia 2003, the Strasbourg Court began the 
                                                          
56 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 
57 Ibid, para 1 
58 Ibid para 50 
59 Abdulaziz, Cabales And Balkandali v United Kingdom - 9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/81 [1985] ECHR 7  
60 Dembour M-B, When Humans Become Migrants: Study Of The European Court Of Human Rights With An 
Inter-American Counterpoint (OUP 2015) 97 
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process of considering situations in which not only family life, but private life and ‘the network 
of personal, social and economic relations that make up the private life of every human 
being’61 were in issue. As a result, in principle at least, irregular living in a Convention state 
could be regularised simply by virtue of the inevitable consequences of the passage of time. 
In a further departure again from the Court’s traditional reluctance to impede states’ 
immigration control powers, the cases of Boultif v Switzerland (2001), Uner v the Netherlands 
(2006) and Maslov v Austria (2008) set the terms under which the Court would countenance 
the prevention of the deportation of a foreign national offender on Article 8 grounds.62  
 
These cases empowered the courts to act as effective arbiters of regularisation, by calling on 
them to make a judgment regarding the proportionality of an individual’s removal from a 
country. In the interests of consistency, the Court developed its own framework of factors to 
decide whether a proposed deportation ‘was necessary in a democratic society and 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’63 These included, for example, consideration of 
‘the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter 
in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled’64 and stipulations that ‘for a settled 
migrant who has lawfully spent all or the major part of his or her childhood and youth in the 
host country very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion.”65 In producing these 
criteria, though, it effectively formed the criteria for regularisation outside of, and developed 
independently of, Executive policy choices; what Thym has referred to as ‘general criteria 
guiding the application of the European Convention to immigration cases’.66 
 
These developments at Strasbourg, and similar development relating to other non-absolute 
rights, had a significant effect in UK domestic law and procedure, through s.2 of the HRA’s 
requirement that rights be interpreted by taking into account Strasbourg case law. As 
Kavanagh has noted, ‘Some commentators have described the acceptance into UK law of the 
                                                          
61 Slivenko v. Latvia App no 48321/99 (ECtHR, 9 October 2003 
62 Dembour, M-B, (n60) 181 -185 
63 Uner v Netherlands App no 46410/99 (ECtHR, 18 October 2006) paras 57-60 
64 Ibid para 58 
65 Maslov v Austria App no 1638/03 (ECtHR, 23 June 2008) para 75 For further discussion of the effect of these 
cases, Dembour, (n60) 81-185 
66 Thym D, ‘Respect for Private and Family Life Under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration Cases: A Human Right to 
Regularise Illegal Stay?’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 87 87 
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doctrine of proportionality as one of the most profound changes brought about by the HRA.’67 
In Razgar [2004], the House of Lords set out its own Article 8 framework, by posing five 
questions regarding whether the removal from the UK of a migrant would breach Article 8, 
the most important and contentious of which was the last; whether the interference with the 
Article 8 rights of a migrant caused by their removal from the country would be proportionate 
to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved.68 However, Lord Binghams’ reference in 
Razgar to his expectation that only ‘a small minority of exceptional cases’ would succeed on 
Article 8 led to further dispute. As Kelly explains, ‘the concept of ‘exceptionality’… gained 
currency as the ratio of the Razgar judgment, rather than as a prediction of success rates.’69 
In an effort to curtail the influence of Article 8, the Executive  argued that the immigration 
rules could be taken to be the measure of what constituted proportionality in all but 
exceptional cases and that ‘an immigration judge was confined to considering whether the 
government’s decision was within the lawful range of responses to the facts’70 Thus, Article 8 
would have no role independent of government policy other than to introduce the equivalent 
of a traditional judicial review. As one cause litigator summarised it, ‘the Secretary of State 
decides and everything else is Wednesbury.’71   
 
These issues were finally resolved in the case of Huang [2007] where the cause litigators were 
again led by Nicholas Blake, who will be remembered from the DFT litigation in chapter 4.72 
In Huang it was decided that the proportionality assessment in Article 8 required a framework 
of testing whether the impugned measure was derived from a legitimate objective, was 
rationally connected to that objective, whether the measure was no more than necessary to 
achieve the legitimate objective in question, and, most contentiously, whether it ‘struck a fair 
balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community.’73 This 
question of the court reaching an independent view on what constituted ‘striking a fair 
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balance’ became the crux of the controversy that was to follow. Controversial because, as 
Laws LJ subsequently stated, there was, ‘real difficulty in distinguishing this from a political 
question to be decided by the elected arm of government’.74 In effect at immigration tribunal 
level it produced an independent merits appeal under Article 8,75 but through judicial decision 
making rather than primary legislation.  
 
Along with Huang [2007], the cases of EB Kosovo [2008] and Chikwamba [2008] pursued this 
direction with a clear statement of the tribunals and courts being capable and appropriate 
decision makers able to come to their own independent view, distinct from the Executive’s 
immigration service, on immigration applications invoking Article 8. As Farbey has put it, ‘The 
Tribunal takes decisions for itself as part of the overall immigration decision-making 
process.’76 In Huang the House of Lords stated that the task of judges in Article 8 cases,  
 
“is not a secondary, reviewing, function... The appellate immigration authority must 
decide for itself whether the impugned decision is lawful and, if not, but only if not, 
reverse it.’77  
 
In EB Kosovo, a case brought through the Immigration Advisory Service, Lord Bingham called 
for judges to engage in a ‘broad and informed judgment… not constrained by a series of 
prescriptive rules’.78 Chikwamba, which followed shortly afterwards, put this principled 
power into practice. As part of their administration of immigration control, the immigration 
service operated a long standing policy of requiring migrants with family life cases to leave 
the country and apply under the normal visa process to come back in again in order to 
regularise their status. Yet in Chikwamba leading cause litigation counsel Mike Fordham QC, 
who would also later reappear in this account having become a part-time High Court Judge, 
instructed by Birmingham migrants’ rights solicitors The Rights Partnership,79 argued that 
such a policy was disproportionate.80 The House of Lords decision that it was likely to be 
                                                          
74 Miranda v SSHD & Ors [2014] EWHC 255 (Admin) para 40 
75 (n73), para 13 
76 Farbey (n70) 335 
77 (n73) Para 11  
78 EB (Kosovo) v SSHD [2008] UKHL 41 para 21 
79 TRP Solicitors, ‘TRP Solicitors’ (TRP Solicitors) http://www.trpsolicitors.co.uk/ accessed 22 September 2016 
80 Chikwamba v SSHD [2008] UKHL 40.  
149 
 
disproportionate in almost all family cases was reached notwithstanding the state’s accepted 
interest in maintaining an orderly and effective immigration control regime.81 While this may 
appear to be a small and technical change, it can be seen as the final element in which the 
Courts, as a result of the arguments of cause litigators, effectively created their own parallel 
regularisation system.82 
 
As a result of these cause litigation cases and the judicial approach that had been taken to 
them, the courts now had a series of unusual powers. These were the power to decide on 
family and individual migration cases independent from government policy and to create 
frameworks and criteria for assessing such cases based on a notion of proportionality. In this 
way the Article 8 framework had been developed independently of government immigration 
policy and effectively imposed on Home Office practice through cause litigation. What is 
more, the development of immigration policy by government now had to take account of 
Article 8 regularisation. By virtue of section 6 of the HRA, the immigration service as a public 
body had a duty of its own to process applications raising Article 8 and apply Article 8 
regularisation case law in its decision making. Up until the start of the controversy that will 
be discussed below, Article 8 claims were formally processed by the Home Office as an 
‘Outside of the Rules’ application, emphasising that Article 8 was not catered for directly by 
executive policy. More importantly still, at the higher level of migration policy development, 
the notion of irregular migrants accruing Article 8 rights to regularisation over time became a 
factor in the design of wider immigration and asylum processes and policy.83  
 
Thus cause litigators, through the opportunities presented by the weight of their daily 
caseload and the ability to marshal the resources of legal expertise and NGO support to 
identify and promote key issues, had brought about systemic change in the UK’s immigration 
legal framework. The senior judiciary of the time had taken an approach to these cases which 
regarded them as falling well within its understanding of its role in the post-HRA environment. 
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This in turn introduced a system of regularisation parallel to the Executive’s intended 
immigration control policy. 
 
iv) Why Regularisation? The intersection of the legal framework and resources 
 
To understand day-to-day cause litigation’s role within the UK’s immigration policy dynamic, 
it is important to understand why it has this prominent role in developing the legal framework 
of regularisation for irregular and vulnerable migrants. As was noted earlier in this chapter, 
the reasons involve an overlapping of the cause litigators’ ethos and political commitments, 
the developing nature of the legal framework that they operate within and the structural 
influence of funding on the types of work that is done. 
 
Migrants’ rights cause lawyers’ motivations centre around the prevention of human rights 
violations against migrants and advocacy on behalf of vulnerable migrants, or migrants who 
would otherwise be ensnared in the legal process but excluded from it. Clearly, not all 
migrants would fall within these categories, and certain classes of migrant are more 
vulnerable to human rights violations from both the state and private actors than others. A 
long term priority for cause lawyers has been to represent a client base that cannot afford 
mainstream private representation.84 As was discussed in chapter 3, this has meant that in 
practice most day-to-day cause litigation has been funded through legal aid, however 
financial eligibility requirements for such aid are strict, meaning that in practice it is limited 
to those either on no, or very low, wages.85 As state immigration law and executive policy has 
developed to be based around the economic value of the migrants’ concerned, it has become 
increasingly exclusionary of cause lawyers’ client base. As a result, the limitations on the 
financial resources available to cause lawyers have worked in conflict with the legal 
framework of the immigration rules that they work within. Put simply, if a client is eligible for 
legal aid they are likely to be ineligible for most of the mainstream immigration rules 
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categories.86 This results in requiring an ever more ‘creative’ approach to securing lawful 
status for their clients that does not rely on these mainstream visa categories.  
 
Moreover, the desire to prevent violations of migrants’ human rights has in its own right led 
to the regularisation of migrants with no lawful status or those facing having it stripped from 
them becoming a top priority for cause litigators. This is because irregular status carries with 
it the most pronounced risks of rights violations. Benhabib has described how, ‘the loss of 
citizenship rights… was politically tantamount to the loss of human rights altogether.’87 Lawful 
immigration status carries with it various degrees of approximation of the citizenship rights 
Benhabib is discussing, with permanent settlement, for example, carrying with it greater 
degrees of rights protection than a time-limited or tied status which continue to produce 
vulnerabilities to exploitation and abuse.88 Irregular status represents the gravest risk to 
migrants’ rights. The increasing encroachment of ‘internal border controls’ seeks to exclude 
irregular migrants from basic needs like housing and healthcare.89 Meanwhile, the threat of 
removal from the country carries with it the related elements of state force, such as arrest 
and immigration detention, that are frequently exercised in unlawful and rights violating 
ways.90 At the same time, these state policies and practices create powerful tools for 
exploitation by predatory elements of a host society. The political and moral imperative for 
cause lawyers is, therefore, to help prevent these risks from occurring. However, this has led 
to cause lawyers being compelled to push at the edges of the law in their active pursuit and 
expansion of regularisation opportunities as, by definition, irregular migrants’ tend to be 
excluded from mainstream immigration policy and status criteria.  
 
This combination of factors have together led to the particularly significant role of cause 
lawyering in developing regularisation opportunities that this chapter focusses on. However, 
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in doing so, day-to-day cause litigation has produced a permanent tension with the control 
imperative within broader immigration policy making. The regularisation of irregular and 
vulnerable migrants outside of executive policy intentions both impacts on the administrative 
delivery of control by the immigration service and undermines the executive’s capacity to 
publicly demonstrate control.  
 
The Regularisation Frameworks Meet the Control Imperative 
 
Administrative justice alongside human rights law has been the two key constraints on 
the executive in terms of how it would like to develop immigration policy in a much 
harsher way.91 
 
Like strategic litigation, day-to-day cause litigation is engaged in in isolation, without the 
political cover provided by a significant political constituency or mass movement activism. As 
was discussed in chapter 2, this constitutes a significant vulnerability for the changes it has 
brought about and this section will demonstrate that despite being developed judicially, they 
have not been able to circumnavigate politics.  
 
This section will discuss the executive’s reactions to the developments in both asylum and 
Article 8 regularisation. In doing so it will primarily focus on Article 8. As has already been 
discussed, asylum has been one of the major issues in debates around immigration policy and 
migrants’ rights for many years and human rights debates in the UK more generally. As a 
result, it has also received an enormous amount of scholarly attention and analysis from a 
domestic, comparative and theoretical perspective.92 In contrast, though, the role played by 
Article 8 both in the UK’s immigration and migrants’ rights debates has been relatively under-
studied.93 As such, the executive’s rhetorical, policy and legislative responses to the asylum 
                                                          
91 Funding Officer Interview, 15th April 2014 
92 Gibney M, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees (CUP 2008) 
Lawrance B & Ruffer G, Adjudicating Refugee and Asylum Status: The Role of Witness, Expertise, and Testimony 
(Cambridge University Press 2014); Bohmer C & Shuman A, Rejecting Refugees: Political Asylum in The 21st 
Century (Routledge 2008), Stevens D, UK Asylum Law and Policy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 
(Sweet & Maxwell 2004) Friedman E & Klein R, Reluctant Refuge: The Story Of Asylum In Britain (British Library 
Publishing Division 2008) 
93 For some examples, Kelly (n48); Wray (n72); Farbey (n72); Thym (n66) 
153 
 
crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and cause litigation’s role within it, will be briefly 
outlined first before a more detailed analysis of political developments around Article 8 is set 
out.  
 
i) Asylum 
 
By the turn of the millennium the executive’s imposition of ‘carrier sanctions’ and visa 
restrictions were proving insufficient to stem the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers. 
The UK’s immigration debate was heavily focussed around asylum and the executive’s failures 
in demonstrating control. The developments in refugee protections won through non-
strategic cause litigation, including the in-country appeal rights system and the low standard 
of proof that cases were assessed by, were identified as one of the main obstacles to the 
control agenda. As Tony Blair claimed in his autobiography, 
 
The combination of the courts, with their liberal instinct; the European Convention on 
Human Rights, with its absolutist attitude to the prospect of returning someone to an 
unsafe community; and the UN Convention of Refugees, [sic] with its context firmly 
that of 1930s Germany, [sic] meant that, in practice, once someone got into Britain, 
and claimed asylum, it was the Devil's own job to return them.94 
 
The government response to this perceived problem operated at both the rhetorical and the 
legislative levels. As was discussed in chapter 4, Labour government ministers repeatedly 
denounced judges,95 seeking to delegitimise decisions that were seen as undermining 
government policy and go so far as to claim that as a result of the judiciary’s asylum decisions 
‘democracy itself is under threat’.96 As Thomas commented at the time, ‘The Home Office 
could not have antagonised the judiciary more if it had tried’,97 while as Kelly has later 
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claimed, ‘At times, the government willingly fostered the suggestion that its attempts at 
[immigration] reform were frustrated by the courts.’98  
 
In tandem with the fostering of this belief, the New Labour administration introduced a series 
of measures designed to curtail the courts’ and cause litigators’ ability to influence this branch 
of immigration policy. The DFT, discussed at length in Chapter 4, can be understood as one 
aspect of this approach. A further structural change was the reform of the Tribunal system 
made under s.26 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 (AI(TCA)), 
from a two tier Immigration Appellate Authority (IAA) made up of Immigration Adjudicators 
and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT), to a single-tier Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. 
This was intended to reduce the number of appeal possibilities and thus speed up the 
decision-making and removal process for failed claimants. This structure was, however, again 
reformed in s.3 of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to reintroduce a two tier 
system of First Tier and Upper tribunals.  
These structural measures should be seen alongside interpretative measures such as the s.94 
powers in the 2002 Act to declare cases as ‘clearly unfounded’ and thus remove in-country 
appeal rights99 and s.8 of AI(TCA) which mandated that certain behaviours common amongst 
asylum seekers (such as not claiming asylum at a port of entry) should be regarded as 
damaging to their credibility.100 Most aggressively of all, during the passage of the 2004 Act 
the government seriously canvassed the possibility of removing all immigration cases from 
judicial review proceedings entirely; a proposal that was ultimately not introduced following 
outcry in the House of Lords.101 When faced with significant pressure to demonstrate control, 
then, one of the New Labour government’s key strategies was to target the frameworks that 
facilitated cause litigation to function.  
 
ii) Article 8 
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While the development of Article 8 through non-strategic cause litigation was certainly not 
welcomed by the New Labour administration in its early phases, neither did it immediately 
result in sustained public controversy. This would change, however, following the ‘failed 
deportation scandal’ of 2006 and the Labour government’s response to it.102 This scandal 
arose when in April 2006 the Home Office revealed that between 1999 and March 2006 over 
1000 foreign national offenders had been released from prison at the end of their sentences 
without being considered for deportation. This revelation prompted the resignation of the 
then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke and his replacement with John Reid who upon taking 
office pronounced that the UK’s immigration service was ‘not fit for purpose’.103 
 
Nothing seemed to demonstrate the lack of control quite as powerfully as the notion of 
foreign criminals remaining in the UK following their sentence. In the search for an ever 
illusive sense of ‘control’, as Dembour says, ‘the deportation of non-citizens convicted of 
crime has now become the expected norm in political debate, with the main parties vying for 
the speed at which and the quantities in which this can be achieved.’104 To this end the 
government’s legislative response to this crisis was to introduce the UK Borders Act of 2007. 
It introduced ‘automatic’ deportation for all non-EEA nationals who were sentenced to one 
year or more in prison.105 However, the ‘automatic deportation’ provisions of s.32 of the 2007 
Act were modified by s.33, which introduced exceptions. While some were technical, relating 
to questions of age at the time of conviction or extradition matters, the two most contentious 
were where deportation would breach a person's Convention rights, or the UK's obligations 
under the Refugee Convention. 
 
In practice, as a result of the Refugee Convention’s exclusion clauses for serious crime106 and 
the limited number of migrants’ eligible to make out a substantive risk of Article 3 ECHR 
mistreatment in their home countries, the only viable appeal option was often Article 8. Thus, 
as a result of government legislation, Article 8 became the main obstacle to government 
policy over a highly controversial area; the deportation of foreign national offenders. Figures 
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quoted in Parliament via a freedom of information request showed that by 2012, Article 8 
accounted for 89% of all successful FNO appeals against deportation.107 As one interviewee 
put it, ‘“You ended up with a law that said basically we’re going to deport everybody unless it 
breaches Article 8. And then you’re surprised that every case gets decided on Article 8 
grounds?”108 This brought cause litigators’ and the judiciary’s role as external impediments to 
the Executive’s control efforts to the forefront of the immigration debate. Given the strength 
of feeling around the issues and the increasingly intense imperative to demonstrate control 
felt by the executive, this placed Article 8 regularisation in a precarious position. 
 
As was shown in the earlier section of this chapter, the executive’s attempts to limit the 
application of Article 8 to dealing with aberrant decisions and extraordinary factual 
circumstances, by insisting in the courts that only those cases that were ‘exceptional’ should 
succeed, largely failed. Rather than ‘exceptionality’ EB (Kosovo) [2008] confirmed that the 
basis on which Article 8 cases should be dealt with was the cause litigators’ formulation of the 
‘reasonableness’ of any proposed removal.109 This much lower test of ‘reasonableness’ was 
later reiterated even more expressly by Sedley LJ in the Court of Appeal in VW Uganda [2009] 
which rejected the necessity of showing ‘insurmountable obstacles’ to any return.110 When it 
came to power, though, the 2010 Coalition government took on Article 8 more directly. In 
doing so it faced two key constraints. The first was the Liberal Democrats’ commitment to the 
ECHR and retention of the HRA.111 Without repeal of the HRA, s. 2 ensured that the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court on Article 8 would remain a key issue in the UK’s 
domestic immigration proceedings. The second was that there was no lawful basis for the UK 
to derogate from Article 8 ECHR solely in immigration cases.112 Indeed, at the height of the 
Article 8 controversy that was to come, a serious move was made by Conservative 
backbenchers to withdraw Article 8 from all immigration cases. This step was rebutted by the 
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Home Secretary solely on the grounds of its illegality under international law, despite her 
expressing strong support for the principle behind the proposal.113 
 
Reforms to Article 8 as it was applied domestically in the UK did nonetheless form a key part 
of the Coalition agenda to create a ‘hostile environment’ for irregular migrants.114 In pursuing 
this agenda the Coalition took a similar twin approach as that which New Labour had used 
when responding to the asylum crisis of the early 2000s. On one hand, substantial changes to 
the legal framework around how Article 8 was to be applied by Tribunals and courts were 
introduced, while on the other the government waged a high profile public campaign to 
denounce judges and lawyers.  
 
This started with changes to the immigration rules. These amendments, referred to cause 
litigators as the ‘New Rules’,115 in essence sought to end the process by which immigration 
judges assessed the proportionality of a foreign national’s removal on a case-by-case basis. 
Instead, Theresa May stated that ‘there will generally be no need for a separate assessment 
of Article 8 beyond the requirements set out in the “immigration rules”. Compliance with the 
“immigration rules” will mean compliance with Article 8, other than in truly exceptional 
circumstances’116 and ‘the way we are approaching it…means that the exceptional 
circumstances will be far more limited than they have been up to now.'117 The rules 
themselves also attempted to reintroduce the insurmountable obstacles test that had been 
rejected in EB Kosovo and VW Uganda.118 In combination, then, the New Rules were intended 
to reverse the most significant developments in the Article 8 case law and revert to a state by 
which practical government policy on immigration, as expressed by the immigration rules, 
would be presumed to be axiomatic with what would be proportional under Article 8. 
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However, these moves quickly devolved into a dispute about the actual legal force of 
immigration rules within the UK’s immigration system. The House of Lords in Odelola [2009] 
had previously stated that  
 
‘The status of the immigration rules is rather unusual. They are not subordinate 
legislation but detailed statements by a minister of the Crown as to how the Crown 
proposes to exercise its executive power to control immigration.’119 
 
As such, immigration rules are not legislation, but ‘executive statements of policy’ and, as was 
argued in Izuazu [2013], one of the first major cause litigation cases on the issue, ‘policy is 
subject to law, not vice versa’.120 The crux of this argument was that under Sections 6 and 2 
of the Human Rights Act, the immigration service and Tribunal had to interpret Article 8 in 
light of the Strasbourg case law, as well as being bound by the normal rules of precedent in 
relation to the domestic case law on Article 8 issues. Immigration rules therefore, regardless 
of their political importance, couldn’t override precedent and primary legislation. As the now 
Blake J, who will be remembered from his role in Huang, above, and the DFT litigation 
discussed in chapter 4 and who heard Izuazu, commented on Huang and EB Kosovo, ‘Whilst 
it is open to Parliament to change the law by primary legislation, unless and until it does so 
these decisions are binding on the Upper Tribunal and will be followed by it.’121 
 
In the first wave of major cases seeking to define the courts’ interpretation of the New Rules, 
the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal essentially accepted these arguments, stating 
that the New Rules provided ‘a complete code’ for Article 8 but only in so far as the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ get-out clause within them enabled an assessment of the 
proportionality of a person’s removal in light of the relevant case law.122 This decision was 
made by the Court of Appeal in MF Nigeria [2013], a case brought by the private cause 
litigation firm Wilsons LLP and argued by Raza Hussain QC, who had previously been junior 
counsel in Huang. Importantly, though, the judges in MF Nigeria referred to the High Court 
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decision of Sales J in Nagre, made around the same period, which raised what would turn out 
to be the most important aspect of the developing Article 8 jurisprudence, the question of an 
‘exceptionality test’. The Court of Appeal approved Sales J’s summary of the Strasbourg case 
law on this point, albeit following it with the assertion that no such test was being applied 
other than that for a case to succeed outside of the circumstances considered by the rules 
‘something very compelling (which would be “exceptional”) is required’.123  As such the 
dispute over whether or not proportionality should be assessed by immigration decision 
makers inside the rules or outside was ‘one of form rather than substance’ as ‘either way the 
result should be the same.’124 This decision was greeted as a success by the cause litigators 
involved, as it seemed they had essentially stopped the attempts to undermine the 
protections for Article 8 that they had developed through the case law up to this point.125 
However, as will be seen below, the decision that the New Rules were in and of themselves 
lawful and therefore continued to apply would prove crucial as the case law developed 
further. 
 
This policy backlash to Article 8 was accompanied by a simultaneous rhetorical backlash from 
the government. In the build-up to the introduction of the New Rules this included making 
serious and often spurious claims about the damaging and dangerous impact of Article 8 as it 
was then operating. At the Conservative Party Conference of 2011 Theresa May announced 
that her focus would be on ‘foreign nationals who, in all sanity, should have no right to be 
here’.126 In particular, May targeted what she described as ‘the misinterpretation of Article 8 
of the ECHR… as an almost absolute right’ by the UK’s courts, despite the UK courts doing no 
such thing. Elements of the press supportive of the hostile environment agenda began 
publishing attacks on named immigration judges, including publishing paparazzi-style 
photographs of judges leaving their homes.127 The introduction of the rules were preceded 
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by the staging of a parliamentary debate over the introduction of the changes to the rules 
that was not required by parliamentary procedure,128 expressly to ‘send a message’ to the 
judiciary.129 The subsequent push back from the courts was then followed by aggressively 
worded media briefings denouncing judges and cause lawyers for choosing to ’ignore 
Parliament’ and ‘drive a coach and horses through our immigration system.’130 When these 
moves did not produce the immediately desired response, the Executive redoubled its 
denunciations of judicial meddling in democratic border control, accusing judges and cause 
litigators of ‘subverting democracy’131 and announcing that legislative restrictions to Article 8 
were necessary in order to stop the judges and cause litigators from causing ‘‘more victims of 
violent crimes committed by foreigners in this country’.132 
 
The executive proceeded to introduce a series of Article 8 related clauses through the 2014 
Immigration Act. These attempted to set out the government’s position on what the ‘public 
interest’ in criminal deportation133 and normal Article 8 regularisation cases134 would be. This 
was an attempt to weight the balancing act that immigration decision makers engage in when 
assessing proportionality under Article 8 in favour of removal. Thus the Act included 
stipulations as to what Courts and Tribunals’ must ‘have regard to’135 when dealing with an 
Article 8 case.136 It also stated that little weight should be given to a private or family life with 
a partner established while a person was in the UK unlawfully,137 and that little weight should 
be given to any private life established during a time when a person’s immigration status in 
the UK was “precarious”.138 In relation to cases of criminal deportation, these restrictions also 
applied but additional measures were introduced which heavily favoured deportation.139  The 
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Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights commented at the time that these steps 
were "a significant, and possibly unprecedented trespass by the legislature into the judicial 
function".140However the Labour Party, at the time the official Opposition, supported the 
moves the government proposed to make, and even attempted to hint at support for the 
backbench amendment mentioned above.141 Thus, ample Parliamentary support was 
available for the retrenchment to take place. 
The changes to the Immigration Rules and the provisions of the 2014 Act were also met with 
alarm by cause litigators.142 They were couched in terms of setting out the government’s 
position on what the ‘public interest’ element of the balancing exercise required, but in effect 
sought to monopolise the determination of what the public interest was and the relative 
weight that should be attached to it.  Moreover, they spilled over into mandating how judges 
should exercise their deliberative functions, by stipulating how much weight judges should 
attach to certain other issues.143  This ran contrary to Lord Bingham’s assertion in Huang that 
it would be wrong to afford ‘deference’ to the Secretary of State on these matters except in 
so far as she was able to access special sources of knowledge and advice, as they were 
ultimately the ‘performance of the ordinary judicial task of weighing up the competing 
considerations on each side.’144  
Thus, once again, faced with significant political demand for control, the tools of cause 
litigation were targeted by the executive. As a result of the political opportunity structures of 
institutionally limited Parliamentary opposition and in particular the control imperative 
influencing both the government and official Opposition, these rights-restricting measures 
were straightforwardly instituted. The question would then arise as to what impact they 
would have in practice. 
 
Outcomes for Cause Litigation’s Regularisation Frameworks 
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I think we were all a bit stupid really. We all thought that Theresa May would never get 
away with those rules, but the Court of Appeal has adopted them.145 
 
i) The Impact of the Reassertion of Control 
 
The overarching intention of this set of reforms was to reduce the impact of Article 8 in 
immigration cases and thus to reassert control over this area of immigration policy. Despite 
the initial resistance of the courts described above, this has been effectively achieved.  
 
In practice, this was achieved firstly by immigration service initial decision makers failing to 
meaningfully apply the requirements set out in Nagre and MF Nigeria that cases must be 
considered in line with the criteria set out in the rules and then an overall assessment of 
proportionality made in line with the wider Article 8 case law. As York notes, ‘Following these 
changes, Home Office decisions on applications covered by the new rules gave no or cursory 
consideration of Art 8 factors.’146 The Tribunals were then put in the position of being the only 
forum in which proportionality under Article 8 is meaningfully discussed. Furthermore, the 
Home Office developed an unwritten policy of applying for permission to appeal to the Upper 
Tribunal against any First Tier Tribunal decisions that sided with the appellant in Article 8 
cases, regardless of the legal merits of the decision.147 This further increased the pressure on 
judges at first instance.  A cause litigation barrister specialising in Article 8 cases reported at 
the time that, ‘Tribunal Judges are totally affected by the fact that all their cases get appealed, 
and the general feeling that they are now targets themselves.’148 This particular tactic 
eventually caused an outcry from the President of the Tribunal.149 
 
Moreover, during and following this period prior to the primary legislation of the 2014 Act 
coming into force, a second wave of cases began to be decided that appeared to take an 
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importantly different line to the cases that had gone before. Cases such as Gulshan150 and 
Haleemudeen151 invoked the new rules not as possessing legal force that overrode the force 
of case law, as this was widely agreed to be impossible, but as providing a contextual force in 
which to conduct Article 8 assessments. They essentially created a pre and post-New Rules 
reality regarding the role of Article 8 in immigration cases, in which the force of the Secretary 
of State’s political views regarding immigration control, as expressed through the New Rules, 
were to be given significantly more weight than had previously been the case. This position 
was endorsed by the High Court in Nagre152 and then by the Court of Appeal in SS Congo 
[2015] in which it was found that it was important to accord,  
proper weight to the judgment of the Secretary of State, as expressed in the rules, 
regarding what is needed to meet the public interest which is in issue153 
Moreover, following the introduction of the 2014 Act this argument from the Secretary of 
State and Parliament’s assessment of the public interest has been adopted even more 
forcefully by the courts. The Court of Appeal cases of AJ (Angola) and AJ (Gambia),154 MA 
(Somalia),155 Singh156 and most recently CT Vietnam157 all called on Tribunal judges to either 
‘take into account Convention rights through the lens of the New Rules’ or to afford ‘great 
weight’ to the public interest identified by Parliament in the 2014 Act.  
 
Most importantly, the decision in SS Congo melded the discussion of the weight to be 
attached to the expression of public interest found in the New Rules and the 2014 Act with 
whether or not a test of ‘exceptionality’ should be applied. In doing so it found that, in light 
of the Huang judgment that the Court of Appeal remained bound by, ‘it cannot be maintained 
as a general proposition that [leave to remain] or [leave to enter] outside the Immigration 
Rules should only be granted in exceptional cases’ but then went on to rule that ‘in certain 
specific contexts, a proper application of Article 8 may itself make it clear that the legal test 
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for grant of LTR or LTE outside the Rules should indeed be a test of exceptionality.’158 This is 
justified by the argument that,  
 
‘It is only if the normal balance of interests relevant to the general area in question is 
such as to require particularly great weight to be given to the public interest. … (as in 
the precarious cases considered in Nagre and the foreign national criminal cases 
considered in MF (Nigeria)) that a strict test of exceptionality will apply.’159 
 
This judgment appears to both confirm the reintroduction on an exceptionality test, as was 
the Executive’s intention to begin with, and to have limited, to an extent, its application. 
However, the implications of the rule depend to a great extent on the meaning of the word 
‘precarious’, given that it leaves open the prospect of an exceptionality test being lawfully 
applied in such cases. On this point, the Upper Tribunal in AM (S 117B) Malawi has interpreted 
Section 117B of the 2014 Act, which deals with the term ‘precarious’ in extremely broad 
terms, so that it is now interpreted as meaning any form of immigration status short of 
citizenship or indefinite leave to remain.160 As one cause litigator stated in a case comment,  
 
“It is difficult to conceive of a less favourable interpretation…In short, any form of 
limited leave will amount to a precarious immigration status.’161 
 
Another argued that ‘this is an extraordinary decision, arguably even per incuriam.’162 The 
legislation gave no indication of what was meant by ‘precariousness’, and other less stringent 
definitions were available to it. The Tribunal’s embrace of the notion that precariousness 
extends beyond irregularity and into any condition in which a person lacks citizenship or 
permanent status means that, as the cause litigator quoted above went on to state,  
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on the Tribunal’s interpretation, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where an 
individual seeking to rely on Article 8 ECHR would have an immigration status that was 
not precarious.163 
 
The day before this thesis was submitted to the printers, the Court of Appeal released 
judgment in Rhuppiah [2016] which dealt with this issue of precariousness.164 Another 
judgment by Sales LJ, it confirmed that most forms of limited leave to remain would constitute 
‘precariousness’ for the purposes of Article 8. To succeed in these circumstances, a non-
criminal person relying on private life would require an exceptional case that showed 
‘compelling circumstances’.165 However it stopped short of the Home Office’s full submission, 
following the above logic in AM[s117B] that anything short of ILR would constitute 
precariousness, although it reserved judgment on this point and did not define what would 
constitute an unprecarious but nevertheless non-permanent immigration status.166  
 
The legal barriers that have been erected, through the imposition of exceptional, compelling 
and ‘very compelling’ circumstances tests and the application of precariousness to what in 
effect is anyone who might conceivably need to rely on Article 8, mean that it is now little 
more than a sweeper of aberrant cases and extraordinary circumstances. Article 8 has thus 
been reduced back to providing a form of minimal core protections for migrants’ rights, rather 
than the more expansive vehicle for regularisation independent of Executive policy that had 
resulted from the long-term day-to-day work of the cause litigators. As a leading Article 8 
cause litigator put it, ‘we’re back in the pre-Huang days.’167 
 
ii) Prospects for Revitalising Regularisation 
 
Fundamentally for cause litigation, this retrenchment represents the undermining of Article 
8 as legal framework of regularisation independent of Executive policy. Cause litigation, 
                                                          
163 Hoshi (n161) 
164 Ruppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 803 
165 Ibid para 54 
166 Ibid para 44 
167 Immigration Barrister Interview, 20th December 2015 
166 
 
therefore, has not been able to break away from the restrictiveness of Executive immigration 
policy and decision making, governed as it is by the control imperative.  
 
Some may doubt, though, whether this is likely to be a permanent state of affairs. While the 
current period is one in which the executive has checked the role of the judiciary when it 
comes to Article 8, but it may be that cause litigation may be able to bring about a 
revitalisation of Article 8's independent regularisation function at some point in the future. 
The developments around refugee status determination might indicate that at least in 
principle this might be possible. As was demonstrated above, the executive engaged in a 
similar pattern of behaviour in response to cause litigation’s success in expanding the legal 
framework of an independent refugee status determination system. The control imperative 
required that anti-cause litigation legislation be introduced and Labour government ministers 
also repeatedly denounced judges, claiming that as a result the judiciary posed a threat to 
democracy and even that their decisions would produce physical threats to the British 
public.168 It seems, then, that the Executive of any political stripe is inclined to launch public 
and legislative attacks against cause litigation and the judicial and legal framework for it when 
the political need to publicly demonstrate control requires it.  
 
However, despite the grave concern of commentators at the time, very few of the 
government’s attempts to curtail the courts’ role in refugee determination in the early 2000s 
produced a fundamental undermining of the cause litigation role.169 Looking back on this 
period, Meili makes the point that, ‘despite the desperate measures taken by the government 
to curb the influx of asylum-seekers, cause lawyers representing asylum-seekers were not 
completely frustrated in their attempts to provide protection for their clients.’170 Specifically, 
certification of cases as manifestly unfounded has meant that cause litigators pursue judicial 
review of the certificate rather than a straightforward merits appeal;171 far from ideal, but not 
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a removal of cause litigation’s role. Likewise, the DFT, as was discussed in chapter 4, was 
undoubtedly a major issue of concern for cause litigators and devolved into a system that 
reduced the judicial function to the point where it was so unfair as to be unlawful. Yet by 
virtue of its physical and institutional limitations connected to detention, it was always 
isolated from the mainstream system and never dealt with more than 10% of claimants.172  
 
Most importantly, when it came to interpreting the Section 8 AI(TCA) provisions on asylum 
seeker credibility, the judiciary were willing and able to resist the legislative and rhetorical 
pressure on them to systematically downgrade the standard of their decision making. Having 
‘been instrumental in overseeing the application of asylum law’, as O’Sullivan put it, judges 
were able to rely on their longstanding jurisprudence, mentioned earlier regarding judicial 
recognition of the gravity of the issues in asylum cases, that they must be subject to the ‘most 
anxious scrutiny’ by the court.173 In JT Cameroon [2008], the Court of Appeal went as far as to 
use Section 3 of the HRA to read the word ‘potentially’ into AI(TCA) s.8 (1)’s instruction that,  
 
‘In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of a person who 
makes an asylum claim or a human rights claim, a deciding authority shall take 
account, as [potentially] damaging the claimant’s credibility, of any behaviour to 
which this section applies.’174  
 
This effectively moved the prescribed behaviour from a position of automatically warranting 
a rejection of the credibility of a claimant, as was intended by the government of the time, to 
one where ‘It is no more than a reminder to fact-finding tribunals that conduct coming within 
the categories stated in section 8 shall be taken into account in assessing credibility.’175 The 
result of this judgment has been that Section 8 has become a largely ineffectual at the appeal 
stage of the asylum decision making process.176 The judicial resistance shown in its approach 
to preserving the independence of its deliberative functions, has meant that, broadly 
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speaking, the independent judicial role in refugee status determination survived these 
attacks. 
  
Having clung on, cause litigation was able to re-emerge once the asylum and refugee issue 
began to lose its political prominence, the intensity of the imperative for control diminished 
and the executive’s attacks subsided. As was described earlier in this chapter, the protections 
afforded to asylum claimants were able to be developed to become relatively expansive in 
relation to a wide range of particular nationalities and social groups through cause litigation 
in the Tribunal system. Yet during this period the Executive’s response to these developments 
has been considerably more muted. When claimant numbers declined substantially the need 
for overt public displays of control had dissipated. Quietly, the refugee recognition rate has 
risen to the around the highest it has ever been in the modern era of mass asylum seeking.177 
Having been put under considerable pressure during the early 2000s, then, cause litigation on 
the Refugee Convention has been able to re-emerge as a major means of protecting the rights 
of vulnerable migrants through regularisation.  
 
This is not to claim that the Executive has been converted to a commitment to refugee 
protection, far from it. However, in place of aggressive legislative and policy responses, Home 
Office responses to the more recent advancements in refugee protection through day-to-day 
litigation have been broadly comparable with that described in the previous chapter 
regarding its response to strategic litigation. The enforcement of judgments expanding 
refugee protections and the institutional adoption of their meaning has become a key 
contested area as a result of the administrative imperative for control.178 As one interviewee 
put it, 
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‘Every time you protect a particular group, the tortured, the trafficked, the child, entry 
to that group is policed harder. It’s members of that group that suffer the policing.’179 
 
While the executive’s attitude to this form of regularisation outside of its control may not 
have changed, then, it had ceased to be the most pressing issue during the relevant period 
and a satisfactory level of control for the immigration administration could be achieved in less 
aggressive ways. A more aggressive form of executive response only became necessary when 
the systemic changes brought about through refugee and article 8 related litigation began to 
impact on the second element of the control imperative; the need for the executive to be 
seen to be exercising control. The systemic changes in regularisation opportunities were the 
result of many individual decisions on immigration status that could not themselves be 
evaded, as each decision required a single concrete response from the executive; the granting 
of legal status to each individual. The executive’s only option in such circumstances was 
therefore to address the whole framework under which these individual decisions were 
made.  
 
It appears, then, that absent public pressure, the executive’s attention can move away from 
an issue, allowing it the chance to be revitalised through long-term cause litigation work. 
What this depends on, though, is the judicial approach to political pressure, and particularly 
its willingness to resist significant political pressure during the peak of the backlash, by 
defending the courts’ and judiciary’s role in the decision making on that issue. When it comes 
to the judicial approach to Article 8, however, very little of this kind of willingness has been 
evident. It is true that throughout the earlier stages of the development of the Article 8 New 
Rules jurisprudence there were some notable rulings which sought to maintain the full legal 
framework of Article 8 as a tool for regularising and thus protecting migrants’ rights. The 
rulings in Izuazu, MF Nigeria, MM (Lebanon)180 and Ganesabalan,181 for example, all either 
sought to keep open the independent role of the tribunal in Article 8 development or to rein 
back in some of the more restrictionist implications of other judgments. As with some of the 
key DFT cases discussed in the previous chapter, these were often from judges who had 
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previous involvement with cause litigation. In particular Blake J, who has already been 
discussed repeatedly, and Fordham J have both been prominent in defending the Article 8 
jurisprudence and have a cause litigation background. Fordham, as was noted above, had 
argued the appellant’s case in Chikwamba, lead for the claimants in the pivotal DFT case of 
RLC v SSHD 2004 and more recently in the Public Law Projects judicial review of the legal aid 
residence test.182  
 
However, these attempts have been largely superseded by a contemporary judicial approach 
which has adopted the Executive’s analysis of the issues and have facilitated Article 8’s 
retrenchment. Contrary to the senior courts’ approach around the time of Huang and EB 
Kosovo, many amongst the immigration judiciary and the senior civil judiciary had been at 
best ambivalent about Article 8’s role in immigration and some had been openly hostile to it. 
Chapter 4 noted that strategic litigation was most successful when judges could be persuaded 
that the issue at hand fell within their territory, and that in particular notions of justice were 
involved. In these day-to-day cases, though, for many judges it seems that Article 8 is neither 
regarded as an issue of justice, nor even to properly fall within their territory.  
 
As one extreme example, an anonymous immigration judge recently published an article in 
the Mail on Sunday newspaper stating that Article 8 was ‘the last resort of the rascal in my 
opinion.’183 Of perhaps greater significance, the Vice President of the Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber, Ockleton J, has called for Huang to be reversed and argued that regarding Article 8 
more generally, ‘It might even be doubtful whether it is proper for judges to make such 
decisions.’184 This perspective echoes the view of Laws LJ, mentioned above, that Article 8 
judgments were in danger of spilling over into the ‘political’ function of the executive. Sales J, 
now elevated to Sales LJ, has led this Court of Appeal’s attempts to ensure that executive 
control would once again predominate over independent tribunal adjudication, particularly 
through the reintroduction of an exceptionality test in Nagre, SS Congo and Agyarko and most 
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recently dealing with the precariousness arguments in Ruppiah. In the mirror image of Blake 
and Fordham, Sales, like Laws LJ before him, is a former First Treasury Council, who 
unsuccessfully argued the Government’s case in EB Kosovo. This has caused significant 
disquiet amongst cause litigators, one of whom argued that ‘I think it’s really alarming that 
those people who have been at the heart of Government Article 8 legal representation are 
now creating our law on Article 8.’185  
 
The prospects for a revitalised Article 8 do not, then, look good. The dominant judicial 
approach of the current Court of Appeal and Tribunal has been to adopt what could be 
described as the ‘lens of the rules’ view, in which the general tenor of restriction and 
Executive control that the rules and legislation represented was willingly applied as a guide 
to all further judicial reasoning on the issues that these developments raised. For cause 
litigators, as one of them put it, ‘you desperately hope that the Supreme Court will come out 
with something good.’186 Time will tell, but it will require a considerable turnaround on the 
part of the Supreme Court for this retrenchment of the legal framework of regularisation to 
be reversed. At the time of writing, two key Supreme Court judgments have so far been 
delivered, in Makhlouf187 and Hesham Ali188, and while Hesham Ali in particular provides some 
counterbalance to the direction of travel the Court of Appeal has taken Article 8, there is little 
sign of the turnaround that would be required.189 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the day-to-day work of cause litigation has been hugely 
influential on the development of the modern immigration system. As a result of the filtering 
effects of the financial resources and wider immigration legal framework the cause lawyers 
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operate with, combined with the underlying political ethos of the lawyers’ cause itself, the 
development of regularisation opportunities outside of the intentions of the Executive has 
become its most important function. These developments have in particular occurred in 
relation to the Refugee Convention and Article 8 of the ECHR. However, these developments 
operate in direct confrontation with the imperative to exercise and demonstrate control 
which motivates Executive policy.  
 
The clash with the control imperative has prompted a backlash from the Executive which 
targeted the legal frameworks of regularisation that resulted from this long-term day-to-day 
cause lawyering. This being said, while both the Refugee Convention and Article 8 have 
experienced backlashes at points where the political controversy surrounding them was most 
acute, efforts by the Executive to curtail their influence have always stopped short of 
removing their protections altogether. What remains after these backlashes are essentially a 
limited set of core protections. For cause litigation the positive sign from this is that, as the 
chapter showed, provided that the infrastructure of cause litigation, such as the HRA, 
sufficient financial and human resources, and a relatively supportive judiciary remain in place, 
these protections can potentially be built on, as occurred in the refugee convention case.  
 
However, a further risk arises from this process. As this chapter noted, while the executive 
will take the least onerous action that is sufficient to meet its need to reassert control, this 
need is relative to the intensity of public demand for control and the related strength of the 
imperative to overtly demonstrate control. As such, a systemic role that cannot be simply 
evaded, as was seen in chapter 4, or in circumstances in which evasion and absorption are no 
longer satisfactory to meet control demand, produces an aggressive and ambitious executive 
backlash. This chapter has discussed examples where this backlash has targeted the outcomes 
of cause litigation. The next chapter will discuss the consequences of cause litigation’s 
systemic role in the UK’s immigration policy dynamic overall. 
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Chapter 6: The Clash with Control and the Consequences for Cause Litigation 
 
Introduction 
‘I think the sector is just bowled over by what’s happening to it.’1 
The studies of cause litigation’s constituent parts in chapters 4 and 5, have shown that 
strategic litigation for migrants’ rights has been frequently undermined and non-strategic 
day-to-day cause lawyering has been met by an aggressive public backlash by the Executive. 
These problematic legal and policy outcomes for cause litigation have come as a result of the 
political opportunity structures that the cause litigators face. The control imperative that the 
executive operates under provides its motivation to respond in this way, while the dominance 
over immigration issues that the executive enjoys within the UK’s constitutional 
arrangements has facilitated their implementation.   
 
However, taken together, chapters 4 and 5 also showed that despite these limitations, cause 
litigation as a whole has acted as one of the primary obstacles to the control imperative. It 
has impeded the administrative business of executive policy implementation and, crucially, 
impeded the executive’s ability to be seen to be exercising control. This chapter assesses 
cause litigation as a whole and the consequences of its obstructive role in the UK’s 
immigration policy dynamic. It examines what Kawar would describe as the ‘radiating effects’ 
of cause litigation.2 The chapter shows that cause litigation’s increasing conflict with the 
political opportunity structures that frame the UK’s immigration politics has in recent years 
resulted in both a practical and rhetorical backlash from the Executive against cause litigation 
itself, rather than simply the outcomes it produces. The practical backlash involved a series 
of policies which sought to undermine cause litigation by diminishing the resources and legal 
framework that sustain it. The chapter shows, though, that the primary constraint on this 
backlash has been politicians’, both in government and in the wider legislature, concern to be 
seen to respect and protect the rule of law. Yet, the chapter shows that the framework of 
justification adopted by the executive for its backlash has allowed them to implement 
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changes that have seriously weakened, although crucially not destroyed, the rule of law in 
immigration control.  
 
The main body of the chapter sets out what in practice has been done to undermine the 
capacity of cause litigation to function as effectively as it has up to now. It then discusses how 
this was achieved by the Executive. The section shows that the executive has attempted to 
justify its backlash against the resources and legal framework of cause litigation through a 
rhetorical turn against the model of the rule of law that allowed cause litigation to flourish, 
and a reassertion of a more overtly nationalist ‘traditional’ conception of the rule of law’s role 
in immigration issues. It has done this by identifying cause litigation with notions of liberal 
universalism and social cosmopolitanism which were then blamed for the wider social and 
economic threats that, as was discussed in chapter 3, have led to the heightened concern 
over immigration. The chapter concludes by discussing the extent to which this backlash has 
been effective and what this means for the role of cause litigation in defending and promoting 
migrants’ rights in the UK.  
 
Given its importance to the subsequent debate, though, the chapter will commence by 
building on some of the analysis in chapter 3 regarding the development of the rule of law 
and cause litigation as it came to exist in the UK. 
 
The Thickening of the Rule of Law: The Role of Resources and Legal Framework  
 
‘When I started doing this stuff the government’s rhetorical position was very clear; 
commitment to the rule of law, commitment to the ECHR, commitment to upholding 
EU law.3 
 
The rule of law as a notion has been described as ‘an essentially contested concept’ within 
political discourse and legal theory.4 Outside of the academy it has proved itself to be a highly 
malleable concept, that develops in equal measure through practical usage and political 
                                                          
3 Immigration and Welfare Barrister Interview, 9th April 2014 
4 Waldron J, ‘Is The Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 
137 
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rhetoric. The frequency with which it is uncritically invoked as a universal good suggests that 
it may have become, as Shklar has put it, ‘just another one of those self-congratulatory 
rhetorical devices that grace the public utterances of Anglo-American politicians.’5 However, 
regardless of its merits, as will be demonstrated throughout this chapter, it can be used as a 
rhetorical tool to discredit opposition. As Bellamy has noted,  
 
‘When Judges criticise legislatures and governments they typically do so in the name 
of the Rule of Law. Unfortunately, politicians do the same when they attack judicial 
activism.’6 
 
Scholarly attempts at its definition have varied substantially over time. As was discussed in 
chapter 2, in the UK context discussion of the notion often begins with the work of AV Dicey, 
whose 19th Century study of the UK’s constitutional arrangements has become canonical.7 
Dicey’s three maxims regarding the production of law, its universal application and an 
opposition to constitutional rights statutes, discussed in chapter 2, have come to be 
associated with ‘thin’ forms of the rule of law, to borrow Tamanaha’s typology,8 which 
emphasise the application of the law to all actors in a given polity, the rejection of 
arbitrariness and the limits on government’s coercive powers over individuals. As the FA 
Hayek argued,  
 
‘stripped of all technicalities [the rule of law] means that government in all its actions 
is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand.’9 
 
However, others, such as Harden and Lewis, have criticised what they argue is ‘Dicey’s 
conflation of nineteenth-century constitutional arrangements and the rule of law.’10 As they 
go on to state, if this conflation  
                                                          
5 Shklar J, ‘Political Theory And The Rule Of Law’ In Hutchinson A & Monahan P (Eds) The Rule Of Law: Ideal Or 
Ideology (Carswell 1987) 1 
6 Bellamy R, The Rule of Law and The Separation Of Powers (Ashgate 2005) xi 
7 Dicey A, An Introduction to The Study Of The Law Of The Constitution (Macmillan 1945) 
8 Tamanaha B, ‘A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law’ in Palombella G and Walker N (Eds) Relocating the Rule of 
Law (Hart 2009) 4 
9 Hayek F A, The Road to Serfdom (2nd Ed. Routledge 2001) 54 
10 Harden I & Lewis N, The Noble Lie: The British Constitution And The Rule Of Law (Hutchinson 1988) 4, emphasis 
in the original 
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‘becomes as description, the ruling paradigm for discussing constitutionality and the 
rule of law, it can only work in opposition to an effective analysis of contemporary 
constitutional conditions’.11  
 
Attempts to engage with these ‘contemporary constitutional conditions’ have tended to 
introduce ’thicker’ conceptions of the rule of law, which include notions such as protection of 
human rights as defined in international rights documents such as the UDHR, the ECHR and 
the ICCPR.12 As Lord Bingham has said,  
 
‘It is, I think, possible to identify the rights and freedoms which, in the UK and 
developed Western or Westernised countries elsewhere, are seen as fundamental, 
and the rule of law requires that those rights should be protected.’13  
 
Bingham declared himself an adherent of a ‘thick’ rule of law.14 This ‘thick’ rule of law position 
is intended to be reflective of contemporary legal and political practices, whereby western 
states that subscribe to the rule of law, including the UK, almost universally operate forms of 
legalised rights charters, and courts are actively involved in adjudicating on disputes between 
the state and individuals over ‘fundamental rights’. In this sense, the ‘thick’ rule of law is an 
example of the malleability of the concept of the rule of law in response to predominant 
practical usage and the facilitative legal framework that it benefits from.  
 
As was discussed in chapter 3, New Labour instituted the development of what could be 
thought of a thicker form of the rule of law through expanding the legal framework and 
resources available to cause litigators, most overtly through the introduction of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. This was accompanied by the Data Protection Act 1998 and followed by the 
Access to Justice Act 1999, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Race Relations 
Amendment Act 2000. The Acts greatly expanded the rights-based claims individuals were 
                                                          
11 Ibid 
12 Bingham T, The Rule of Law (Penguin 2011) 66- 67  
13 Ibid 68 
14 Ibid 67 
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able to make on the State, while simultaneously constraining state action and placing a variety 
of duties regarding standards of treatment and disclosure of information on state agencies. 
Backing these rights and duties up would be a greater role for litigation, where disputes over 
them would be resolved independently of government, by the judicial system. Commenting 
on these developments at what would turn about to be near the end of New Labour’s time in 
power, Gearty summed the position up by stating that ‘in recent years the power of … the 
state generally has been regulated by statute in ways that simply did not exist in years gone 
by.’15 
 
These changes, particularly the Access to Justice Act which realigned and expanded legal aid 
spending in civil law, were partially instituted as part of New Labour’s ‘social exclusion 
agenda’.16 As York notes, 
 
The newly-constituted Legal Services Commission found itself, as part of 
the Access to Justice Act 1999, the instigator of a trendy relaunch of legal aid: the 
Community Legal Advice Service. This was to be an area-based provision, based on a 
scientific assessment of unmet client need in every area of social welfare law, in every 
part of the country. This arose out of, and its development was paralleled   by, 
extensive, well-resourced government-backed research which showed how 
‘justiciable problems’ contribute to and exacerbate ‘social exclusion’.17 
  
Issues such as poverty, educational underachievement and housing vulnerability were 
identified as often resulting from failures in the enforcement of legal rights. This line of 
thinking invited greater judicial involvement in questions of social provision and greater 
intervention in various levels of executive decision making in these areas. 
 
                                                          
15 Gearty, quoted in Ewing K D, Bonfire of the Liberties: New Labour, Human Rights and the Rule of Law (OUP 
2010) 7 
16 Sommerlad, H, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship between Citizenship, Access to Justice, and the Reform 
of Legal Aid’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 350  
17 York S, ‘The End of Legal Aid in Immigration - A Barrier To Access To Justice For Migrants And A Decline In The 
Rule Of Law’ (2013) 27 JIANL 106 128 
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At the same time, the broader package of legislative changes formed part of a programme of 
constitutional reform which was central to the first term New Labour government’s self-
identity as a ‘modernising’ force. As Klug puts it, ‘Constitutional reform as a package had 
become one of the badges of New Labour; a set of measures to signal that it still had a distinct 
radical programme’.18 The modernity that New Labour in its first term sought to bring about 
was imbued with the ‘third way’ principles of its wider policy programme.19 Built on an 
electoral base of newly affluent, socially liberal and increasingly cosmopolitan voters,20 and 
significantly influenced by liberal and left-leaning lawyers,21 New Labour’s constitutional 
reform programme was intended to be both empowering of citizens against a state which 
under the period of long Conservative rule had become viewed as authoritarian and 
reactionary,22 while at the same time promoting a form of individualism which would avoid 
the centralising, statist tendencies of the old British left.23  
 
New Labour were not alone in looking to expand and enrich the traditional role of the rule of 
law in the UK. As discussed in chapter 3, these reforms were met with open arms by a growing 
and increasingly prominent sector of the legal profession, human rights lawyers, who gained 
a more prominent place in media and popular consciousness during the period.24 As has been 
discussed throughout this thesis, judges also developed a wider willingness to engage in more 
searching judicial review of ministerial and executive actions than was previously the case.25 
For example, the developments in case law of measures such as protective costs orders 
involved the courts recognising the role of judicial review for ventilating ‘issues of general 
                                                          
18 Klug F, A Magna Carta for all Humanity: Homing in on Human Rights, (Routledge 2015) 246 
19 Giddens A, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Blackwell 1998); and Plant R, Beech M & Hickson 
K, The Struggle for Labour's Soul: Understanding Labour's Political Thought Since 1945 (Routledge 2004) 
20 Heath AF, Jowell RM, Curtice JK, The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices (OUP 2001) 122 
21 For relationship between New Labour and lawyers Klug F, Values for a Godless Age: The Story of the United 
Kingdom's New Bill of Rights (Penguin Books 2000) 158- 163 
22 Erdos D, ‘Charter 88 and the Constitutional Reform Movement: A Retrospective’, [2009] Parliamentary affairs 
538 538 
23 Klug, (n18) 246 
24 Maiman R, ‘Asylum Law Practice in the United Kingdom after the Human Rights Act’, in Sarat A and Scheingold 
S (eds) The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure and Agency in Legal Practice, (Stanford University Press 2005) 
25 Kavanagh A, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2009); Hickman T, Public Law After 
the Human Rights Act (Hart 2010); and Tomkins A, ‘National security and the role of the court: a changed 
landscape?’ (2010), 126, LQR 543, For a critical perspective on these developments, Ewing K, ‘The Futility of the 
Human Rights Act’ [2004] PL 829 For a response, Kavanagh A, ‘Judging The Judges Under The Human Rights Act: 
Deference, Disillusionment And The ‘War On Terror’’ [2009] PL 287 
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public importance’26 and consciously taking on a duty to facilitate this to ensure that such 
cases were heard.27 These developments occurred around the same time as the charity and 
NGO sector, which drew much of its approach and staff-base from a similar left-liberal, rights-
focused milieu as New Labour,28 began to develop its role from the provision of goods and 
services to rights-based public campaigning organisations, openly discussing the economic 
and political causes of the issues they were working on.29  
 
There was a concentrated period, then, around New Labour’s first term in office, when 
legislative changes coincided with wider social and political developments to expand the rule 
of law in the UK into a thicker form and encourage the greater use of litigation for social 
purposes. As the next section will show, though, a gradual waning of Executive tolerance 
eventually transformed into a full-scale backlash against cause litigation. 
 
Thinning down the Rule of Law in Immigration  
 
Aggregate funding into the field is probably… around £15-18m a year; that’s all 
funders including Big Lottery. So, you know, there’s a bigger cut in legal aid per year 
than that.30 
 
As this section will show, this waning of enthusiasm on the part of the Labour government 
began as a result of the control imperative, and was augmented in the Coalition and 
Conservative eras by the austerity agenda of both governments, and the Conservative’s 
particular ideological concerns regarding legalised rights charters. These concerns overlapped 
with the control imperative to produce a concerted policy backlash aimed at reducing the 
resources available to cause litigators and rolling back the advancements in the legal and 
judicial framework that facilitated it.   
                                                          
26 R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry [2005] EWCA Civ 192 para 46 
27 Ibid para 71 (1) (ii) and (v)  
28 Buchanan T, ‘Human Rights Campaigns in Modern Britain’ in Hilton M, Crowson N J & McKay J (Eds), NGOs in 
contemporary Britain: non-state actors in society and politics since 1945 (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 122 – 124; 
also Hilton M, The politics of expertise: how NGOs shaped modern Britain (OUP 2013) 
29 Hilton M, Crowson N J & McKay J (Eds), NGOs in contemporary Britain: non-state actors in society and politics 
since 1945 (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 39; also Nash K, The Cultural Politics of Human Rights: Comparing the US 
and UK (CUP 2009) 137 
30 Funding Officer Interview, 15th April 2014 
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i) New Labour Backtracks on Cause Litigation and the Thick Rule of Law 
 
As was mentioned in chapter 3, the Labour Government began a process of reducing the 
commitment to a human rights framework in British government policy and political life as a 
result of the War on Terror.31 However, while this affected a number of areas, including 
foreign policy and the conduct of the security services,32 many of the major human rights 
controversies of the 2000s regarding terrorists should be understood to be migrants’ rights 
issues in another form. Controversy has largely revolved around what actions the state can 
and can’t take against foreign national terrorists by way of deportation and detention, 
including the use of indefinite, trial-less internment,33 the use of secret evidence34 and the 
deportation of terrorist suspects to states that practice torture.35 One of the major drivers for 
the control imperative in immigration policy has been the threat of terrorism that certain 
forms of migrant are perceived to pose. However, as has already been noted in chapter 5, the 
later Labour governments had also begun to institute a number of policies that sought to 
diminish the effectiveness of cause litigation in migrants’ rights and immigration matters in 
connection to more mundane issues than national security.  
 
As was noted during chapter 3’s discussion of the legal framework of migrants’ rights cause 
litigation, New Labour’s time in office contained a near continuous process of immigration 
legislation. 36 A significant aspect of this process was the introduction, particularly in relation 
to asylum, of measures directed towards the curtailment of the power of courts to affect 
immigration decision making and to limit migrants’ access to them. These legislative steps 
targeted the legal framework cause litigators relied on and were discussed at length in 
chapter 5.37 These attacks on the legal framework were combined with a systemic change to 
                                                          
31 Gearty C, Can Human Rights Survive? (CUP 2006) 99 
32 Belhaj & Anor v Straw & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 1394  
33 A & Ors v. SSHD [2004] UKHL 56 
34 Jackson J, ‘Justice, security and the right to a fair trial: is the use of secret evidence ever fair?’ [2013] PL 720 
35 Kavanagh A, (n25) ‘Judging The Judges’; Tomkins A, (n25); Michaelsen C, ‘The renaissance of non-refoulement? 
The Othman (Abu Qatada) decision of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 750 
36 Depending on how it is counted, New Labour passed between eight and twelve Acts of Parliament relating to 
immigration issues during their 13 years in power. Mulvey G, ‘Immigration Under New Labour: Policy and 
Effects’ (2011) 37 JEMS 1477 
37 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act of 2002 s. 94; Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 
2004 s. 8 
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the funding regime of legal aid. In 2007 the traditional hourly rate mode of payment for legal 
work was replaced by a ‘fixed fee’ model termed the Graduated Fee Scheme (GFS).38 As the 
cause litigation charity Asylum Aid have said, 
  
‘Ten hours spent working closely with an asylum seeker receives the same funding as 
a single hour’s work – with the result that less detailed work results in larger profits.39 
 
This scheme was particularly damaging to the long-term non-strategic cause litigation 
discussed in chapter 5 and, as will be discussed again below, ultimately led to the closure of 
the two major national cause litigation legal charities doing this work, the Refugee Legal 
Centre and the Immigration Advisory Service, who failed to adapt to the new business model 
even prior to the subsequent implementation of the legal aid cuts in the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) that will be discussed below.40  
 
While the majority of these measures required legislative approval in one form or another, 
the reality of large majorities and party discipline under the Labour government allowed for 
a strong executive to implement them with little tangible opposition. The House of Lords, less 
subject to executive control and containing a large number of retired judges and senior 
lawyers, proved the only substantial legislative obstacle during this period. 41 Thus, as would 
become a theme throughout the period of backlash, the dominance of the executive in the 
UK’s institutional political opportunity structures facilitated these retrenchments of the rule 
of law’s influence in immigration control. These steps also indicate that a direction of travel 
had begun long before Labour was removed from office.  
 
ii) Coalition & Conservative Governments Expand the Backlash 
 
                                                          
38 Constitutional Affairs Committee, Implementation of the Carter Review of Legal Aid (HC 2006-07 223-II) 
39 Asylum Aid, ‘Asylum Aid policy briefing Legal Aid’(Asylum Aid, February 2013) 
http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/LegalAidBriefing.pdf accessed 22 September 2016 
40 York, (n17) 112 
41 Migrants’ Rights Consultant Interview 27th August 2013; Immigration NGO Legal Director Interview, 12th 
September 2013 
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The change of government in 2010 heralded the beginning of a concerted executive attack on 
cause litigation. Thomas has recently argued that,  
 
‘It is generally recognised that access to justice has been severely limited, but … 
immigration may have sustained some of the severest restrictions’.42  
 
In particular, and once again, these actions targeted both the resources available to cause 
litigators and the legal framework that they operated in, and were facilitated by limited 
opposition in Parliament. This time, though, they did so in a considerably more far reaching 
and damaging ways.  
 
Some steps taken were connected to a combination of immigration and wider austerity policy 
priorities. For example, very substantial increases in application fees for regularisation, 
citizenship naturalisation and appeals against decisions at the tribunal were introduced.43 
Under the rubric of austerity, the Home Office was instructed by the Treasury that the 
immigration system had to become ‘self-funding’;44 in the sense that the costs of processing 
and determining immigration applications and implementing decisions taken (including 
enforced removals) would have to be met by migrants themselves. However, this demand 
could be mobilised by the Home Office as part of the control agenda. It chose to impose the 
subsequent cost increases almost exclusively on family migration, settlement, naturalisation 
and appeals against Home Office decisions; business immigration under the points based 
system being left largely untouched.45 This meant that applications in ‘unwanted’ migration 
categories, to borrow Joppke’s phrase, now operate at a considerable profit margin. As one 
                                                          
42 Thomas R, ‘Immigration and Access to Justice: A Critical Analysis of Recent Restrictions’ in Palmer E, Guinchard 
A, Cornford T & Marique Y (Eds.) Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics of Austerity (Hart 2016) 105 
43 UK Visas and Immigration, ‘New immigration and nationality fees for 2016 to 2017’ (UK Visas and Immigration, 
11 January 2016) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-immigration-and-nationality-fees-for-2016-to-
2017 accessed 22 September 2016 
44 Home Office and HM Treasury, ‘Home Office's settlement at the Spending Review 2015’ (Home Office and HM 
Treasury, 25 November 2015) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-offices-settlement-at-the-
spending-review-2015 accessed 22 September 2016 
45 (n43) 
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example, the cost to the Home Office of processing an application for a child to register as a 
British Citizen is £272,46 but the application fee has been raised to £936.47 
 
In addition to bringing in revenue under the austerity system, the size of these fees may act 
as an unavoidable obstacle to irregular and otherwise vulnerable migrants accessing their 
legal entitlements. As one cause litigator commented following the announcement, ‘The 
choices made by Ministers as to where the highest fees should fall are telling. High fees have 
a deterrent effect and are simply unaffordable for some families.48 In 2016 the government 
also announced its intention to raise appeal fees for the tribunal by over 500%, but eventually 
backed down following universal opposition in a consultation exercise and unusually 
significant parliamentary pressure.49 The imposition of very high fees of this kind is ordinarily 
subject to little if any parliamentary scrutiny, being done through regulations laid before 
parliament under the negative resolution procedure, and as a result are another example of 
the institutional strength of the executive in implementing control-imperative inspired 
measures. The government have said that it is reviewing the fee increase and will return with 
fresh proposals. 
 
Financial decisions as tools of the control imperative were also demonstrated in the Coalition 
reforms to legal aid. These reforms were crucial as, as has been discussed throughout this 
thesis, the funding regime and the rules around it has a major influence on the manner and 
extent to which cause litigation is conducted. As one institutional litigation funder noted,  
 
                                                          
46 Home Office, Impact Assessment for the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Order 2016 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/177/impacts/2016/33 accessed 28th September 2016   
47 (n43) 
48 Colin Yeo, ‘Massive increase in family immigration fees for 2016-17’ (Free movement, 2 March 2016) 
https://www.freemovement.org.uk/massive-increase-in-family-immigration-fees-for-2016-17/ accessed 22 
September 2016 
49 Ministry of Justice, Tribunal Fees: The Government Response to the consultation on proposals for 
the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) and Upper Tribunal (Immigration and 
Asylum Chamber) (Ministry of Justice September 2016) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553387/proposals-imm-
asylum-chamber-consultation-response.pdf accessed 20 September 2016; Daily Telegraph, Government U-
turns on 500 per cent increase on immigration tribunal fees, (25 November 2016) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/25/government-u-turns-500-per-cent-increase-immigration-
tribunal/  (accessed 12 February 2017) 
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‘the changes to legal aid contracting over not just the last year but over the last five 
years is extremely relevant to how casework is developed. It’s clearly the single biggest 
driver for how certain firms do their work or how any firm does their work, but also 
who is in the field and who isn’t and how particular work is done.’50 
 
The austerity regime introduced under the Coalition provided the justification for a major 
restructuring and curtailment of legal aid spending, far more drastic than the introduction of 
the GFS had been previously. The legal aid framework under the Access to Justice Act 1999 
was replaced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO). 
This reduced legal aid funding across many areas of civil law that impact on both migrants’ 
and citizens’ rights, including housing, education and employment51 and has been 
characterised as ‘an enormous assault on the availability of publicly funded legal services.’52 
However, immigration cases, including the kinds of Article 8 cases discussed in chapter 5, 
were removed from legal aid entitlement altogether, despite their crucial importance.53 What 
remained for migrants’ rights cause litigators was legal aid for asylum cases, trafficking cases, 
a small subset of cases relating to domestic violence, judicial review and immigration bail 
cases.54 These cuts were then followed up in the ‘transforming legal aid’ regulations of 2013 
which cut legal aid payments further by removing the 35% ‘uplift’ previously paid for work at 
the Upper Tribunal level.55 As Thomas has summarised, ‘the upshot was a radical reduction 
in immigration legal aid.’56 
 
While what was left continued in principle to cover a significant amount of cause litigation 
work, in combination with the cuts under the GFS scheme LASPO further damaged the mixed-
economy model that many legal practitioners in this field relied upon. Up to this point, the 
                                                          
50 Funding Officer Interview, 15th April 2014 
51 LASPO 2012, Sch 1 
52 Armstrong N, ‘LASPO, Immigration and Maaouia v United Kingdom’ (2013) 18 Judicial Review 177 177 
53 Ministry of Justice, ‘Scope’ (Ministry of Justice, Updated: Friday, 11 January 2013) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130128112038/http://www.justice.gov.uk/legal-aid/newslatest-
updates/legal-aid-reform/scope accessed 22 September 2016 
54 York (n17) 107 
55 Ministry of Justice ‘Transforming legal aid: delivering a more credible and efficient system: Consultation Paper 
CP14/2013’ (Ministry of Justice, 9 April 2013) https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-
communications/transforming-legal-aid/supporting_documents/transforminglegalaid.pdf accessed 22 
September 2016 
56 Thomas, (n42) 115 
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more difficult and time consuming Article 8 regularisation or asylum cases had been cross-
subsidised by the more relatively straightforward immigration cases.57 This approach had 
been encouraged by the Legal Services Commission, the administrative agency responsible 
for legal aid funding at the time, which referred to it as ‘a “swings and roundabouts” business 
model’, which ‘relied on balancing simple cases against complex ones’.58 Following LASPO and 
the withdrawal of immigration from legal aid in its entirety this would no longer be possible.  
 
It should also be remembered that, as was mentioned in chapter 4, in 2013 the intention to 
introduce a residence test for eligibility for what remained of legal aid was announced, which 
would have effectively excluded all irregular migrants and all newly arrived lawful migrants 
from entitlement to civil legal aid (other than asylum claimants). The statutory instrument 
required for this move was subject to judicial review by cause litigators who, after losing 
before Laws LJ in the Court of Appeal on all grounds, succeeded in obtaining a decision from 
the Supreme Court that it was unlawful as being ultra vires the powers given by LASPO.59 The 
Court expressly gave no opinion on the underlying discrimination and access to justice issues 
at the heart of the Residence test proposals, issues which the Court of Appeal had found 
acceptable, and so the prospect of primary legislation to introduce a residence test remains 
open.60  
 
In the same way as financial issues under austerity coincided with the immigration control 
imperative, ingrained Conservative party scepticism towards constitutionalism and a thicker 
rule of law61 was allied with concerns about control to bring in a number of restrictions to 
Judicial Review proceedings. While they had a wider impact, cause litigation for migrants’ 
rights was particularly vulnerable to them and, as will be discussed below, they were publicly 
justified in control imperative terms. Firstly, the Coalition attempted to restrict the role that 
NGOs and other interveners could play in judicial review proceedings, discussed at length in 
                                                          
57 York (n17) 131 
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59 R (The Public Law Project) v Lord Chancellor [2016] UKSC 39; and Public Law Project v The Lord Chancellor 
[2015] EWCA Civ 1193  
60 R (The Public Law Project) v Lord Chancellor [2016] UKSC 39 para 39 
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chapter 4, by increasing the financial obstacles to them doing so.62 Sections 85 and 87 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 required third parties supporting claimants to provide 
much more detailed disclosure of their financial records than was previously the case and, 
more onerously, created for interveners a potential liability for any costs accrued by the 
defendant (typically the Home Office) arising from their intervention.  
 
Of potentially the greatest risk to strategic cause litigation were measures designed to reduce 
the financial viability of judicial review challenges. Section 88 of the CJCA barred the 
application of PCOs to the pre-permission stage of judicial review.63 As was also discussed in 
chapter 4, fear of liability for government costs if the case is unsuccessful is a major obstacle 
to NGO participation in strategic litigation cases. PCOs were created in order to diminish this 
fear. However, as Hickman and Jaffey have noted,  
 
‘Defendants and interested parties not infrequently run up massive pre-permission 
bills... We have seen cases where such cases pre-permission costs have comfortably 
exceeded £30,000. The risk of unknown and potentially substantial pre-permission 
costs is a risk that those who would otherwise qualify for costs protection cannot 
possibly take.’64  
 
Mirroring this move, the Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) Regulations 2015 also 
limited legal aid payments to those cases where permission to proceed was ultimately 
granted or the Secretary of State withdrew the challenged decision. Thus all work in 
preparation for a judicial review around individual or a group of individual’s cases would be 
done at the financial risk of the lawyers concerned, as payment would depend on the result 
achieved.65 This was a highly significant step for cause litigation as aside from the strategic 
cases, judicial review plays a particularly prominent role in day-to-day immigration and 
                                                          
62 Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review – proposals for further reform: the Government response, (MoJ February 
2014) https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/judicial-review/results/judicial-review---
proposals-for-further-reform-government-response.pdf para 35 accessed 22 September 2016 
63 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s. 88 (3) 
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asylum matters. Statistics released in 2013 at the height of the backlash against the expanded 
Rule of Law showed 77% of the total judicial reviews lodged were immigration and asylum 
related.66 Such a preponderance of migrants’ rights cases had attracted the ire of the 
immigration service and the wider Executive. As Robert Thomas has commented, ‘epithets 
such as “lacking substance”, “without merit”, and “vexatious” have repeatedly been 
employed by the Home Office to characterise immigration judicial reviews.’67  
 
Using this weight of ‘vexatious’ claims as justification the Coalition also, through section 84 of 
the CJCA,68 compelled judges to refuse permission for judicial review in circumstances where 
the conduct of the public authority was unlawful, but it is considered that had the public 
authority behaved lawfully the outcome would have been ‘highly likely’ to have been the 
same. Thus judicial review’s capacity to act as a means for securing damages, censure and 
thus discipline public bodies were further reduced. 
 
The most contentious aspect of this drive to curtail the legal framework for cause litigation 
and diminish the influence of the rule of law in immigration, though, has been the ongoing 
drive to repeal the Human Rights Act. This was a manifesto pledge of the Conservatives in the 
2010 election but was blocked by the Liberal Democrats once the Coalition had formed.69 
Nevertheless, sections of Conservative government, most prominently Theresa May the then 
Home Secretary and now Prime Minister and Chris Grayling the then Justice Secretary, 
continued to agitate for its repeal and towards the end of the Parliament, in November 2014, 
a Conservative party paper was published which set out concrete proposals.70 Amongst many 
other aspects of concern to cause litigators, this document contained provisions that would 
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have likely led to the UK having to withdraw or be expelled from the ECtHR and contained 
specific curtailment of the roles of articles 3 and 8 ECHR in immigration policy and 
procedure.71 On achieving a majority in the 2015 general election, the new Conservative 
government announced the intention to progress the repeal of the HRA within its first 
hundred days in office.72 However since that announcement the timetable continued to slip, 
as a series of obstacles created more difficulties than it appears were bargained for when the 
pledge was made.73 The difficulties the current government have had in delivering what was 
a clear and long-standing manifesto commitment are an important issue which will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. For now it is enough to note that since the 
coming into power of the Coalition government of 2010, the prospect of revocation of the 
HRA has been hanging over cause litigators and since 2015 has become a viable possibility.  
 
While these general steps were of particular importance to cause litigation, a number of 
specifically anti-cause litigation steps were also pursued. Chapter 5 has already demonstrated 
that substantial steps were taken to curtail the influence of Article 8 ECHR in judicial decision 
making. However, in addition to these moves, s.15 of the Immigration Act 2014 withdrew a 
wide range of appeal rights in their entirety, leaving only appeals on the grounds that removal 
would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and/or the 
2004 EU Qualification Directive, or be unlawful under the HRA. 
 
Moreover, s.17(3) of the Act gave the Secretary of State the power to issue a certificate in 
cases where an individual has sought to make a human rights appeal against a deportation 
order (as was previously discussed in chapter 5, effectively the only ground of appeal open to 
most deportees) which would compel them to pursue their appeal from outside the country. 
This has been referred to as a ‘deport first, appeal second’74 provision. Cause litigators report 
that while the power to certificate such cases is permissive rather than mandatory, 
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immigration service caseworkers effectively apply it in every available case.75 In addition, the 
recent Immigration Act 2016 contains provisions to extend this power to all human rights 
appeals where the Secretary of State considers that the person would not face a real risk of 
serious irreversible harm.76  
 
In combination with the legal aid provisions discussed above, and even without the potential 
reintroduction of a residence test, these moves mean that migrants seeking to regularise their 
status face a concerted range of obstacles to them doing so. Firstly, they will be compelled to 
rely on human rights arguments in their appeals (as all other arguments have been withdrawn 
from them) and in effect for most people this will mean reliance on Article 8. Secondly, 
consideration of Article 8 has been significantly undermined through the legislative and rules 
changes discussed in chapter 5. Thirdly, in any case such a person is highly likely to go 
unrepresented, given the lack of legal aid funding for such cases; and fourthly, in deportation 
cases at the present time, and shortly all other immigration cases, appeals arising from such 
applications will likely be conducted with the claimant already in their country of origin rather 
than the courtroom. The likely scenario will therefore be a ‘highly adversarial’77 Tribunal 
hearing before an Immigration Judge where the Immigration Service is represented and the 
Appellant is neither represented nor present.  
 
When interviewed, an experienced cause litigation barrister described this scenario as one in 
which ‘the Secretary of State has a free run at the appeal’,78 but it is a scenario that has been 
challenged by cause litigators and found by the Court of Appeal in Kiarie [2015] to be lawful 
in the generality of cases.79 Despite the judicial approach documented in chapter 4 of tending 
to defend their territory against encroachment from the executive when issues of justice are 
concerned, when asked to deal with this scenario of foreign national offenders relying on 
Article 8 to appeal a deportation order, the justices went out of their way to characterise the 
practical business of an out of country appeal in a manner that did not reflect cause litigators’ 
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experience80 and placed huge reliance on the effectiveness of ‘the specialist immigration 
judges within the tribunal system’ to act as a backstop for any problems that might arise.81    
 
iii) Conclusion 
 
In response to cause litigation’s role in the UK’s immigration politics, then, a series of 
restrictive measures have been introduced directed at the resources and legal framework 
that cause litigation relies on. To understand the full consequences for cause litigation and its 
role in protecting and defending migrants’ rights in the UK’s immigration politics of this 
backlash, it is necessary to first analyse how this backlash was delivered, as this will help 
explain the nature, if any, of the constraints that the executive was operating under.  
 
How the Rule of Law in Immigration was diminished: Liberal Universalism and the Control 
Imperative 
‘Human rights has become a code word for foreigners interfering in our legal affairs.’82 
This section will show that this backlash was intended to appeal to a core of factors, including 
the politics of austerity and anti-Europeanism, which had coalesced into a reassertion of a 
nationalist, sovereignty-based political framework around immigration. The expansion of the 
rule of law into a thicker, internationalist and universal rights-based framework, which cause 
litigation depends on, was associated with a wider project of liberal economics and social 
cosmopolitanism which were collectively treated as being responsible for the threats and 
peril which, as was discussed in chapter three, dominate the UK’s immigration discursive 
opportunity structures. They were contrasted by the executive with a more traditional ‘thin’ 
notion of the rule of law, which had applied during the prolonged period of executive 
dominance of immigration and ‘zero-migration’ policies of the second half of the 20th Century. 
A thinner rule of law would undermine cause litigation, facilitate the control imperative and 
was thus treated as the only legitimate form for the UK context.  
 
                                                          
80 Ibid para 66 
81 Ibid para 65 
82 Migrants’ Rights Consultant Interview 27th August 2013 
191 
 
i) Obstacles to the Backlash 
 
Before examining the executive’s rhetorical strategy in detail two important factors should 
be noted. The first is to reiterate the point, discussed in chapters 2 and 3, that politicised 
litigation in other contexts has been shown to be vulnerable to backlash when it is engaged 
in in isolation from mainstream activism and a viable public engagement with significant 
political purchase. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have shown that cause litigation for migrants’ rights in 
the UK does largely suffer from this handicap. This lack of a significant mainstream 
constituency in support of migrants’ rights leads to the second key point to note. This is that 
the control-orientated backlash that was instituted was able to proceed with little or no 
Parliamentary opposition. As was discussed in chapter 5, the curtailment of access to Article 
8 was supported by the Labour party with the only formal criticisms being that the steps taken 
did not go far enough. The withdrawal of appeal rights were opposed by the Labour party in 
the Commons but passed easily with the support of the Liberal Democrats, the junior partner 
in the Coalition.83 Regarding the legal aid cuts, Thomas has commented that,  
 
‘a notable feature of LASPO was the almost total lack of Parliamentary opposition… 
the withdrawal of immigration legal aid was barely mentioned in the Commons… An 
amendment to retain immigration within scope was defeated in the Lords.84 
 
It is indicative, though, that the curtailment of access to Judicial Review was met with some 
opposition in the House of Lords. The duty on the court to compel interveners to pay the 
government’s costs, as described above in relation to what was to become section 87 of the 
CJCA, was watered down to only apply in more limited circumstances.85 Even more 
significantly, the most successful act of opposition to the backlash came from the judges. 
Stronger restrictions on the rules of standing in judicial review, which would have drastically 
curtailed NGO’s ability to bring strategic litigation, had been initially proposed by the 
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executive86 but were opposed by the judiciary in an unusually strongly worded public 
submission to the consultation on the Bill. This was done through reliance on the rule of law, 
with the judges stating, amongst other things, that,  
‘Any consideration of a new test of standing must address head‐on the effect this may 
have on the rule of law. The consultation paper fails to do so.’87  
Following this intervention the proposal was dropped from the bill. With regard to the 
specifically immigration-orientated restrictions, despite not ultimately being pushed to a 
vote, the curtailment of immigration appeal rights received the strongest of what little 
parliamentary opposition there was, and this was done again in rule of law terms. Opposition 
MPs pushing for the retention of appeal rights cited the Wilson Committee’s 1967 report on 
administrative justice, which stated that it was 
 
“fundamentally wrong and inconsistent with the rule of law that power to take 
decisions affecting a man’s whole future should be vested in officers of the executive, 
from whose findings there is no appeal.”88 
What parliamentary opposition to the backlash there was was couched in rule of law terms, 
with the more overt the clash the stronger the resistance. The executive therefore had to 
construct an approach that would meet the imperative for a reassertion of control in 
immigration by undermining cause litigation, while at the same time being seen to preserve 
an acceptable conception of the rule of law. 
 
ii) The Forces in Immigration Policy: Universalism versus Nationalism  
 
As was discussed in detail in chapter 2, analysts of liberal states’ responses to immigration 
have raised various explanations for the competing influences that govern the policy 
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approaches adopted.89 Joppke in particular has addressed the UK directly, and writing in the 
late 1990s found a state that, ‘has displayed an exceptionally strong hand in immigration 
policy.’90 Joppke argued that the UK, ‘stands out as the Western world's foremost ‘would‐be 
zero immigration country’ displaying an exceptionally strong and unrelenting hand in bringing 
immigration down to the ‘inescapable minimum’.91 This strength, Joppke argued, derived 
from a political consensus on immigration rooted in race-based nationalism. In the UK case, 
Joppke identified a situation in which a nationalist frame of executive conduct and 
governmental policy was in competition almost solely with universalist legal norms that this 
thesis has shown cause litigation relies on, and that it was consistently winning out in that 
contest. As a result, immigration policy could be conducted on the basis that, ‘immigration is 
considered a non‐recurrent, historically unique event whose consequences are not yet fully 
mastered, and which is unlikely to be repeated in the future.’92 
 
Hampshire’s more recent analysis of this field came to some similar conclusions regarding the 
importance of liberal universalism as a counterweight to the dominance of nationalist policy 
framing, albeit based on general norms of which specific legal rules are an important but still 
only a constituent part.93 For Hampshire, these factors are more expressly balanced against 
each other, theoretically in a permanent and irresolvable competition, in contrast to Joppke’s 
approach of assuming a nationalist framework and then applying a (on his argument very 
weak) legal universalist counterweight.  
 
Yet, however the relationship between these two forces is specifically conceptualised, around 
the time of Joppke’s publication a set of both legal and wider policy changes were being 
instituted that would run counter to his assessment. Immigration policy would in a number 
of respects be opened up and legal universalism would be expanded through the thickening 
of the rule of law. This was itself part of a project combining liberal economics, social 
cosmopolitanism and a universalist rights framework. It is this thickening that was then taken 
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up and activated by the cause litigators. This could be thought of as an experiment, then, in 
introducing a universalist framework to the UK’s immigration politics. These changes have 
come to be particularly associated with the New Labour government. This is ultimately 
because of the effect they had on New Labour’s political philosophy and its economic policies 
while in government. 
 
As was discussed earlier in this chapter and in chapter 3, New Labour’s philosophy and 
economic policies were centred around notions of ‘modernisation’ which sought to 
differentiate themselves from previous Labour administrations through adherence to 
neoliberal economics.94 Employment ‘flexibility’ was encouraged, 95 making, as Anderson has 
noted, certain rights more contingent on economic performance than citizenship or belonging 
to the national “us”.96 At the same time, low and high skilled migration was encouraged, 
particularly through the decision not to impose transitional controls on A8 migrants from 
eastern Europe.97 These reforms are frequently characterised solely in terms of New Labour’s 
neo-liberalism and adoption of neoliberal globalisation.98 Yet, they must also be understood 
in social cosmopolitan terms. Economic liberalisation was combined with a rejection of race-
based nationalism of the previous Conservative administration. In this sense they sought to 
appeal to ‘the middle-class, socially liberal and Southern voters’ who occupied crucial 
marginal constituencies, while banking on the continued support of Labour’s electoral base 
in the rapidly de-industrialised North, Wales and Scotland. As Consterdine and Hampshire 
have noted,  
 
‘economistic reasoning was reinforced by a secondary aspect of the Third Way, its 
cosmopolitan pluralism, which was part of New Labour’s wider project of fostering a 
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progressive interpretation of British identity based on ideas of tolerance, openness 
and internationalism.’99  
 
In this sense, the decision to allow greater migration from the new EU member states formed 
part of a wider policy of closer engagement with the European project, in contrast to the 
highly contentious relationship the previous Conservative administration had developed with 
the EU.100  
 
To this socially cosmopolitan pro-Europeanism and the liberalisation of economic and 
migration policy can be added the rights-based universalist reforms of the Human Rights Act 
and the expansion of legal aid which as was shown in chapters 3, 4 and 5, began to take their 
effect in the same period. While the New Labour project could not generally be described as 
universalist, particularly in relation to their approach to immigration, the inherently 
universalist principles of the human rights framework proved expedient for a political project 
intent on pursuing a centre-left programme while appealing to voters across social, racial and 
class divides.101 Although these reforms were couched in the relatively nationalistic 
communitarian terms of ‘bringing rights home’ and as part of the ‘social exclusion’ agenda, 
they were nevertheless truly universalist in effect. They allowed access to the courts and 
greater legally enforceable rights for migrants than had ever previously been the case. 
 
iii) The Resurgence of Nationalism and the Demand for Control 
 
However, as chapter 3 recorded, these policies were introduced against a historic policy and 
discursive backdrop heavily informed by a nationalist frame, with significant hostility to 
immigration amongst large sections of the British electorate and no significant history of 
commitment to rights-based, judicialised politics. The collapse brought about by the Banking 
crisis of 2007-8 spurred a resurgence in nationalist and anti-migration sentiment.102 This was 
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particularly the case amongst working class, traditional Labour, voters for many of whom the 
universalist liberalisation and cosmopolitanisation of British economic and social life had not 
brought the benefits that the Labour government had claimed the country would enjoy.103 
While the middle-class socially liberal and southern voters that had become synonymous with 
New Labour, including, as was noted above, a legal profession and human rights lawyers, had 
obtained security despite, and in some cases because of, the rejection of traditional 
nationalism, as Goodwin and Ford noted, many traditional working class voters,  
 
‘saw the influx of ‘foreigners’ as threatening their jobs, wages, identity, the cohesion 
of their local communities, and the nation at large.’104  
 
This talk of security and of threats is, of course, at the heart of the political imperative for the 
demonstration of control that has been discussed throughout this thesis. The coincidence of 
policies that were perceived by large portions of the electorate to have increased economic 
and social precariousness had led to an identification of this policy programme as being 
largely responsible for the threats that needed to be controlled, and a failure of the executive 
to perform its proper function of providing this security.  
 
While New Labour’s pro-economic migration position derived from a combination of 
economic priorities and social cosmopolitanism, towards the end of their time in power this 
growing resurgence of nationalist influence on policy was already being recognised. Gordon 
Brown famously declared himself in favour of ‘British jobs for British Workers’, a phrase 
borrowed directly from the far-right nativist rhetoric of the BNP.105 A line of policy thinking 
began to gain traction, led by figures such as Maurice Glasman and John Cruddas and known 
as Blue Labour, which emphasised a more rooted, community-based, socially traditional and 
ultimately nationalist policy perspective over the individualism and itinerancy identified in the 
migration state and legalised rights model that had previously been pursued.106 Thus by the 
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time of the arrival of the Coalition government with a guiding agenda of austerity, a distinct 
turn against the economic liberalism, social cosmopolitanism and rights-based universalism 
of the previous era had been identified by all the main parties.  
 
This is not to claim that reversion to a nationalist frame was a universal or even hegemonic 
view amongst the UK population. However, it is to argue that a significant nationalist 
tendency had developed within UK society and, equally importantly, that it had considerable 
electoral significance. 
 
iv) Targeting Cause Litigation’s Universalism 
 
In justifying the Coalition and Conservative backlash, elements of cause litigation that were 
broadly accurate, its ideology and the social make up and predominant political inclinations 
of cause litigators, were equated with New Labour’s project of liberal reform and social 
cosmopolitanism, and then held collectively to be the archetype of both what was wrong with 
the previous regime and, crucially, why the electorate’s demands for control were not being 
met.  As will be seen, this rhetorical backlash in particular sought to impose a division of 
legitimacy between the rule of law model of ‘modernising’, rights-based, universalist cause 
litigation, based in what was characterised as the discredited previous regime, and the 
traditional and national, and therefore legitimate, model of the rule of law that favoured a 
minimalist role for the judiciary in immigration policy and control matters. All sides in the 
dispute around cause litigation presented themselves as in favour of the rule of law and as a 
result it became a malleable symbol of unquestionable social good. The contest then became 
focussed on what considerations fell inside and outside of its parameters.  
 
At one level this involved questioning the legitimacy of the practical functions of the rule of 
law in the immigration context. The exercise of lawfully granted appeal rights and access to 
judicial review were characterised as ‘abusing the system’. The then Home Secretary, Theresa 
May, announced to Parliament that, ‘By limiting the grounds for appeal to four—only those 
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that engage fundamental rights—we will cut that abuse’,107 having previously claimed to the 
Conservative party conference that the appeal system, 
 
‘is like a never-ending game of snakes and ladders, with almost 70,000 appeals heard 
every year.  The winners are foreign criminals and immigration lawyers – while the 
losers are the victims of these crimes and the public.’108  
 
The emphasis on ‘fundamental rights’ indicates another aspect of this process, whereby a 
rhetorical division was created between what were considered to be ‘real rights’ and 
‘abusive’109 or ‘so-called rights’.110 To this end David Cameron claimed that ‘the good name 
of ‘human rights’ has sometimes become distorted and devalued. It falls to us in this 
generation to restore the reputation of those rights.’111 Article 8 ECHR rights have been 
particularly vulnerable to this technique. In the run up to the 2015 election, for example, 
David Cameron promised that ‘We will extend our new policy of deport first, appeal later to 
cover all immigration appeals where a so-called right to family life is invoked.’112 
 
These ‘so-called’ rights were then directly identified with the previous regime, through the 
repeated identification of ‘New Labour’s Human Rights Act’, as being responsible for blocking 
the executive’s control efforts. This was a trope routinely used in conservative media 
outlets,113 while Grayling, for example, asserted,  
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‘We will repeal Labour’s Human Rights Act. In its place we will be bringing forward a 
British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. Because we believe the two go firmly 
together. It’s not good enough to announce ‘I know my rights’ if you aren’t prepared 
to accept that you have responsibilities to society and your fellow citizens as well.114 
 
In this way, rights-based migrants’ appeals were conflated with New Labour, rendering both 
contrary to British traditions, spurious and responsible for society’s current problems.  
 
Following this, the point was driven home through invoking a notion of lawyers as having 
profiteered off the lack of control in immigration. May’s comment, above, regarding ‘lawyers 
and foreign criminals’ being the only people that benefitted from the appeals system was one 
such instance, while others included the then Lord Chancellor Grayling’s complaint about 
‘lawyers who make money out of creating opportunities to attack government, Parliament 
and the decisions they make’115 and the Justice Minister Dominic Raab’s reference to human 
rights laws as ‘an industry or bandwagon for lawyers.’116 It is here that a notion that a class of 
moneyed social cosmopolitans have directly benefitted from instituting the threats that ‘the 
public’ and ‘ordinary people’ suffer from was developed. In some instances, this was taken to 
the point of conflating ‘New Labour’ and cause litigators, through an assumed alliance of 
common interests, with Grayling publishing the complaint that,  
 
The professional campaigners of Britain are growing in number, taking over charities, 
dominating BBC programmes and swarming around Westminster… There is a steady flow 
of people taking up such jobs from the world of politics – former advisers and politicians 
joining the ranks of these serial campaigners… The traffic also goes in the opposite 
direction, with campaigners lining up to try to become Labour MPs… One essential part 
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of the campaigner’s armoury is the judicial review, through which it is possible for them 
to challenge decisions of government and public bodies in the courts. 117 
 
These directly politicised attacks also merged with an appeal to the need to revert to an older, 
‘traditional’, political culture with regard to legalised rights and immigration control. In doing 
so, the present, discussed as chaotic and threatening, was contrasted with an idealised past 
of properly functioning institutions and effective immigration control. In particular, legitimacy 
for the role of the rule of law was linked directly to the extent to which it could be associated 
with a particular political tradition; the tradition of minimal state intrusion and the protection 
of property rights and civil liberties. Raab, as Justice Minister, was most overt about this 
principle when repeatedly invoking,  
 
‘this country’s liberal tradition of freedom and its approach to human rights, which is 
founded in Magna Carta and in the thinking of great British philosophers from John 
Locke and John Stuart Mill through to Isaiah Berlin.’118  
 
However similar, less theoretically literate, points were made by Cameron, who invoked the 
importance of rights ‘rooted in our values’.119 This critique included direct attacks on cause 
litigators, as mentioned above, but also encompassed judges, who were accused of ‘activism’ 
and of actively undermining the rule of law120 when their judgments and the rights they 
applied could be construed as falling outside of the boundaries of this tradition.  
 
This traditionalist rhetorical backlash against cause litigation’s universalism and social 
cosmopolitanism was further imbued with a heavy emphasis on nationalism. The most overt 
example of this being the proposal to replace the Human Rights Act with ‘a British Bill of 
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Rights’.121 The nationalisation of the rights involved in cause litigation indicates a conscious 
attempt to paint the rights available through the Human Rights Act as foreign, or specifically 
European, and as therefore distinct from the legitimate tradition of the rule of law in the UK. 
David Cameron emphasised this nationalisation when stating that ‘this country will have a 
new British Bill of Rights to be passed in our Parliament, rooted in our values.’122  
 
The migrants’ rights cause litigation case of Ullah, discussed in Chapter 5, played a crucial role 
here, as a result of the principle that Lord Bingham enunciated in it regarding British courts’ 
duties under section 2 of the HRA to ‘take into account’ the Strasbourg caselaw. Bingham’s 
interpretation of what ‘take into account’ required was that ‘courts should, in the absence of 
some special circumstances, follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
court’ and that ‘The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less.’123  This strong adherence to Strasbourg 
authority has proved highly controversial amongst academic124 and judicial commentators125 
while in political debate, particularly during the backlash period, it was reduced to the notion 
of a ‘threat to British democracy by the human rights bandwagon’126 and British courts being 
subservient to ‘foreign judges’. During the backlash foreign migrants’ and ‘foreign’ judges, 
then, were associated together as joint threats to the nationalist model of control being 
promoted. At the time of writing the future of this British Bill of Rights continues to be up in 
the air.127 Nevertheless, its totemic presence in Conservative discourse during this period 
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served as a catch-all response to the various interconnecting strands of concern discussed in 
this section. 
 
As the same time as instituting a backlash that would diminish the capacity of the rule of law 
to function as a check against executive power through cause litigation, though, the executive 
needed to continue to express commitment to principles of the rule of law and of human 
rights, which were assessed to be indispensable. David Cameron repeatedly invoked the rule 
of law as a key part of his campaign to promote ‘British values’, describing it as, ‘as British as 
the Union Flag, as football, as fish and chips.’128 Theresa May did similarly, describing, ‘our 
shared values, such as democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect.‘129 
Lord Chancellor Grayling was most overt of all on this point when defending the judicial 
review provisions in the Commons, 
 
As Lord Chancellor I take my responsibility to uphold the rule of law very seriously, but 
I do not believe that the way in which it has evolved in relation to the current use of 
judicial review is consistent with or necessary to uphold the rule of law.130 
The solution that was reached was described by one interviewee for this thesis  as ‘a 
permanent war with the human rights defenders.’131 However, it can perhaps be better 
explained as a project of cultural politics which, in Nash’s sense as was discussed in chapter 
2, involves ‘challenges to power relations’132 in which ‘accepted norms and meanings are 
challenged and new articulations of interests and identities instituted in their place.’133 This 
process can involve the contestation over notions of legitimacy, and involves processes of 
‘symbolisation’ in which concepts and foundational myths within a political society, such as 
‘the rule of law’ or ‘human rights’,134 and indeed social groups such as ‘ordinary people’, the 
‘British public’ and even ‘lawyers’, can be ascribed a meaning the definition of which is 
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contestable and contested through rhetoric, including around the nature and extent of any 
notions of legitimacy that might be attached to them.  
 
v) Conclusion 
 
In the present case, the executive’s rhetoric was focussed on demarcating a legitimate 
definition of the rule of law and notions of rights and their role in immigration control. This 
definition was based around a claimed national tradition of classical liberalism. At the same 
time, this legitimacy was contrasted with a class of ‘lawyers’ and a wider ‘human rights 
industry’ symbolised as essentially trivial, rootless and profiteering off an illegitimate and 
failed New Labour experiment in cosmopolitan reform to the rule of law and to wider British 
society. This was an experiment that was ultimately held responsible for the threats and sense 
of peril that sat at the heart of the public imperative for control of migration. Thus, it was 
through appealing to and appeasing the public element of the political opportunity structure 
that cause litigators confront, the control imperative, that the executive was able to secure 
the roll back of the resources and legal framework that sustain cause litigation. 
 
The Consequences for Cause Litigation as a Tool for Protecting Migrants’ Rights 
“I do think it’s a problem that we end up so dependent on litigation because we are so 
unable to win the argument.”135 
The backlash targeted cause litigation by seeking to undermine its resources, primarily in the 
sense of finance through the legal aid system, and the legal and judicial framework that 
sustains it. It made the pursuit of judicial review and strategic litigation as set out in chapter 
4 more difficult, more risky and less effective while at the same time diminishing day-to-day 
cause lawyering through curtailing appeal rights and, as was set out in chapter five, reducing 
the influence of Article 8. While the previous section has clearly set out that this was the 
intent, the extent to which it has been effective must be examined. Despite the compelling 
nature of the control imperative’s demand for action to be taken in this way, the previous 
section also noted that the executive did not have an entirely free hand in this area. How the 
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constraints that existed impacted on the practical effects and the broader consequences of 
the backlash will explain much about where cause litigation has been left and what the future 
may hold for its role in defending and promoting migrants’ rights.  
 
Taking the practical effects first, it is perhaps too early to get a defined picture of the extent 
of the backlash’s impact, although research efforts are being made to chart this.136 That said, 
the most overt and fundamental issue has been the reduction in legal aid availability. The cuts 
to financial resources led to reductions in the availability of the other key resource for cause 
litigation; committed cause lawyers able to engage in long-term representation work. As has 
already been noted, the early days of the coalition government saw the collapse of the two 
leading national cause litigation charities, the RLC and the IAS. While this happened prior to 
LASPO coming into effect, their collapse was precipitated by the announcement that 
immigration would be removed from legal aid scope.137 Their demise was followed by the 
closure of one of the leading cause litigation barristers chambers, Tooks Chambers, in 2013 
citing ‘devastating legal aid cuts’,138 and over the course of three years following the coming 
into force of the LASPO cuts, 11 law centres closed down.139 This has left only 44 law centres 
across the country, of which 20 are in Greater London.140 As one funder of cause litigation 
noted, ‘’I think the sector’s in shock and everybody’s head are down.’141 
 
Law centres and private cause litigation firms are also reported as having to ‘turn people away 
who they would have previously been able to help’ while the Law Centres Network state that, 
‘On average, centres are taking on only one in four of the cases they would have conducted 
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in the past’ across all areas of law.142 This has been put down to a combination of the removal 
of classes of case, particularly non-asylum regularisation cases, from legal aid provision all 
together and the withdrawal of appeal rights. The lack of alternative sources of income for 
not-for-profit organisations such as law centres and the mixed-economy business models of 
private cause litigation firms have meant it has not been possible to maintain the levels of 
cause litigation casework at previous levels.143 Some cause litigators have predicted that the 
removal of appeal rights and their replacement with ‘administrative review’ will simply 
generate significantly more judicial reviews of poor administrative review decisions.144 It is 
too early to tell definitively whether or not this has occurred, but recent figures show an 
increase in immigration-related judicial reviews from just over 13,000 in 2013, to over 20,000 
in 2015/16.145 Even if a permanent increase in judicial review did occur, it is unlikely that it 
would fully compensate for the loss of appeal rights, both in quantities of cases and in 
practical outcomes, as such reviews would not ordinarily be empowered to reach decisions 
on the underlying merits of the case. Moreover, as has already been discussed in this and the 
previous chapter, cause litigators report that the ‘deport first appeal later’ provisions, in 
combination with the roll-back of article 8 protections, have rendered what appeals that 
remain extremely difficult to win. 
 
Turning to the broader implications for cause litigation’s future, interviewees repeatedly 
expressed serious concern about the impact of the specific measures that have been 
introduced and also the implications of the manner in which this was done. An NGO officer, 
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for example, noted that her organisation was concerned that they would need a more 
effective communication strategy around their cause litigation work as,  
 
‘there’s a really negative attitude towards lawyers and barristers and so [the case 
causes] might get caught up in those issues and the focus I think taken away from what 
[the cases] actually mean for claimants.’146  
 
Another officer at a different NGO expressed concern that, 
 
I think you’re going to see a reduced pool of specialist public lawyers which will result 
in more in less good quality claims being brought and that will ultimately have a knock 
on effect on the organisations that those lawyers work with.147 
 
Clearly, then, the sector itself has worries for the future of cause litigation. It should be noted, 
though, that such concerns and lamenting declines in funding and capacity are something of 
a recurring theme across the scholarship on lawyering for migrants’ rights in the UK.148 It 
appears that at any given time a state of crisis and embattlement has existed yet, as this thesis 
has set out, cause litigation has survived and developed over time. In its various forms it 
appears to be durable, and the backlash that has been instigated need not be terminal.  
 
This is because, as was demonstrated in the previous section, cause litigation is insulated from 
backlash, to an extent, by its association with the notion of the rule of law, a norm of 
apparently universal legitimacy and importance in the UK’s political system, although far from 
universally accepted definition. The few successful parliamentary obstacles to the restrictive 
legislation, for example in relation to judicial review, did so on the basis of defending the 
oversight role of the executive by the courts within the rule of law framework.149 Moreover, 
the attempts to justify the backlash, and particularly to repeal the Human Rights Act, were 
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presented in terms of preserving human rights150 and did not go as far as simple repeal of the 
HRA, suggesting instead that a replacement bill of rights would be put in place, albeit one that 
appeared likely to be significantly weighted against migrants’ rights claims.151 For the future 
of cause litigation these concessions may not look promising, but are significant. They would 
seem to indicate a fundamental change in the minimum standards expected of a functioning 
rule of law in the UK.  
 
Demand for a legalised rights charter and a relatively significant capacity for public interest 
litigation could not be entirely surmounted by an appeal to a traditional, nationalist, rule of 
law discourse around liberties, responsibilities and parliamentary sovereignty. Public interest 
litigation, including the kind of NGO-based strategic litigation discussed in chapter 4, was 
defended strongly in the House of Lords, where the constitutional role of the judiciary as a 
check on executive power was discussed at length and taken to include such strategic cases.152 
With regards to the role of legalised rights charters, despite the backlash they in principle 
maintained a relatively strong level of support. Polling data has shown that only 11% of adults 
regarded repeal of the HRA as a governmental priority, while when asked which of the 
enumerated ECHR rights should not be protected under a replacement British Bill of Rights, 
the only issue to receive double-figure support was a ban on the death penalty.153 This would 
appear to indicate that there remains substantial support for the notion of legalised rights 
and even the formulation of rights as they currently exist in the ECHR and brought into UK 
law through the HRA.  
 
A further crucial factor has been the insulation of the HRA  by the devolution arrangements 
which gave the Scottish and Northern Ireland governments a more significant, albeit 
contested, say in any reforms than would normally be the case for Westminster legislation.154 
In this regard it is notable that a commission of inquiry set up under the Coalition Government 
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to examine public demand and ideas around repeal of the HRA and replacement with the 
‘British Bill of Rights’ found a marked geographical and cultural division within the UK. As the 
majority report (in favour of HRA repeal) noted, 
  
‘“the meetings that we had, particularly in Scotland and Wales, produced in general 
very little support for a UK Bill of Rights. Calls for a UK Bill of Rights were generally 
perceived to be emanating from England only and there was little if any criticism of 
the European Court of Human Rights or of the Convention.’155 
 
The appeal of the kind of anti-cosmopolitan nationalism that has been used to justify repeal 
of the HRA although electorally powerful, was limited in its reach to those who felt particularly 
threatened by the cosmopolitan globalism of the previous regime. An alternative form of 
nationalism and diminished concerns regarding control amongst the Scottish electorate in 
particular were used by the SNP since the 2015 election to characterise the nationalist 
justification for repeal of the HRA as a form of English parochialism, and the issue as a whole 
was used as a point of principle around which to differentiate themselves from the 
Westminster Conservative government.156 The UK’s recent Brexit vote, as mentioned in the 
introduction chapter to this thesis, appears to have added to these difficulties and further 
complicated the government’s position, although it remains committed to HRA repeal.157 
Whether the defence of the HRA is ultimately successful or whether it is still replaced by a 
BBoR will be of major importance for how the future of cause litigation will develop. A BBoR 
appears highly likely to be offer fewer possibilities than the HRA has done up to this point. 
Yet, this insulating effect of contemporary understandings of what a modern rule of law 
requires seems likely to allow at least some forms of cause litigation for migrants’ rights 
relying on legalised rights charters to continue. 
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In this sense it appears that the backlash has left the elements of cause litigation that deal 
with what could be described as the process of immigration control in a relatively functional 
state. The continued availability of judicial review, and the maintenance of legal aid funding 
for this work, albeit on a more limited basis means that aspects of immigration control 
procedure such as use of immigration detention and the treatment of migrants during 
processing, determination and removal procedures can still be the subject of cause litigation. 
In addition, the defence of the rules of standing mean that this ‘process’ work may continue 
to be possible on both a strategic and non-strategic basis. As chapter 4 demonstrated, this 
work is not insignificant, it secures some practical and procedural changes that would not 
otherwise have been granted by the immigration service and the executive. However, these 
changes are diminished through executive absorption and evasion of judgments.  
 
Strategic litigation is also to a significant extent reliant on the continued work of non-strategic 
day to day cause lawyering, the long term capacity and quality of which has been placed under 
considerable strain by the backlash. The point where this strain has been particularly felt is in 
relation to individual casework, particularly regularisation as was seen in chapter 5 but also 
the broader fundamental issue of the granting and refusing of legal status in the UK. In 
contrast to the process aspects discussed above, this could be viewed as the outcomes of 
immigration control. The roll back of appeal rights, both in terms of their straightforward 
removal and in their undermining through out-of-country appeal certification, occurred in 
conjunction with the diminishment of Article 8 that was discussed in the previous chapter. To 
these moves must be added the major increases in appeal fees that at the time of writing are 
due to come into effect. In combination, this package of measures represents a major roll 
back of the function of the independent tribunal system.  
 
This is a system that, as was discussed in chapter 3, was first instituted in the 1971 Act, 
subsequently expanded to include asylum cases in the 1993 Act and which had, over time, 
developed into a significant and assertive independent source of entitlement to remain in the 
UK. As this thesis has documented, having access to an effective alternative source of status 
determination has been crucial in allowing cause litigation to become as influential a force as 
it has been. This is particularly the case given chapters 3 and 4’s findings regarding the 
institutionalised problems of the immigration service’s attitude to applying rights protecting 
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court judgments in the absence of active oversight. The undermining of the tribunal system 
represents a major realignment of the power to determine lawful presence in the UK, away 
from independent determination and towards a reassertion of executive control.  
 
When surveying the state of cause lawyering for migrants’ rights in the UK prior to the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act, Sterett argued that cause lawyers were effectively 
limited to disputes over process and as such had a limited effect on the policy environment 
in which their cause operated.158 This thesis has demonstrated that since that time substantial 
developments have taken place which meant that Sterett’s description was no longer 
accurate. While not as stark as Sterett’s findings, the present backlash appears to be taking 
things back towards that state of affairs. Going forwards, the process of immigration control 
remains disputable, but its outcomes are to be firmly controlled by the executive. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite all its limitations, cause litigation has acted as one of the few major obstacles to the 
executive fulfilling the requirements of the control imperative. Failings in control as a result 
of cause litigation’s obstruction have further increased the pressure on the executive to 
reassert control. The sense of immigration as a crisis has escalated as it has appeared more 
and more to be uncontrollable. This is effectively a feedback effect, whereby the more 
obstructive of control cause litigation is, the greater the imperative for control becomes.  
 
In response to this role, the executive has launched a backlash targeting the resources and 
legal framework that have sustained cause litigation. Cause litigation’s universalism and in 
particular its reliance on a thicker notion of the rule of law was used against it. Its liberal 
universalism was construed as trivial, anti-democratic, undermining of the traditional, and 
therefore legitimate, rule of law and even as responsible for the threats and precariousness 
that permeates contemporary discourse around immigration and inspires the public pressure 
for control. Cause litigation and its practitioners were identified as symbolic of an at-best 
foolish and at-worst dangerous experimental era in British political culture and the history of 
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immigration policy, when universalist rights-based individualism was promoted and the rule 
of law’s function within the immigration control system was expanded. This thicker notion of 
the role of the rule of law was to be replaced with what was characterised as a nationalist 
tradition based around liberty and responsibility, with minimal judicial interference in the 
executive’s exercising of its democratically authorised immigration control functions. 
 
Rather than Joppke and Hampshire’s notions of nationalist and universalist frames in 
permanent tension with each other, then, this chapter and the thesis as a whole has 
demonstrated a process whereby an experiment in aggressive promotion and activation of 
those universalist liberal norms through cause litigation produced a period in which they were 
to a significant extent elevated above their nationalist competitors. The result has been a 
counter-mobilisation and aggressive reassertion of the nationalist frame, leaving it in the 
ascendency over universalism and the rule of law in immigration. The result has been a series 
of measures which have substantially reduced the scope of cause litigation’s capacity itself to 
act as a protective force for migrants’ rights within the UK’s immigration control procedures. 
In particular, there has been a major realignment of powers to grant and refuse lawful status 
in the UK – the path away from other risks to migrants’ rights – from the immigration judiciary 
and the cause litigators, back to the executive. However, the limits placed on the backlash’s 
reach have indicated that the malleable nature of the rule of law as a norm now requires the 
availability of some form of legalised rights charter and the capacity for public interest and 
strategic litigation cases to be brought. The insulation provided by the residual respect for 
this conception of the rule of law within the UK’s constitutional framework has meant that 
cause litigation is likely to survive the backlash, albeit in a reduced form focussing on 
processes of immigration control rather than substantive outcomes. 
212 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined what happens when immigration and migrants’ rights questions are 
litigated for political purposes by migrants’ rights activists in the UK. The thesis’ key findings 
and their implications both for migrants’ rights and for cause litigation itself will be discussed 
in this concluding chapter. 
The thesis sought to make a contribution to the understanding of immigration policy, politics 
and migrants’ rights in the UK firstly by rooting its analysis in the practical realities of 
politicised litigation and the policy responses of the executive. As such it has attempted to 
provide a clearer, more current and more analytical picture of the actors involved in the UK’s 
contemporary migrants’ rights debate than has otherwise been available in the scholarly 
literature. As will be discussed below, this has produced findings regarding the strengths and 
limits of the capacities of migrants’ rights cause litigators along with a characterisation of 
executive practice centred on institutional and political imperative rather than broader 
strategic or theoretical considerations. At the same time, it has sought to show how broader 
debates from constitutional and political theory perspectives play out in practice, through the 
activation and mobilisation of liberal norms such as the rule of law to defend and progress a 
political project which runs contrary to the general drift of democratically established policy. 
In doing so it has shown that while, perhaps counterintuitively, systemic change may be 
possible through this method, this process also produces negative consequences that have 
put the rule of law to the test, particularly as it applies to immigration questions. Conversely, 
while this period of severe pressure on the contemporary notion of the rule of law in the UK 
has weakened and diminished it in many respects, this process has also revealed some 
apparently durable and potentially permanent core aspects from which cause litigation can 
seek insulation and hope for the future.  
There have been numerous discussions about the role that rights and the courts play in 
immigration policy and politics both in the UK and on a more theoretical level regarding liberal 
states generally.1 These studies have a tendency to take judicial interventions in immigration 
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questions as inevitable and are more concerned with either the specifics of the rulings or the 
constitutional or political implications of their existence. However this thesis has found that 
this perspective misses a crucial aspect of the picture. Human Rights and related universalist 
norms such as the rule of law are not a disconnected and a-contextual force that exist within 
a political society independent of the actors involved. They exist in practical implementation, 
whether that be in political adherence by executive policy makers and implementers or, as 
was discussed in this thesis, through contentious and active enforcement by litigation. 
Likewise, litigation and judicial interventions in immigration questions are not themselves 
inevitable or constant forces that can be understood as uniform factors in liberal states’ 
migrants’ rights and immigration politics. Judicial interventions only occur when cases are 
brought to them and judges’ rulings reflect the issues and arguments that are presented to 
them. This thesis has shown that certain types of case are taken, on behalf of certain types of 
migrant and by certain types of litigator. The nature of judges’ interventions are therefore to 
a significant extent, although clearly not exclusively, influenced by the actors that bring those 
cases and the influences and frameworks that those actors operate within.  
The thesis demonstrated a three-fold framework of influences on cause litigation for 
migrants’ rights in the UK, of which the two most crucial for influencing the types of cases 
that end up before the judges were the resources available to the movement and the legal 
framework that governs immigration and migrants’ rights in the UK. As the thesis has shown, 
financial resources and legal framework have both facilitated cause litigation’s development 
and directed it towards focussing on irregular migrants and technical strategic challenges 
against Home Office procedure.  At the same time, the human resources available to cause 
litigation are made up of what Sarat and Scheingold would define as ‘cause lawyers’,2 legal 
professionals working in a politically motivated fashion, and non-legal NGO and charity staff 
and volunteers. As was discussed in chapter 3, this is a crucial and distinctive element of the 
UK’s migrants’ rights movement, where activists dedicated to a common cause of migrants’ 
rights have tended to professionalise in either formally constituted NGOs or through the 
provision of legal services, and this professionalisation has been combined with a relatively 
                                                          
2 Sarat A & Scheingold S (eds), Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, (OUP 
1998) 
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high degree of coordination and cooperation. Between them they constitute a well-
functioning ‘support structure’,3 in Epp’s phrase, for cause litigation to be pursued. 
These cause litigators are seeking to pursue their political and ethical project, the promotion 
and defence of migrants’ rights, through the courts. Some of this work is engaged in purely 
on the basis of a desire to apply professional skill and training to a political or moral position.4 
For others it is a more expressly calculated move to seek alternative ways of promoting a 
deeply unpopular cause without having to depend on traditional forms of political support. 
Critics of cause litigation in the UK, such as Tomkins5 and Morgan,6 have frequently expressed 
variations on the view that litigation for political purposes is a means of seeking policy change 
by evading democratic politics. However, this study has strongly demonstrated that cause 
litigation for migrants’ rights does not and cannot evade such politics. This finding raises 
important questions for cause litigators, who by politicising the theoretically a-political 
practice of client legal representation remove the ‘political immunity’7 that the practice 
traditionally enjoys. 
In relation to this point, the third influencing factor on cause litigation’s outcomes and 
consequences that the thesis identified was the UK’s political opportunity structures in 
immigration policy. These govern both the manner in which the outcomes of cause litigation 
are received and responded to by the executive, and frame the approach the executive 
ultimately takes to cause litigation and cause litigators themselves. The UK’s immigration POS 
is made up of both institutional and discursive aspects. Chapter 3 showed that the 
institutional power relationships between the executive, its administrative agencies and the 
legislature is heavily dominated by the executive.8 It was also shown, as Jennings noted, that 
                                                          
3 Epp C R, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (University 
of Chicago Press 1998) 18/ 
4 Hilbink T, ‘You Know the Type: Categories of Cause Lawyering’ (2004) 29 Law and Social Enquiry: Journal of 
the American Bar Foundation 657 
5 Tomkins A, ‘The Role Of The Courts In The Political Constitution’ (2010) 60 University Of Toronto Law Journal 
4 
6 Morgan J ‘Amateur Operatics: The Realization of Parliamentary Protection of Civil Liberties’ in Campbell T, 
Ewing K & Tomkins A The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (OUP 2011) 452 
7 Sarat A and Scheingold S, The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure And Agency In Legal Practice, (Stanford 
University Press 2005) 3 
8 Consterdine E, ‘One step forward, two steps back: Evaluating the institutions of British immigration 
policymaking’ (Institute for Public Policy Research, 25 Apr 2013) http://www.ippr.org/publications/one-step-
forward-two-steps-back-evaluating-the-institutions-of-british-immigration-policymaking accessed 31st August 
2016 
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this strong centralisation of governmental power subject to only limited opposition within 
parliament means that government is ‘able to intervene directly in bureaucratic activities 
through legislative, executive and administrative controls.’9 These institutional factors give 
the executive significant capacity to deliver rights-affecting measures.  
Most importantly, though, the thesis has shown that the public discursive element of the POS 
is dominated by what has been termed ‘the control imperative’. The control imperative is 
made up of the immigration administration’s need to monopolise decision making authority 
in their field and the political need for the executive to be seen to be in control by the 
electorate. These aspects are obviously interrelated. Gaps or failures in administrative 
delivery can undermine the executive’s appearance of control. Likewise the executive need 
to appear in control can increase pressure on the immigration service to conduct its business 
in an uncompromising manner and can lead to changes in priorities for immigration service 
activities. However, control in this sense is less about a specific immigration policy, or even 
about cutting immigration to the UK necessarily. It is about the location and monopolisation 
of decision making and implementation authority over immigration issues in the executive. 
This imperative conditions the executive’s response to the advancements and protections for 
migrants’ rights secured through both strategic and day to day litigation, encouraging the 
evasion and absorption of judgments where they can be isolated, or a more aggressive and 
overt backlash against the framework that produces such judgments when necessary. 
Moreover, the need to be seen to be in control has ultimately produced an ostentatious 
reassertion of executive authority over cause litigators themselves, in a backlash targeted at 
their capacity to pursue their activities.  
This systemic backlash has resulted from the executive’s need to respond to the permanent 
failures of control that have occurred, both during the UK’s relatively liberalised ‘managed 
migration’ period and subsequently during the more recent period of overt hostility to inward 
migration, and irregular migration in particular. While there are a number of factors that have 
brought these about, including the setting of unrealistic political targets and under-resourced 
implementation, this thesis has demonstrated that cause litigation has been key. Contrary to 
                                                          
9 Jennings, W, ‘Bureaucratic Performance and Control in British Politics: Asylum Policy 1994–2007’ (2010) 12 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 539 540 
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some previous studies of activist litigation on immigration issues,10 this thesis has found that 
in some circumstances cause litigation is capable of bringing about systemic change in 
defence of migrants’ rights. However, what constitutes systemic change for the better for 
migrants’ when secured through cause litigation simultaneously constitutes an unacceptable 
encroachment into its role for the control imperative-dominated executive.  
Notable in this issue is the relative importance of the two constitutive elements of cause 
litigation. Strategic litigation, discussed in chapter 4, as it is most commonly practiced in the 
UK context has tended to have a regulating influence over the technical implementation of 
immigration control procedures and processes. In this sense, as a result of the regularity of 
the litigation being pursued and its specific policy focus, strategic litigation in effect functions 
as another means of negotiation or ‘stake holder engagement’ between the migrants’ rights 
sector and the immigration administration, only one that includes an element of compulsion. 
More significantly, though, the cumulative weight of day to day cause litigation, politicised as 
‘acts of resistance’ as discussed in chapter 5, over time resulted in highly significant change 
through the development and creation of routes to regularisation. This finding is often 
unacknowledged, even within the sector itself, and is perhaps counter-intuitive given the 
considerable prominence strategic litigation has, both within the sector and within academic 
studies of legal mobilisation. However, the long-term impact of day to day cause litigation has 
produced significantly more systemic change than its more overtly political strategic litigation 
counterpart. 
These outcomes taken together produce cause litigation’s role in obstructing and overtly 
undermining the executive’s efforts to fulfil the control imperative. As time and these failures 
by the executive have gone on, they have combined with and reinforced wider economic, 
security and cultural concerns about precariousness to greatly increase the intensity of the 
public demand for control. This has in turn required greater displays of the exercise of control 
by the executive to meet this demand. Such exercises are facilitated by the fact that cause 
litigation is engaged in largely in political isolation, without the support of a wider electorally 
significant constituency or an influential protest movement. Chapter 5 documented steps 
                                                          
10 Kawar L, Contesting Immigration Policy in Court: Legal Activism and its Radiating Effects in the United States 
and France (CUP 2015); Sterett S, ‘Caring about Individual Cases: Immigration Lawyering in Britain’, in Sarat A 
& Scheingold S (eds), Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, (OUP 1998) 
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taken to significantly retrench the developments in the law of regularisation that day to day 
cause litigation has brought about. This was done not just at the level of technical rules 
changes, but as part of an overt public strategy of aggressive engagement with cause litigators 
and immigration judges.  
However, this process has ultimately led to the executive feeling sufficient pressure to take 
actions against cause litigation itself, and there being insufficient parliamentary opposition to 
prevent it. The heyday of managed migration saw human migration as an inevitable 
consequence of contemporary globalised capitalism, and something of potentially significant 
benefit to host societies in primarily economic, but also cultural terms, provided it was 
‘managed’ correctly. There is now a greater scepticism about this perspective, with a 
resurgence of a nationalist frame to the UK’s immigration policy development embodied by 
the view that control is an urgent first order priority which must be established, as the system 
had become ‘out of control’. Cause litigation, and the cause litigators that do it, have been 
caught up in a more general process of a turn against liberal universalism and social 
cosmopolitanism in British political life, which have been identified as the underlying cause of 
the ‘precariousness, instability, lack of protection, insecurity and social and economic 
vulnerability’11 from which the demands for control stem and the reason for why control has 
not been effectively implemented.12 
As a result a backlash against cause litigation was implemented which has seriously 
diminished cause litigation’s capacity to function in the way that it had been previously.13 
Financial resources, appeal rights, access to Tribunals and the effectiveness of judicial review 
have all been targeted. An ongoing threat exists against the Human Rights Act itself, which 
has survived up to now thanks to constitutional difficulties regarding Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, with the recent Brexit vote adding a further complication. These elements that cause 
litigation had relied on were all constituent parts of a ‘thicker’ conception of the rule of law 
than had traditionally been applied to British politics, society and executive conduct. Yet this 
                                                          
11 Anderson B, Us and Them?: The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control (OUP 2013) 81 
12 Goodwin M and Ford R, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain (Routledge 
2014) 
13 Thomas R, ‘Immigration and Access to Justice: A Critical Analysis of Recent Restrictions’ in Palmer E, 
Guinchard A, Cornford T & Marique Y (Eds.) Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics of Austerity (Hart 
2016) 
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thesis has shown that this thick rule of law has been put through a severe test as a result of 
the control imperative, and has come out reduced, ‘thinner’, as a result.  
Of greatest concern to cause litigators is that, as was discussed in chapter 6, the application 
of the rule of law to the executive’s exercising of its immigration control powers has been 
particularly affected. Executive policy appears to be increasingly directed towards the rolling 
back of independent sources of status determination, primarily the Immigration Tribunal. This 
in turn is part of a centralisation of control over the outcomes of immigration processes, the 
issue of whether or not a person is granted lawful status in the UK, in the immigration 
administration. Another overt manifestation of this direction of travel occurred during the 
recent, at the time of writing, debate around whether or not the UK should adopt an 
‘Australian style points based system’ for its post-Brexit immigration regime. This proposition 
was rejected out of hand by the government on the basis that    
“a points based system would give foreign nationals the right to come to Britain if they 
meet certain criteria: an immigration system that works for Britain would ensure that 
the right to decide who come to the country resides with the government.’14 
From the perspective of the rule of law this statement is incoherent, in that any alternative 
immigration rules would be accompanied by a public law duty of fairness to apply the 
published policy and grant immigration status to people who met them, an issue that was 
itself discussed in chapter 4 in relation to the Lumba case. However, it does demonstrate 
another small example of the wider trend this thesis has documented. In pursuit of control 
the executive is seeking not only monopolisation of decision making authority, but also to 
remove the notion of migrants’ baring rights, as migrants, that the state has a duty to meet 
and to diminish the role of the rule of law in regulating grants or refusals of status. One of the 
themes of this thesis has been the gradual introduction and enforcement of the rule of law 
into the executive’s immigration control regime over many years, which cause litigators have 
both contributed to and benefited from. The recent backlash, though, appears designed to 
move things back towards migrants’ lawful status in the UK depending on executive fiat.   
                                                          
14 The Guardian, No 10 rules out points-based immigration system for Britain (5 September 2016) 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/05/no-10-theresa-may-rules-out-points-based-
immigration-system-for-britain-brexit accessed 22 September 2016 
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This concern is born out by chapter 6’s finding that of the two branches of cause litigation, 
the effects of this backlash have been most immediately felt in the day to day cause litigation, 
rather than in strategic work. It is the day to day litigation that is most straightforwardly 
directed towards securing a person’s legal status in the UK, from which protection from other 
rights violations and abuses derives. Strategic litigation, in contrast, has tended to focus on 
regulating the processes and procedures the immigration service uses while making their 
determinations. Another important finding of the thesis has been that the survival of aspects 
of the migrants’ rights protection regime depend to a large extent on how closely associated 
they are with the commonly accepted standard of the rule of law in the contemporary UK. It 
is for this reason that in delivering the backlash against cause litigation the executive sought 
to revise and reinterpret the meaning of the rule of law, rather than repudiate it entirely.  
The control-inspired backlash has put the thicker rule of law to the test, but what has survived 
this test reveals something important for cause litigators and constitutional debate in the UK. 
The attacks on the thicker version of the rule of law that cause litigation embodies and relies 
upon could not be taken as far as might have been considered desirable or necessary from a 
control imperative perspective, because doing so would have fallen outside of contemporary 
perceptions of a legitimate reinterpretation of the rule of law. Relatively assertive judicial 
review and the powers and capacity to pursue public interest litigation were both supported 
by elites who regarded them as fundamental to the rule of law. In historical terms, as this 
thesis has discussed, these are relatively modern developments that now appear to be 
entrenched. Strategic litigation, which particularly depends on these aspects, was therefore 
insulated from the worst of the backlash in a way that its day-to-day counterpart was not. 
Notwithstanding some resistance, particularly the popular support for some form of legalised 
rights charter that again, the, backlash’s test of the thick rule of law revealed, there has been 
far greater willingness to concede to the executive its control over migrants’ status rights.  
Finally, much of this thesis, and indeed this concluding chapter, has given a negative response 
to the central question of what happens when migrants’ rights are litigated in the UK. It would 
be possible to understand this thesis’ findings as showing a fairly unrelenting pattern of 
executive obstruction of cause litigators efforts, of political attacks against them and 
ultimately legislative and policy retrenchment of the advances they have secured. However, 
there is positivity from a migrants’ rights perspective to be found amidst the gloom. The thesis 
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has shown that in terms of practical protections for migrants’ rights, cause litigation is capable 
of bringing about not only simple defence, but actually intermittent progress. While this 
progress has been attacked and retrenched, it has rarely been done away with entirely. In 
assessing cause litigation it is crucial not to consider its role in isolation, but also to 
acknowledge the weakness of migrants’ rights protections outside of the legal arena. With 
this in mind, cause litigation has brought about practical changes both at a technical 
procedural level and at a structural level that are non-negligible, even after the executive has 
implemented its control-inspired responses, and which would not have occurred otherwise. 
Things are unequivocally better for migrants in the UK as a result of cause litigation’s presence 
in the UK’s immigration policy dynamic than if the alternative were the case.  
The backlash that this thesis has charted has eroded many of the advancements that cause 
litigation created and leaves it in a diminished and vulnerable position. The UK’s Brexit vote, 
the full implications of which at the time of writing have not yet become clear, does not bode 
well for the future of the cosmopolitan, rights-based, pro-migrant framework that cause 
litigation depends upon and is a manifestation of. Nevertheless, despite this diminished role 
and the further threats it faces, some core activities have remained. Cause litigation appears 
likely to continue to ‘lift the wire’ of immigration control ‘a little bit at a time’.15
                                                          
15 London Immigration Solicitor 1 Interview, 2nd April 2014 
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